The Lift Line
“Once the police get involved in a civil case, the process is devastatingly fast.” (Abhinav Chandrachud, The Indian Express)
Why This Editorial Matters for Your Exam
In the news: In The Indian Express on 26 October 2026, Abhinav Chandrachud, an advocate at the Bombay High Court, argues that slow civil courts push litigants who are owed money towards the police, where the threat of arrest during a “preliminary inquiry” forces debtors to settle. The writer calls the result “a parallel civil justice delivery mechanism”.
For the law on registering FIRs, see our explainer on FIRs and the BNSS safeguards for public servants; for pendency in the Supreme Court, our editorial on filtering special leave petitions.
UPSC relevance:
- GS Paper 2: functioning of the judiciary; police and criminal justice reform; access to justice.
- GS Paper 4 (link): probity in public institutions; misuse of power by public servants.
- Prelims: cognizable and non-cognizable offences; the FIR and the preliminary inquiry (Lalita Kumari, 2013); Sections 35 and 173 of the BNSS; cheating and criminal breach of trust in the BNS; the judge-population ratio and the Law Commission’s 120th Report.
- Essay: “Justice delayed is justice denied”; the rule of law and its practice.
The Crux in 60 Words
Abhinav Chandrachud argues that India’s slow civil courts push well-connected litigants owed money to the police. By alleging cheating or breach of trust, they turn a debt into a criminal complaint; a summons, a “preliminary inquiry” and threats of arrest then force a quick settlement. The result, the writer says, is a parallel civil justice mechanism that needs structural and cultural reform.
When civil courts are slow, well-connected litigants owed money go to the police alleging cheating or breach of trust, and the threat of arrest during a ‘preliminary inquiry’ forces a settlement: in effect, a parallel civil justice delivery mechanism.
- Too few judges: the writer puts Maharashtra at 15 judges per million people and the Bombay High Court at 1.9, against about 157 in New York state.
- A mere breach of a contract to pay money is neither cheating nor breach of trust, yet the police take up such complaints; the writer reports a rumour of bribes on a ‘commission basis’.
- The police process is fast and coercive: a summons at short notice, hours of waiting and threats to arrest the debtor or the family, so most people settle without an FIR.
- The root cause, the writer argues, is an archaic civil procedure that gives a defendant every chance to delay a decree.
Not every complaint of cheating in a money dispute is false: where dishonest intention exists from the start of the transaction, there is an offence and the police must act. The writer also grants that not all police officers succumb to temptation.
The writer calls for structural and cultural reform of civil justice. Our analysis adds: hold preliminary inquiries to their limited purpose and time limit, use notice instead of arrest, and raise judicial strength towards the Law Commission’s benchmark.
Background and Context
Too few judges, in the writer’s figures
The column opens with capacity: “too much work for too few judges seems to be a big factor”. The writer’s figures are these:
- Maharashtra: 112 million people at the 2011 Census, and 15 judges per million people.
- Bombay High Court: 1.9 judges per million people; 648,725 cases pending, of which 9,454 are civil suits, according to the National Judicial Data Grid (NJDG) as the writer cites it. The column gives no date for the count.
- New York state: about 157 judges per million people.
These are the writer’s numbers. The official yardsticks for the country as a whole are below.
| Measure | Figure | Source |
|---|---|---|
| National judge-population ratio | About 21 judges per million: sanctioned strength in 2024, on the Census 2011 population of 1,210.19 million | Minister of State for Law, reply in the Rajya Sabha (as reported by The News Minute) |
| Law Commission, 120th Report, “Manpower Planning in Judiciary: A Blue Print” (July 1987) | Raise the strength from 10.5 to 50 judges per million, in a phased manner | PIB, Ministry of Law and Justice, 10 December 2002 |
| Supreme Court, All India Judges Association (21 March 2002) | From 13 to 50 judges per 10 lakh people within five years | PIB, 10 December 2002 |
| Ratio reported in December 2002 | 14.7 judges per million | PIB, 10 December 2002 |
The practice the column describes
Elsewhere, the writer notes, litigants in countries like Japan and Venezuela turn to extra-judicial remedies, as the undertaker in Mario Puzo’s The Godfather turns to the mafia don. In India, “affluent and well-connected litigants” who are owed money go to the police and allege that the other side has committed an offence such as cheating or breach of trust. The writer’s account of what follows:
- The complaint. “A person who merely breaches a contract to pay money commits none of these offences.” Yet the police act. The writer says a litigant may offer an officer a cut if the opponent settles, and that “it is rumoured” a branch of the police asks for bribes on a “commission basis” to take up such cases. “Of course, not all police officers succumb to such temptations.”
