The Lift Line

“India can, today, coexist peacefully with China, and China with India.” (M.K. Narayanan, The Hindu, 31 October 2026)

Why This Editorial Matters for Your Exam

In the news: In the Lead article of The Hindu on 31 October 2026, M.K. Narayanan, a former National Security Adviser, asks whether India and China can coexist peacefully, and answers that they can.

The paper describes the writer thus: “M.K. Narayanan is former Director, Intelligence Bureau, a former National Security Adviser, and a former Governor of West Bengal”. For recent India-China items on this site, see the Ministry of External Affairs on the border areas, our report on the Subansiri and Upper Siang dams, the India-China trade item, the standard names for 28 places in Ladakh and The Indian Express on the Communist Party of China’s plenum.

UPSC relevance:

  • GS Paper 2: India and its neighbourhood; bilateral agreements involving India; India-China relations.
  • GS Paper 3: security challenges and their management in border areas.
  • Prelims: the 1993, 1996 and 2005 border agreements; Articles I and VII of the 2005 agreement; the Special Representatives mechanism (2003); the WMCC (2012); Galwan (2020).
  • Essay and Interview: managing a rival neighbour; peace without a settlement.

The Crux in 60 Words

India-China relations are best described, M.K. Narayanan argues, as managed coexistence that every patrolling face-off puts at risk. Neither 1962 nor Galwan, in his view, fully explains the distance between the two. He calls Rajiv Gandhi’s 1988 visit a beacon, though one since ‘frittered away’, sees in the 2005 agreement proof that China ‘knows when to bend’, and concludes that the two countries can coexist peacefully.

Key Arguments at a Glance

India and China can coexist peacefully, M.K. Narayanan argues, because neither gains from conflict and China has shown that it ‘knows when to bend’, provided each reads the other right.

Supporting
  • Relations today are, in his words, ‘managed coexistence’, strained because every ‘patrolling deviation’ is regarded as a ‘face-off’.
  • In his view neither the 1962 conflict nor the 2020 Galwan clash fully explains the distance between the two civilisations; he points also to an improperly demarcated border.
  • He calls Rajiv Gandhi’s 1988 visit a ‘watershed’ that allowed the border question to be discussed separately.
  • He argues that India is not China’s ‘real opponent’, that a conflict would set China back several years, and that China’s military edge is a ‘myth’.
Counter

The Government’s account of Galwan is that the violence arose because the ‘Chinese side was seeking to erect structures just across the LAC and refused to desist from such actions’, and the MEA records that relations were ‘adversely impacted’ by incidents in Eastern Ladakh in April-May 2020. Narayanan’s judgements on the military balance are his own; the column offers no figures for them.

Way Forward

Narayanan asks that messages go out to the military and border guards of both countries so that a Galwan does not recur, that inadvertent action be avoided, and that India understand China’s intentions better. Our analysis: keep the Special Representatives talks and the WMCC working, hold both sides to the 1993 commitment to respect the LAC, and stand firm on India’s territorial integrity.

Background and Context

Milestones on the official record

Year Step In the official record
1950 Diplomatic relations established India the “first non-socialist bloc country” to do so (MEA)
1962 Border conflict “a setback to bilateral ties” (MEA)
1988 Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visits China “marked a beginning in the improvement of bilateral relations” (MEA)
1993 Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the LAC both sides to respect and observe the LAC
1996 Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the LAC signed on 29 November 1996
2003 Prime Minister Vajpayee’s visit; SR mechanism set up the “Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation” (MEA)
2005 Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit, April “Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity”; the Political Parameters agreement
2012 WMCC set up from an agreement at the 15th round of SR talks
2020 Incidents in Eastern Ladakh, April-May; violence at Galwan relations “adversely impacted” (MEA)
2024 Agreement on patrolling arrangements; leaders meet at Kazan, 23 October; 23rd SR talks, Beijing, 18 December “disengagement from all the friction points of 2020”; “first full delegation-level talks in nearly five years” (MEA)
2025 24th SR talks, New Delhi, 19 August; Modi-Xi meeting, 31 August; SCO summit, Tianjin, 1 September; Kailash Mansarovar Yatra resumed; direct flights resumed in October the Yatra resumed “after a nearly five-year-long hiatus” (MEA)
2026 Strategic dialogue, New Delhi, 10 February; 35th WMCC, Beijing, May; 36th WMCC, New Delhi, 6 August; 25th SR talks, Beijing, 25 August 36 WMCC meetings and 25 SR rounds so far; the 26th SR round is to be held in India in 2027

What the 2005 agreement says

Its full title is the “Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question”. It was signed in New Delhi on 11 April 2005, during Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit. Its preamble recalls the 1993 and 1996 agreements and notes that “the two sides have appointed Special Representatives”.

  • Article I: “Neither side shall use or threaten to use force against the other by any means.”
  • Article VII: “In reaching a boundary settlement, the two sides shall safeguard due interests of their settled populations in the border areas.”

