The Lift Line

“If we must preserve broad access to the Supreme Court we need to rethink what 38 judges are being asked to do.” (Laveesh Bhandari and Shagun Suryam, The Indian Express, 26 October 2026)

Why This Editorial Matters for Your Exam

In the news: in an Explained piece in The Indian Express on 26 October 2026, Laveesh Bhandari, President and Senior Fellow at the Centre for Social and Economic Progress (CSEP), and Shagun Suryam, a Research Analyst with CSEP, ask whether more judges can clear the Supreme Court’s backlog. Their answer: not without a filter on special leave petitions (SLPs) under Article 136.

For background, the rise in the Court’s sanctioned strength to 38 was reported in our 6 October roundup.

UPSC relevance:

  • GS Paper 2: structure, organisation and functioning of the Judiciary; jurisdiction of the Supreme Court; pendency and judicial reform.
  • Prelims: Articles 32, 124(1), 132 to 134A and 136; the Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Act, 1956 and its 2026 amendment.
  • Essay and Interview: access to justice against an apex court that can settle the law.

The Crux in 60 Words

Adding judges will not clear the Supreme Court’s backlog, Bhandari and Suryam argue, because the cases it accepts keep rising, led by special leave petitions it may choose to hear. Article 136 was meant as a last resort. Their remedy is a well-defined threshold for admission, while admitting the trade-off: a filter would narrow the Court’s idea of justice.

Key Arguments at a Glance

Bhandari and Suryam argue that adding judges will not clear the Supreme Court’s backlog, because the cases it accepts keep rising, led by special leave petitions it may choose to hear; the fix is a well-defined threshold for what reaches the docket.

Supporting
  • The sanctioned strength rose from 34 to 38, including the Chief Justice, with effect from 16 May 2026, yet in 2025 the Court received 75,410 fresh matters and disposed of 65,615.
  • SLPs are the dominant category of filings; the authors cite estimates of around 80 per cent of fresh filings.
  • Article 136 was engineered as a last resort; in 2010 the Court itself warned that it had been ‘converted practically into an ordinary appellate Court’.
  • Other apex courts filter far more aggressively, the authors say, citing the US and UK Supreme Courts.
Counter

A codified filter ‘would also formally narrow the court’s own conception of what justice delivery means’; many SLPs are admitted to correct an individual injustice, and in January 2016 a five-judge Bench declined to restrict the power, preferring to use it ‘with circumspection’.

Way Forward

The authors: build clear filters for the disputes that warrant the Court’s attention, without closing the door to a remedy the framers included. Our analysis: publish admission data first, and let any threshold be framed by the Court itself in reasoned terms.

Background and Context

The backlog and the new strength

Measure Figure Source
Cases pending, 1 January 2026 92,101 Statement of Objects and Reasons, Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment Bill, 2026
Fresh matters instituted in 2025 75,410 same
Cases disposed of in 2025 65,615 same
Cases pending, 1 October 2026 95,019 (up 380 in September, after a fall of 1,079 in August) Supreme Court Observer, from the Court’s data
Figure the authors cite “more than 96,000”, or “about 2,500 cases per judge” the column, citing the National Judicial Data Grid

The Bill’s own explanation is the authors’ starting point: even while working at “near-full sanctioned capacity of 34 Judges since 2019”, the Court recorded more institutions than disposals. The Bill substitutes “thirty-seven” for “thirty-three” in Section 2 of the Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Act, 1956, the number of judges excluding the Chief Justice, so the Court’s strength becomes 38 including the Chief Justice of India. The Bill was brought to replace the Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Amendment Ordinance, 2026, and provides that it “shall be deemed to have come into force on the 16th day of May, 2026”. For context, the Rajya Sabha passed it on 5 August 2026, completing Parliament’s approval. In the authors’ words, “In May this year, the central government increased the top court’s sanctioned strength from 34 to 38 judges”. The Constitution’s own text has not changed: Article 124(1) still names a smaller number “until Parliament by law prescribes a larger number”.

What Article 136 says

Article 136(1) reads: “Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India.” Clause (2) excludes any court or tribunal constituted by or under a law relating to the Armed Forces.

Two features stand out. The power reaches any order of any court or tribunal, not only High Court judgments; and it is discretionary, so a petitioner has no right to be heard, only a right to ask. The framers expected restraint. Speaking in the Constituent Assembly on 6 June 1949, H.V. Pataskar said, as the research body DAKSH quotes him: “The Supreme Court is not likely to grant special leave in any matter whatsoever unless it finds that it involves a serious breach of some principle in the administration of justice, or breach of certain principles which strike at the very root of administration of justice as between man and man”. The authors attribute to him a related argument: without a King to serve as a “fountainhead of all justice”, India needed an equivalent guardian of justice. In the Assembly record of that day, the “fountainhead of all justice” remark was made by Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar.

The Court’s own warning, and its answer

On 19 March 2010, in Mathai @ Joby v George ((2010) 4 SCC 358), a two-judge Bench wrote that “the arrears in this Court are mounting and mounting and this Court has been converted practically into an ordinary appellate Court which, in our opinion, was never the intention of Article 136 of the Constitution”. It warned that “a time will come when the functioning of this Court will become impossible”. It asked a Constitution Bench to decide in what kind of cases SLPs should be entertained.