- The summons. Unlike a civil suit, where a defendant rarely appears in person, the police send a cryptic summons ordering the “accused” debtor to the police station at short notice.
- The “preliminary inquiry”. Hours of waiting, menacing questions and threats to arrest the debtor, the spouse or the family unless the case is settled; then a summons to return the next day.
- The settlement. “In the commercial world, time is money.” Most people settle and no FIR is registered. “According to some accounts, 50 per cent of such cases that come to a police station end at the preliminary inquiry stage.” The fear of arrest, deplorable prison conditions and the risk to reputation do the rest.
The Analysis
The writer’s argument, step by step
- Diagnosis and detour. Too few judges keep civil courts slow, so litigants with access to networks take civil claims to the police, dressed as crimes, where action is fast and the debtor settles.
- The gap. Scholars of “law and society” distinguish the “law on the books” from the “law in action”. Criminalising civil cases “is considered an “abuse of process” that the Supreme Court has repeatedly deprecated and discouraged”, but, in the writer’s words, “The law in action is something else.”
- The root cause. “It would be unfair to blame our understaffed and overworked courts for a system that requires structural and cultural reform.” Civil justice rests on “a bedrock of archaic procedure”: “A defendant in India is given every conceivable opportunity to thwart a plaintiff’s attempts at getting a decree.” The writer quotes the Privy Council as remarking in 1872 that “the difficulties of a litigant in India begin when he has obtained a Decree”, and says this is still true.
What the law on the books says
The column names no ruling or section. The law it alludes to draws clear lines at each stage of the practice it describes.
| Stage | In the writer’s account | What the law says |
|---|---|---|
| Is it a crime at all? | A mere breach of a contract to pay money | The Supreme Court, in Ashok Kumar Jain v. The State of Gujarat (2025 INSC 614, judgment dated 1 May 2025), quoted Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar: “Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction” |
| The preliminary inquiry | Used to press the debtor to settle | Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh (Constitution Bench, 12 November 2013), para 111: an inquiry may be held “only to ascertain whether cognizable offence is disclosed or not”; its scope “is not to verify the veracity or otherwise of the information received”; it should be time-bound and “should not exceed 7 days” |
| The BNSS version | Not discussed | Section 173(3): for an offence “punishable for three years or more but less than seven years”, the officer in charge may, with the prior permission of an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, hold a preliminary enquiry “to ascertain whether there exists a prima facie case for proceeding in the matter within a period of fourteen days” |
| Summons and arrest | A cryptic summons and threats to arrest the debtor or the family | Section 35(3): where arrest is not required, the police “shall” issue a notice to appear. Section 35(5): a person who complies “shall not be arrested ... unless, for reasons to be recorded, the police officer is of the opinion that he ought to be arrested”. For a cognizable offence punishable with up to seven years, arrest without warrant needs the officer to be satisfied that it is necessary, for instance “for proper investigation of the offence”, with reasons recorded in writing (Section 35(1)) |
| If the police refuse an FIR | Not discussed | Section 173(4): the complainant may send the information in writing, by post, to the Superintendent of Police, and, if the Superintendent does not act, apply to the Magistrate |
Two points follow for an answer. First, a preliminary inquiry in a money dispute is not unlawful in itself: Lalita Kumari lists “Commercial offences” among the categories where one may be held. What the law forbids is using it for anything beyond checking whether a cognizable offence is disclosed, or stretching it in time. Second, Lalita Kumari was decided under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 173 of the BNSS is its successor, and it sets fourteen days for the band of offences it covers. In Ashok Kumar Jain, the Court held that “a mere civil dispute has been given the colour of an offence of cheating and criminal breach of trust”, and that continuing the FIR was “an abuse of the process of law”. That is the “abuse of process” the column refers to.
