🗞️ Why in News Prime Minister Narendra Modi met Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian on the sidelines of the SCO Summit at Bishkek on August 31, 2026, and urged the protection of commercial shipping and freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, saying seafarers and civilians must not be harmed.
What Was Said
India’s ask, in the Ministry of External Affairs’ own words, was that “all issues must be resolved through dialogue and diplomacy”, with “continued efforts to ensure peace and stability in the region, and for safeguarding freedom of navigation and commerce”, and that seafarers not be harmed. The Prime Minister posted that India wants to “expand and diversify our trade basket” with Iran, reiterated readiness to work with Iran in BRICS and the SCO, and said he looked forward to welcoming the Iranian President at the BRICS Summit in New Delhi on September 12 and 13. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi was in the room.
Iran’s position, stated at the same summit. President Pezeshkian said in Bishkek that “if the US returns to its commitments in the memorandum of understanding, the Islamic Republic of Iran will immediately reciprocate”. That Memorandum of Understanding, the background to everything Iran now says about the Strait, was signed remotely by the United States President and President Pezeshkian on June 17, 2026 to end the war; its published terms include an end to Iranian restrictions on the Strait of Hormuz and Iranian arrangements for the safe passage of commercial vessels between the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman. Ships have nonetheless continued to be threatened and attacked in the Strait since.
The context that gives the meeting its weight. This was the first face-to-face meeting between the two leaders in two years, and the first since the conflict involving Iran began in early 2026; they had spoken by telephone in March. On the evening of August 31, the day of the meeting, the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations reported that a tanker was struck by three unknown projectiles while completing an outbound transit of the Strait, about 17 nautical miles east of Khasab, Oman, with no casualties and no attribution.
Why the Strait of Hormuz Is Not Substitutable
The geography. The Strait of Hormuz connects the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and thence to the Arabian Sea. It lies between Iran to the north and Oman, specifically the Musandam exclave, and the United Arab Emirates to the south. At its narrowest it is about 21 nautical miles, roughly 39 kilometres, wide. The shipping lanes themselves are far narrower: an inbound and an outbound lane of about two miles each, separated by a two-mile buffer.
Why that matters legally. A strait that narrow is entirely within the territorial seas of the littoral States, since the territorial sea extends 12 nautical miles from the baseline. There is no corridor of high seas through it. Passage therefore depends on the law of the sea rather than on the geography of open water.
The legal regime, stated precisely.
| Concept | Where it applies | What it permits |
|---|---|---|
| Innocent passage | Territorial sea generally | Continuous and expeditious passage; may be suspended temporarily for security; submarines must surface |
| Transit passage | Straits used for international navigation | Continuous and expeditious transit that cannot be suspended or impeded; submarines may transit submerged; overflight permitted |
Transit passage through international straits is provided for in Part III of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982. India is a party to UNCLOS. Iran signed UNCLOS in 1982 but has not ratified it, and has maintained that transit-passage rights under the Convention are available only to parties. The United States is not a party either, but treats transit passage as customary international law. That triangle is the whole legal dispute over Hormuz, and it is worth writing out in exactly those terms.
The claim to handle carefully. It is frequently written that Iran “can legally close” the Strait. It cannot, on the majority view: transit passage is non-suspendable, and a closure would in any case be an act against the shipping of many States. What Iran can do is make transit commercially unviable through risk, insurance costs and interdiction. Disruption, not closure, is the realistic mechanism, and answers that say “closure” are describing a legal impossibility rather than the actual risk.
India’s Exposure, With the Numbers
The dependence is real and has been actively reduced.
| Measure | Position |
|---|---|
| Crude imports via Hormuz | About 41 per cent in the first nine months of FY2026 |
| A January 2026 spike | Reported at about 53 per cent as refiners bought more Gulf crude |
| LNG imports via Hormuz | About 55 per cent in the first nine months of FY2026 |
| LPG imports via Hormuz | About 88 per cent in the first nine months of FY2026 |
| Now routed outside Hormuz | Petroleum Ministry, March 11, 2026: about 70 per cent of crude imports were coming from outside the Strait |
| Source countries | Crude imported from 40 countries, including Iran, per the government in April 2026 |
These figures are not all measuring the same thing and must not be added. The 41 per cent is a nine-month FY2026 average; the 53 per cent is a single month; the 70 per cent “outside Hormuz” is a government statement of routing on one date in March and is the complement of a share, not an independent quantity. Give each figure with its period and its source, and never present them as a single time series.
The LPG number is the one to remember. At about 88 per cent, liquefied petroleum gas is India’s most Hormuz-dependent energy import, and it is the fuel that goes directly into domestic kitchens under Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana. A Hormuz disruption reaches an Indian household through cooking gas faster than through petrol. Crude has diversified sources; LPG has not, because the Gulf holds the surplus.
The diversification, and its limits. India buys from about forty countries, and Russian crude has been roughly a third of imports in recent years. Diversification of source reduces exposure to a single supplier. It does not fully remove exposure to a single chokepoint, because a disruption at Hormuz raises the global price for everyone, including buyers whose own barrels never pass through it. Price exposure is global even when volume exposure is diversified. That is the sentence an examiner is looking for.
The other chokepoints. Indian trade is also exposed at Bab al-Mandab, into the Red Sea, and at the Strait of Malacca eastward. A complete answer on India’s maritime vulnerability names all three.
Why India Talks to Iran At All
Three durable interests, none of which is oil.