Galwan in the Government’s words

As background, a PIB statement of 20 June 2020 on the all-party meeting of 19 June recorded two things:

  • “the events of 15 June at Galwan that led to the loss of lives of 20 Indian military personnel”;
  • “the violence in Galwan on 15 June arose because Chinese side was seeking to erect structures just across the LAC and refused to desist from such actions.”

The Analysis

Narayanan’s argument

  1. Managed coexistence. “The state of relations between China and India today can best be described as managed coexistence,” he writes. It is “proving problematic” because every “patrolling deviation” is regarded as a “face-off”.
  2. The past does not fully explain the present. He sees the 1962 conflict as, in part, an outcome of Mao’s “hubris”, while noting that historians give other reasons. Galwan, in his view, is a “singular event” that cannot quite explain “the distance that exists between the two civilisations”.
  3. The border itself. In the Arunachal Pradesh sector, he writes, “the true villain, perhaps, is as much the McMahon Line, as are the Chinese, for leaving behind an improperly demarcated border.”
  4. The 1988 model. Rajiv Gandhi’s visit, when he met leaders such as Deng Xiaoping, was in his words “a new watershed”, which “enabled the border question to be discussed separately”. He regrets that this was “subsequently frittered away by leaders on both sides”.
  5. Outside factors. The Quad, in his view, has added to the stalemate, and Chinese strategists believe India’s part in US plans is “a ploy to contain China”.
  6. No cause for fear. India “is by no means an ally of China”, but it is “far-fetched to believe that India is its real opponent”. A conflict “would set China back several years”. He calls China’s military edge a “myth” and holds that “neither country enjoys an edge in the disputed areas in the high Himalayas”.
  7. China knows when to bend. He cites the 2005 agreement and its Articles I and VII as evidence.

Where the column needs a second look

  • The 2005 agreement. The column places it “under President Hu Jintao” and describes it as an agreement “to foster a long-term constructive and cooperative partnership”. On the MEA’s record, it was signed in New Delhi during Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit and deals with the parameters of a boundary settlement; the partnership named during that visit was the “Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity”. Hu Jintao was then China’s President, but the agreement belongs to the Premier’s visit.
  • Galwan. The column calls it a clash “between Chinese and Indian patrols”. The Government’s account is the PIB line above: Chinese structures just across the LAC and a refusal to desist.
  • Territory. The column speaks of “disputed areas” and of a “loss of territory” in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh. In an answer, state India’s position: Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh are integral parts of India.
  • The military balance. That China’s edge is a “myth”, and that India “is more than a match for China’s capabilities in the high Himalayas”, are the writer’s judgements; the column cites no figures for them.

Where the column is strong, and where it stops

  • Strong: it separates managing the relationship from resolving the boundary, which is how the official mechanisms work, and its warning against inadvertent action fits the 1993 commitment to respect the LAC.
  • Strong: it resists threat inflation, a useful corrective in a debate that often treats every incident as a crisis.
  • It stops short on what most shapes the relationship day to day: trade, rivers and the dams on the Yarlung Tsangpo (see the links above), and how much military reassurance the 2024 patrolling agreement has actually brought.
  • Its evidence is thin where its claims are boldest, on the military balance and on Chinese thinking.

Way forward

  1. Keep the mechanisms working. Regular rounds of the SR talks and the WMCC give each incident a channel before it becomes a crisis.
  2. Prevent the next Galwan. Narayanan writes that “Messages would, however, have to go out to the military and border guards of both countries” so that it does not recur; the 1993 commitment to respect the LAC is the baseline.
  3. Understand China better. His warning that “Misreading China would cost India dearly” argues for deeper expertise on China in government and universities.
  4. Engage from strength. Dialogue and preparedness go together, and India’s position on its territory is not on the table.

Data and Institutions Vault

Prelims-grade facts:

Agreements:

  • 1993: Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the LAC, signed at Beijing, 7 September 1993
  • 1996: Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the LAC, 29 November 1996
  • 2005: Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the Boundary Question, New Delhi, 11 April 2005, during Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit
  • 2005, Article I: no use or threat of force by any means; Article VII: safeguard due interests of settled populations in the border areas

Mechanisms:

  • Special Representatives (SR) mechanism: set up 2003; 25 rounds; 24th New Delhi, 19 August 2025; 25th Beijing, 25 August 2026; the 26th is to be held in India in 2027
  • WMCC: from an agreement at the 15th SR round, New Delhi, January 2012; 36 meetings, latest New Delhi, 6 August 2026

Milestones:

  • Diplomatic relations: 1 April 1950; India the first non-socialist bloc country to establish them with the PRC
  • Galwan, 15 June 2020: 20 Indian military personnel lost their lives (PIB)
  • Patrolling agreement, October 2024; leaders’ talks at Kazan, 23 October 2024
  • Direct flights resumed October 2025; Kailash Mansarovar Yatra resumed in 2025