Where the argument is strong, and where it stops
- Strong: it links two institutions that are usually discussed apart, slow courts and police incentives, and shows how one feeds the other. It also refuses to blame overworked judges for a structural problem.
- The evidence is thin in places. The “50 per cent” rests on “some accounts” and the commission-basis bribes on rumour, both in the writer’s own words. The State and New York ratios are not set against the official national series, and the NJDG count carries no date.
- “Merely” carries the argument. A debtor who never meant to pay, and deceived the creditor from the start, may have committed cheating. The law’s test is intention at the beginning of the transaction, so not every such complaint is an abuse.
- The remedy is unnamed. “Structural and cultural reform” is the conclusion, but the column does not say which reform.
Way forward
- Hold the preliminary inquiry to its purpose. Only to see whether a cognizable offence is disclosed, within the time limit, with the prior permission that Section 173(3) requires.
- Notice, not arrest. Enforce Section 35(3) and (5), so that a person who answers a notice is not threatened with arrest without recorded reasons.
- Check abuse in court. The Supreme Court’s test in Ashok Kumar Jain gives courts a clear basis to stop FIRs that dress a civil dispute as cheating or breach of trust.
- Fill the benches. Move the judge-population ratio towards the Law Commission’s 50 per million, with enough judges for original civil suits.
- Make decrees count. Simplify civil procedure and the execution of decrees, the stage the 1872 remark the writer quotes still describes.
Data and Institutions Vault
Prelims-grade facts:
Judges and population:
- About 21 judges per million people in India: sanctioned strength in 2024, Census 2011 population of 1,210.19 million (Minister of State for Law, Rajya Sabha)
- Law Commission, 120th Report, “Manpower Planning in Judiciary: A Blue Print”, July 1987: 50 judges per million, in phases
- Supreme Court, All India Judges Association, 21 March 2002: from 13 to 50 judges per 10 lakh people within five years
The law:
- Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh (Constitution Bench, 12 November 2013): FIR mandatory if the information discloses a cognizable offence
- Lalita Kumari: a preliminary inquiry only checks whether a cognizable offence is disclosed, and should not exceed 7 days
- BNSS Section 173(3): preliminary enquiry, with a DSP’s prior permission, for offences punishable for three years or more but less than seven years; fourteen days
- BNSS Section 173(4): remedy when the police refuse to record: Superintendent of Police, failing which the Magistrate
- BNSS Section 35(3): notice of appearance where arrest is not required
- BNS Section 316: criminal breach of trust, up to five years, or fine, or both
- BNS Section 318: cheating; Section 318(2) up to three years, or fine, or both; Section 318(4), delivery of property, up to seven years and fine
- Ashok Kumar Jain v. The State of Gujarat, 2025 INSC 614: continuing an FIR that gave a civil dispute the colour of cheating was an abuse of the process of law
The traps:
- A preliminary inquiry is permitted for “Commercial offences” (Lalita Kumari, para 111); its limits are purpose and time, not subject
- The “50 per cent” and the commission-basis bribes are the writer’s hearsay, not data
The Debate
| The practice is a serious abuse | Reasons for caution |
|---|---|
| A breach of a contract to pay money is not a crime; police pressure makes a civil claim a criminal threat | Where dishonest intention exists at the start, cheating is a real offence, and a complainant has a right to have it examined |
| The threat of arrest and prison is used to extract settlements without any FIR or record | The safeguards already exist: limits on the inquiry, a DSP’s permission, notice before arrest and the remedy of Section 173(4); the problem is enforcement |
| Only the affluent and well connected can use the police this way, which makes justice unequal | The writer’s figures on how often it happens rest on “some accounts” and rumour |
| Slow civil courts leave creditors with no real remedy, so the pressure will continue until courts are faster | Faster courts need judges and procedural reform over years; police accountability can act now |
How to Think About This
- Civil or criminal? Ask when the dishonest intention arose. At the start of the transaction it can be cheating; a later failure to pay is a civil matter.