The answer came in the same case. On 11 January 2016, a five-judge Bench (Justices Anil R. Dave, Kurian Joseph, Shiva Kirti Singh, Adarsh Kumar Goel and Rohinton Fali Nariman) said that “no effort should be made to restrict the powers of this Court under Article 136”, since the Court can use its discretion on the facts of each case: “In the interest of justice, in our view, it would be better to use the said power with circumspection, rather than to limit the power forever.” The SLP itself was dismissed as infructuous.

The Analysis

The authors’ argument

1. More judges, more intake. Adding judges should reduce pendency, but “cases accepted by the Supreme Court are also rising over time”. SLPs are the most prevalent type, and “The SLPs are cases that the Supreme Court has a choice to hear.” The authors cite “some estimates” that SLPs “account for around 80 per cent of fresh filings”.

2. A last resort turned routine. “Despite being a provision that was engineered as a last resort, SLPs have become one of the top contributors to the top court’s docket.”

3. An example. The authors describe an Assistant Engineer’s case arising from a 2014 office altercation: a High Court dismissed his petition in 2018, the Supreme Court granted leave and allowed his appeal in 2023, nine years after the incident, itself calling the allegations “trivial”. The matter, they write, “did not raise a substantial constitutional issue”.

4. Other courts filter harder. By the authors’ figures, the US Supreme Court hears roughly 70 to 80 of several thousand petitions a year, and the UK Supreme Court granted 45 of 207 permission to appeal applications in 2025-26, “while India sends several thousand cases to full hearing every year”. The UK figure could not be matched to the Court’s published statistics: its annual report for 2025-26 says the Court decided 295 permission-to-appeal applications in the year.

5. Symptoms, not the cause. Proposals over several decades to separate the Court’s constitutional function from its appellate jurisdiction, or to create regional divisions, “are only addressing the symptoms and not the underlying problem, namely, that too many appeals of the SLP variety are being accepted”.

6. The remedy, and its price. The authors propose “tightening what makes it to the court’s docket in the first place by developing a well-defined threshold”. They recall the 2010 warning, and say a Constitution Bench later refused to restrict the power; as the 2016 order shows, that Bench was answering the reference in the same case and chose circumspection over limits. They are candid about the cost: “A codified filter has real potential to reduce the apex court’s docket burden, but it would also formally narrow the court’s own conception of what justice delivery means.” Many SLPs, they note, are admitted “because the court perceives that they would be better able to correct an individual injustice than the lower court could”. The difficulty is “the absence of agreement on how to reorganise or limit those functions effectively”.

Where the argument is strong, and where it stops

  • Strong: it moves the debate from the supply of judges to the demand on them. The Court’s own figures back the point: 75,410 fresh matters against 65,615 disposals in 2025, at near-full strength.
  • Its key number is an estimate. The 80 per cent share rests on “some estimates” with no source named, and the column gives no figure for how many SLPs are actually granted leave, which is the number a filter would act on.
  • Its pendency figure runs ahead of the tracked count. The authors’ “more than 96,000” is higher than the Court’s figure for 1 October 2026 as tracked by Supreme Court Observer.
  • It leaves the hard question open. Who would set the threshold, and how would it sit with a five-judge Bench that in 2016 preferred circumspection to limits? A threshold that the Court frames for itself is a different reform from one imposed from outside.

Way forward

  1. Data first. Published figures on SLP filings, grants of leave and disposals, by case type, would replace estimates with evidence.
  2. A reasoned threshold. Criteria for leave, such as a substantial question of law or a serious breach of a principle in the administration of justice, Pataskar’s test of 1949, applied with short reasons.
  3. A door left open. The authors’ own caveat: the aim is not “to close the doors to a constitutional remedy the framers deliberately included”, but to stop the Court turning into “an all-purpose court of appeal”.

Data and Institutions Vault

Prelims-grade facts:

The Constitution:

  • Article 136(1): special leave to appeal, “in its discretion”, from any court or tribunal in India
  • Article 136(2): excludes courts and tribunals under laws relating to the Armed Forces
  • Article 32: the right to move the Supreme Court for enforcing Fundamental Rights “is guaranteed”
  • Articles 132, 133, 134: appeals from High Courts, mostly on a certificate under Article 134A
  • Article 124(1): Chief Justice plus other judges “until Parliament by law prescribes a larger number”

The Court’s strength:

  • Supreme Court (Number of Judges) Act, 1956, Section 2: 33 changed to 37 judges excluding the CJI, so 38 in all
  • With effect from 16 May 2026; the Bill replacing an Ordinance passed Parliament in August 2026

The backlog:

  • 92,101 pending on 1 January 2026; 95,019 on 1 October 2026

The cases:

  • Mathai @ Joby v George, (2010) 4 SCC 358, 19 March 2010: two-judge Bench referred the SLP question to a Constitution Bench
  • 11 January 2016: five-judge Bench declined to restrict the Article 136 power; the SLP was dismissed as infructuous