⚠️ Watch the trap:

  • The 2005 agreement came during Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit, not a visit by President Hu Jintao
  • The 2005 agreement sets boundary parameters; the Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity is a separate outcome of the same visit
  • The LAC does not settle the boundary: the 1993 agreement says references to it do not prejudice either side’s position
  • The SR mechanism dates from 2003; the WMCC from 2012

The Debate

Coexistence can hold (Narayanan’s case) Reasons for caution
Neither side gains from conflict; a war would set China back several years The violence at Galwan happened despite the 1993, 1996 and 2005 agreements and the SR talks
China “knows when to bend”, as in 2005 Bending in 2005 settled principles, not the boundary itself
That China’s threat to India is “a grave one” is “a myth perpetuated by interest groups” The column offers no figures for this judgement
The 1988 approach let the border be discussed separately Since 2020 the border has shaped the whole relationship: the leaders’ first full delegation-level talks in nearly five years came only after the patrolling agreement

Balanced verdict: Narayanan’s central claim, that peaceful coexistence is possible and conflict is in neither side’s interest, is a fair reading of the steps since 2024. His case is weakest where it dismisses the military threat without evidence; an answer should take his framework and pair it with preparedness.

How to Think About This

  1. Separate managing from resolving. Mechanisms like the SR talks and the WMCC keep the peace without settling the boundary; judge them by incidents prevented.
  2. Read the record, not the recollection. A column by a former official is a valuable view, but dates, signatories and terms come from the agreement texts.
  3. Hold two ideas together. Engagement and deterrence are not opposites: each makes the other credible.

Diagram-in-Words

1993: respect the LAC → 1996: military confidence-building → 2003: SR mechanism → 2005: political parameters (Articles I and VII) → 2012: WMCC → 2020: Eastern Ladakh incidents and Galwan → 2024: patrolling agreement and disengagement → 2025-26: talks, Yatra and flights resume

Read it left to right: every step before 2020 built a way to manage the line; 2020 tested them, and the steps since 2024 rebuilt ties.

✍️ Mains Answer Framework
Question

'Managed coexistence' is one description of India-China relations today. Examine the role of the border agreements and dialogue mechanisms in maintaining peace along the Line of Actual Control, and assess the prospects for peaceful coexistence between the two countries. (250 words)

Introduction

India and China share a boundary that is not yet settled. Pending a settlement, their 1993 agreement commits both sides to ‘strictly respect and observe the line of actual control’.
The years since 2020 show both the strain an incident on that line can cause and the capacity of dialogue mechanisms to manage it.

Body

The framework is layered. India established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China on 1 April 1950.
The 1993 Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control was followed by the 1996 agreement on confidence-building measures in the military field, the Special Representatives mechanism on the boundary question in 2003, and the 2005 Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles, whose Article I says that neither side shall use or threaten to use force against the other by any means, and whose Article VII asks both to safeguard the due interests of settled populations in the border areas. The Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) came from an agreement of January 2012.
Incidents in Eastern Ladakh in April-May 2020 and the violence at Galwan on 15 June 2020, in which 20 Indian military personnel lost their lives, set ties back. An agreement on patrolling arrangements in October 2024 led to disengagement from all the friction points of 2020.
It was followed by leaders’ talks at Kazan in 2024, the 24th round of Special Representatives talks in August 2025, the resumption of the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra in 2025 and of direct flights in October 2025, the 36th WMCC meeting in August 2026 and the 25th round of Special Representatives talks in Beijing on 25 August 2026. The boundary itself remains unsettled, so each step manages the dispute rather than resolving it.

Conclusion

Peaceful coexistence is possible, but it has to be managed: by keeping the mechanisms working, respecting the LAC pending a settlement, widening the relationship while the boundary is negotiated through dedicated channels, and pairing engagement with preparedness. Throughout, India’s position stands: Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh are integral parts of India.

Interview Angle

"A former National Security Adviser writes that the threat China poses to India is exaggerated. Do you agree, and how would you balance engagement with China against preparedness along the Line of Actual Control?"

Takeaway Box

  • The frame: in Narayanan’s words, “managed coexistence”; peace without a boundary settlement.
  • The texts: the 1993 agreement (respect the LAC) and the 2005 agreement (Article I no force; Article VII settled populations), signed during Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit.
  • The channels: the SR mechanism (2003) and the WMCC (2012).
  • India’s position: Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh are integral parts of India.

Sources:

  • The Hindu, M.K. Narayanan, “Can India and China coexist peacefully?”, 31 October 2026
  • Ministry of External Affairs, India-China bilateral brief, July 2026
  • Ministry of External Affairs, Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question, 2005
  • Ministry of External Affairs, Foreign Relations 2005
  • Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas, 7 September 1993
  • PIB, Prime Minister’s Office, statement on the all-party meeting of 19 June 2020, 20 June 2020

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