The Lift Line

“Public broadcasting is not state broadcasting.” (Suhas Borker, The Hindu, 23 October 2026)

Why This Editorial Matters for Your Exam

In the news: on 23 October 2026, The Hindu’s lead article by Suhas Borker, Editor of Citizens First TV and convener of Jan Prasar, argued that Prasar Bharati “is not a public service broadcaster” but “a mouthpiece of the government of the day”, because the 1990 Act that was meant to make it autonomous has been only partly implemented.

The column has no single news peg. For context, the author points to the 138th episode of “Mann Ki Baat”, broadcast on 27 September 2026, as a reminder that the state still treats the public airwaves as its own platform, and to Public Service Broadcasting Day on 12 November, which he says the government declared in 2000.

GS Paper 2: statutory, regulatory and quasi-judicial bodies; government policies and interventions; the role of the media; Parliament and its committees. Constitution: Article 19(1)(a) and 19(2). GS Paper 4: accountability and transparency in public institutions.

The Crux in 60 Words

Borker argues that Prasar Bharati, created by a 1990 law to be an autonomous public broadcaster, still works as an arm of the government. The Act’s watchdogs, a Parliamentary Committee and a Broadcasting Council, were never set up, he says, and the Board, staff and money stay under the Ministry. His remedy: implement the Act, as the Supreme Court’s 1995 airwaves ruling demands.

Key Arguments at a Glance

Suhas Borker argues that Prasar Bharati, created under the Prasar Bharati (Broadcasting Corporation of India) Act, 1990 to be an autonomous public broadcaster, remains a mouthpiece of the government of the day, because the Act’s accountability bodies were never created and the Centre keeps its hold on the Board, the staff and the money.

Supporting
  • Section 13 provides for a Parliamentary Committee of 22 MPs and Section 14 for a Broadcasting Council to receive complaints; Parliament’s Standing Committee on Information Technology recorded in December 2010 that neither had been implemented, and the author says neither exists today.
  • Section 12(2)(b) directs the Corporation to safeguard the citizen’s right to be informed freely, truthfully and objectively, and to present contrasting views without advocating any opinion or ideology of its own.
  • In Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting vs Cricket Association of Bengal (9 February 1995), the Supreme Court held the airwaves to be public property and directed the Centre to set up an independent autonomous public authority to regulate them; the author says this has not been done.
  • The government told the Lok Sabha on 5 August 2026 that no grievances on autonomy were received from journalists, employees or media bodies in the previous year; the author reads this as proof that there is no forum for complaints, not of independence.
Counter

The government says editorial matters are regularly reviewed by the Editor-in-Chief and senior editorial teams for accuracy and balance, and that viewer complaints are passed to editorial teams (August 2026 reply, as reported). The Act also confines the Centre’s power of direction under Section 23 to three grounds and requires every direction to be laid before Parliament, and the Chairman is appointed on the binding recommendation of a committee chaired by the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha.

Way Forward

The author’s agenda: constitute the Parliamentary Committee, create the regulatory council named in the Act, rebuild the Board as a professional body, transfer assets and staff, design funding without government strings, remove Indian Information Service officers from operational control, and amend the Act where practice has exposed its traps.

Background and Context

From the Verghese Working Group to the 1990 Act

The Janata Government appointed a Working Group on the autonomy of Akashwani and Doordarshan in August 1977, chaired by B.G. Verghese. It reported on 24 February 1978 and recommended an “Akash Bharti”, or National Broadcasting Trust. In the author’s account, its BBC-style model became the Prasar Bharati Bill of 1979, which lapsed; a new version introduced in 1989 became the 1990 Act.

The Act is dated 12 September 1990, but it came into force only on 15 September 1997 (notification S.O. 509(E) of 22 July 1997). The Corporation itself came into existence on 23 November 1997. The author quotes the Act’s Statement of Objects and Reasons as wanting “a genuinely autonomous body” with “a high degree of credibility”, responsible to the people and to Parliament.