⚠️ Watch the trap:

  • 38 includes the Chief Justice (37 plus the CJI)
  • The Constitution does not fix 38; Parliament sets the number by law
  • The 2016 Bench declined to lay down limits; it did not hold that the Court must hear every SLP
  • An SLP is a request for leave, not an appeal as of right
  • The 80 per cent share of fresh filings is an estimate the authors cite, not an official figure

The Debate

For a filter on SLPs Against a filter
Intake outpaces disposal: 75,410 fresh matters against 65,615 disposals in 2025 Article 136 was drafted broad on purpose; the authors themselves would not “close the doors”
In 2010 the Court itself said it had become “practically” an ordinary appellate Court In 2016 a five-judge Bench preferred “circumspection” to limiting the power “forever”
Other apex courts filter far more aggressively, by the authors’ figures Many SLPs correct an individual injustice the lower court did not
Stops the Court becoming “an all-purpose court of appeal” A filter would “formally narrow the court’s own conception of what justice delivery means”

Balanced verdict: the case for a filter is strong on the numbers, but the threshold has to be reasoned, transparent and set by the Court itself, or it trades one injustice (delay) for another (exclusion).

How to Think About This

  1. Supply or demand? More judges raise capacity; only a change in what is admitted changes the demand.
  2. Discretion cuts both ways. The same discretion that lets the Court admit an SLP lets it refuse one; a filter is about how that discretion is used, not whether it exists.
  3. Access against function. Ask what a Supreme Court is for: correcting individual errors, settling the law, or both, and what each costs in time.

Diagram-in-Words

Argument map

Too many special leave petitions: the authors' case

Covers the backlog, the rise in judges, the intake problem, the Court’s 2010 warning and 2016 answer, and the proposed threshold.

The backlog intake outpaced disposal in 2025 the authors cite more than 96,000 pending More judges: 34 to 38 including the Chief Justice (2026 amendment) the supply answer Intake keeps rising, led by SLPs Article 136: cases the Court may choose to hear the authors' diagnosis 2010: the warning 'converted practically into an ordinary appellate Court' referred to a Constitution Bench 2016: the five-judge answer declined to restrict the Article 136 power use it 'with circumspection' the Court on its own power A well-defined threshold for leave the price: a narrower idea of what justice delivery means the proposal
Bhandari and Suryam’s argument: more judges add capacity, but only a threshold on special leave petitions changes the intake, and it comes at a cost.

Read it from top to bottom: the backlog and the extra judges sit above the intake problem in the dark box, and the Court’s 2010 warning and 2016 answer frame the authors’ proposal at the foot.

✍️ Mains Answer Framework
Question

Article 136 was meant to be an extraordinary remedy, yet special leave petitions dominate the Supreme Court's docket. Examine the case for a filter on special leave petitions and the risks it carries. (250 words)

Introduction

Article 136 lets the Supreme Court, ‘in its discretion’, grant special leave to appeal from any court or tribunal in India except those of the Armed Forces. Conceived as an extraordinary remedy, special leave petitions (SLPs) now make up the largest share of the Court’s work, while 92,101 cases were pending on 1 January 2026.

Body

Why more judges are not enough. Parliament raised the sanctioned strength from 34 to 38, including the Chief Justice, with effect from 16 May 2026, after the Court had worked at near-full strength of 34 since 2019; yet in 2025 it received 75,410 fresh matters and disposed of 65,615.
Capacity rises, but so does intake. The Court’s own view.
In Mathai @ Joby v George (2010) a two-judge Bench said the Court had been ‘converted practically into an ordinary appellate Court’ and referred to a Constitution Bench the question of when SLPs should be entertained; in January 2016 a five-judge Bench declined to restrict the power, saying it would be better used ‘with circumspection’. Options. (1) A published threshold for leave, such as a substantial question of law or, in the words of a Constituent Assembly member, a ‘serious breach of some principle in the administration of justice’. (2) Admission and disposal data by case type, so that the share of SLPs is measured rather than estimated. (3) Long-standing proposals to separate constitutional and appellate work, or to create regional divisions, which ease the load but not the intake.
Risks. A filter narrows access for litigants who see the Supreme Court as the last corrector of injustice; a threshold that is not reasoned and transparent would trade one problem for another.

Conclusion

Broad access to the Supreme Court and a Court able to settle the law are both constitutional values. A reasoned threshold for special leave, built on data and framed by the Court itself, would protect both.

Interview Angle

"Should the Supreme Court hear fewer special leave petitions so that it can decide more constitutional questions, even if some litigants lose their last chance to correct an injustice?"

Takeaway Box

  • Article 136: discretionary special leave from any court or tribunal, except those under Armed Forces laws.
  • The numbers: 38 judges including the CJI from 16 May 2026, yet intake still outpaces disposal.
  • The argument: the backlog is an intake problem, led by SLPs, not only a shortage of judges.
  • The remedy and its price: a well-defined threshold for leave, at the cost of a narrower idea of what the Court is for.

Sources:

Cite this page: Special Leave Petitions: Article 136 and an Overloaded Court — Ujiyari.com | Free UPSC & State PCS Editorial Analysis