- Books versus action. The rules on inquiries, notices and arrest are already written. An answer that only proposes new rules misses the writer’s point about practice.
- Two institutions, one problem. Judicial capacity and police incentives feed each other; reform of one without the other moves the pressure elsewhere.
- Weigh the evidence. Separate official figures from the writer’s anecdotes and estimates, and say which is which.
Diagram-in-Words
From a slow civil court to the police station
The writer’s account of how a money dispute becomes a criminal complaint, set beside what the law requires.
Read the figure from the top down: slow courts push the creditor to the police, and the paired row sets the writer’s “law in action” beside what the law requires at the same stage. The writer’s verdict closes it.
Delay in civil courts pushes some litigants to present money disputes as crimes. Discuss the causes of this practice and the safeguards that criminal procedure provides against it. (250 words)
Criminalising a civil dispute means turning a claim for money, which belongs in a civil court, into a police complaint of cheating or criminal breach of trust. Slow civil justice feeds the practice: on the government’s figures, India had about 21 judges per million people in 2024 (sanctioned strength), against the 50 per million the Law Commission recommended in its 120th Report (1987).
Causes: too few judges and heavy pendency in civil courts; a civil procedure that lets defendants delay a decree; the speed and coercive weight of police action; and the fear of arrest, prison and reputational loss, which pushes debtors to settle. Consequences: the police turn into debt collectors, the poor and unconnected lose equal access to justice, and public faith in the rule of law weakens.
Safeguards: under Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh (2013), registering an FIR is mandatory if the information discloses a cognizable offence; a preliminary inquiry, allowed in categories such as commercial offences, may only ascertain whether a cognizable offence is disclosed and should not exceed 7 days. The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, permits a preliminary enquiry for offences punishable for three years or more but less than seven years only with a Deputy Superintendent of Police’s prior permission, within fourteen days (Section 173(3)), and requires a notice of appearance where arrest is not necessary (Section 35(3)).
The Supreme Court held in 2025 that continuing an FIR which gave a civil dispute the colour of cheating was an abuse of the process of law, reiterating that mere breach of contract is not cheating unless dishonest intention exists at the beginning of the transaction.
The remedy has two halves: faster civil justice through more judges and simpler procedure, and strict policing of the line between civil and criminal law, so that the threat of arrest never becomes a tool for recovering debts.
Interview Angle
"As a district police chief, how would you stop your police stations from being used to recover private debts, without turning away genuine complaints of cheating?"
Takeaway Box
- The argument: slow civil courts drive well-connected creditors to the police, where the threat of arrest forces settlements: a parallel civil justice mechanism.
- The law: a mere breach of contract is not cheating without dishonest intention from the start; a preliminary inquiry may only check whether a cognizable offence is disclosed, within strict time limits.
- The trap: the writer’s frequency estimate and the bribe rumour are hearsay; the government’s figure was about 21 judges per million in 2024 (about 22 in a Rajya Sabha reply reported in January 2026).
- The exam frame: access to justice, police accountability and judicial capacity in one question.
Sources:
- The Indian Express, Abhinav Chandrachud, “Slow courts, swift coercion: When the police replace judges”, 26 October 2026
- Supreme Court of India, Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P., 12 November 2013 (Indian Kanoon)
- Supreme Court of India, Ashok Kumar Jain v. The State of Gujarat, 2025 INSC 614
- The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Gazette of India Extraordinary, 25 December 2023
- The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, Gazette of India Extraordinary, 25 December 2023
- PIB, Ministry of Law and Justice, on the judge-population ratio, 10 December 2002
- The News Minute: “India has 21 judges for every 10 lakh people: Govt in Parliament”
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