- Chabahar. The port on Iran’s Sistan-Baluchistan coast on the Gulf of Oman, outside Hormuz, is India’s route to Afghanistan and Central Asia bypassing Pakistan. India signed a long-term agreement for the operation of the Shahid Beheshti terminal.
- The International North-South Transport Corridor. A multimodal route from India through Iran to Russia and Europe, initiated by India, Iran and Russia in 2000.
- Regional stabilisation. India has a very large diaspora and remittance base in the Gulf, and a stake in the region not becoming a theatre.
The multi-alignment cost. India maintains simultaneous working relationships with Iran, Israel, the Gulf Arab states and the United States. Each relationship constrains the others. Iran-facing projects have repeatedly run into United States sanctions exposure, which is the practical reason Chabahar has moved slowly. Being able to raise navigation safety directly with Tehran, at a leaders’ meeting, is the payoff of that patience, and the price of it is that India cannot take sides publicly.
UPSC Relevance
GS Paper 2. India and its neighbourhood; bilateral groupings and agreements involving India; effect of policies of developed countries on India’s interests.
GS Paper 3. Energy security; infrastructure; internal and external security challenges relating to sea lanes of communication.
The Mains framing. Treat this as a case study in the difference between diversification and resilience. India has diversified suppliers effectively and remains exposed to a chokepoint, because the exposure operates through price and insurance rather than through volume. A resilience strategy therefore has to include strategic petroleum reserves, alternative routing, LPG source development outside the Gulf and demand-side substitution, not just more supplier countries.
The way forward that scores. Expand strategic petroleum reserve capacity and fill discipline, accelerate Chabahar precisely because it sits outside Hormuz, diversify LPG sourcing where the Gulf surplus makes that hardest, keep naval presence and convoy capability for Indian-flagged and Indian-crewed shipping, and maintain the diplomatic channels with every party that let India make the ask it made at Bishkek.
A Mains question worth preparing. “India has diversified its crude oil suppliers but remains exposed to a single maritime chokepoint. Examine why, and outline what an energy resilience strategy would require. (250 words)”
Prelims focus. The littoral States of the Strait of Hormuz and its narrowest width, the distinction between innocent passage and transit passage and where each applies, Iran’s UNCLOS status, India’s LPG dependence on Hormuz, and the founding members and year of the INSTC.
📌 Facts Corner — Knowledgepedia
Prelims, statement-ready facts:
- Modi met Pezeshkian at Bishkek on August 31, 2026, on the SCO sidelines, with FM Araghchi present; first face-to-face in two years.
- MEA readout: dialogue and diplomacy, freedom of navigation and commerce, and seafarers must not be harmed.
- US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding, signed remotely June 17, 2026, includes an end to Iranian restrictions on the Strait.
- UKMTO: a tanker was struck by three unknown projectiles on August 31, 2026, about 17 nautical miles east of Khasab, Oman; no casualties.
- Geography: Persian Gulf to Gulf of Oman to Arabian Sea; Iran north, Oman’s Musandam exclave and the UAE south; narrowest about 21 nm.
- Lanes: an inbound and an outbound lane of about two miles each with a two-mile buffer; the Strait lies entirely within territorial seas.
- A territorial sea extends 12 nautical miles from the baseline, so there is no high-seas corridor through Hormuz.
- Innocent passage applies in the territorial sea and may be suspended; transit passage in international straits cannot be suspended.
- Transit passage, Part III of UNCLOS 1982, allows submerged transit and overflight; innocent passage requires submarines to surface.
- Iran signed UNCLOS in 1982 but has not ratified; the US is not a party but treats transit passage as customary law; India is a party.
- Crude via Hormuz about 41 per cent (nine months FY2026), 53 per cent in January 2026; LNG about 55 per cent; LPG about 88 per cent.
- Petroleum Ministry, March 11, 2026: about 70 per cent of crude then routed outside Hormuz; crude sourced from 40 countries (April 2026).
- Chabahar (Gulf of Oman, outside Hormuz): India runs the Shahid Beheshti terminal; INSTC founded by India, Iran and Russia in 2000.
- Other chokepoints for Indian trade: Bab al-Mandab into the Red Sea and the Strait of Malacca eastward.
Prelims, the traps:
- On the majority view Iran cannot lawfully “close” the Strait; disruption through risk, insurance and interdiction is the real mechanism.
- The 41, 53 and 70 per cent figures are different periods and measures; never add or chain them into one series.
Mains, arguments and keywords:
- Frame: diversification against resilience; price exposure is global even when volume exposure is diversified.
- Keywords: sea lanes of communication, chokepoint, transit passage, strategic petroleum reserves, multi-alignment, sanctions exposure.
- LPG at 88 per cent is the household-facing exposure: a Hormuz disruption reaches Ujjwala kitchens before petrol pumps.
- Way forward: SPR capacity and fill discipline; Chabahar because it sits outside Hormuz; LPG sourcing beyond the Gulf; naval escorts.
Interview, be ready for:
- Probe: “Why talk to Iran at all?” Chabahar, INSTC and Gulf stability; the channel is what let India make the ask at Bishkek.
- Probe: “Can Iran close Hormuz?” Legally no, commercially yes; explain the difference in one minute.
Sources: ANI (MEA readout), Euronews (Pezeshkian on the MoU), NPR (MoU text), Akashvani News (70 per cent), Arab News (UKMTO)
Source: Twenty-One Nautical Miles: India Raises the Strait of Hormuz With Iran at Bishkek — Ujiyari.com | Free UPSC & State PCS Current Affairs