What the Act provides, and the record

Provision What the Act says The record
Section 10 Recruitment Boards “consisting wholly of persons other than the Members, officers and other employees of the Corporation” (for posts at Joint Secretary pay and above, the Board’s own Members) “never implemented” (Standing Committee, December 2010); the author says the first came only in July 2020
Section 12 Primary duty to inform, educate and entertain; objectives include a “fair and balanced flow of information” The author’s core test (below)
Section 13 A Parliamentary Committee of 22 MPs (15 elected by the Lok Sabha, 7 by the Rajya Sabha, by single transferable vote) to oversee the Corporation and report to Parliament “never implemented” (December 2010); the author says no government has constituted it
Sections 14 and 15 A Broadcasting Council to receive and consider complaints and advise the Corporation “never implemented” (December 2010); the author says it has never been set up
Section 23 Directions from the Centre, on limited grounds; each laid before Parliament In force (see the Analysis)

The record column comes from Parliament’s Standing Committee on Information Technology (Fifteenth Lok Sabha), in its report on the Prasar Bharati (Amendment) Bill, 2010, presented on 10 December 2010. It found that, “Even after 13 years of the operation of the Act”, provisions including the transfer of employees (Section 11), Recruitment Boards (Section 10), the Parliamentary Committee (Section 13) and the Broadcasting Council (Section 14) “were never implemented”, “in spite of the fact that the word ‘shall’ has been used in the Act”. Of 36,675 employees at the time, 33,042 (90.09 per cent) had served in All India Radio and Doordarshan before the Corporation was set up. Section 11, on the status of employees, was later substituted by an amending Act of 2012 (in force from 8 March 2012).

Who runs it now

The Prasar Bharati Board page (last updated 22 October 2026) lists Prasoon Joshi as Chairman and Gaurav Dwivedi, IAS, as Chief Executive Officer. It shows two of the part-time member seats as vacant.

The Analysis

Borker builds his case in five steps.

1. A promise unkept. He recalls that in May 2014 the then Information and Broadcasting Minister, Prakash Javadekar, promised to end the “government fiefdom” over Prasar Bharati and recast it on the BBC model: “autonomous in administration, free in editorial judgement, and accountable to Parliament”. “Twelve years later that promise remains unfulfilled”, he writes. He traces the idea further back, quoting Jawaharlal Nehru in the Constituent Assembly in 1948 who wanted a semi-autonomous corporation, with policy set by the government but “otherwise not conducted as a government department”, words he says remain unkept.

2. The editorial constitution. For Borker, Section 12 is “the editorial constitution” of the broadcaster. Its clause (2)(b) asks the Corporation to be guided by “safeguarding the citizen’s right to be informed freely, truthfully and objectively on all matters of public interest, national or international, and presenting a fair and balanced flow of information including contrasting views without advocating any opinion or ideology of its own”. He argues that Prasar Bharati fails this test and is “a pretender, a mouthpiece of the government of the day”.

3. The missing watchdogs. “Critical Sections 13, 14 and 15 of the Act remain unimplemented”, he writes. The Parliamentary Committee was meant to let Parliament, not the Ministry, oversee the broadcaster; the Broadcasting Council was meant to hear complaints. He cites former chief executive Jawhar Sircar’s explanation: Ministers insist that they alone are answerable to Parliament. The official record supports him up to 2010, when Parliament’s own committee said these bodies were “never implemented”. For today, his statement that they still do not exist is his claim: no later official record is cited.

4. Control through people, money and directions. Borker argues that the Board “has been filled with pliable bureaucrats”, that ownership of assets and staff “was never transferred”, and that without its own fund “the Board remains at the Ministry’s mercy”. He cites a 2021 manpower audit which, he says, found almost half of the then 25,000-strong workforce in engineering, against a little over 10 per cent at the BBC, and content staff under 20 per cent against about 70 per cent. In his account, a recruitment board under Section 10 came only in July 2020, and its choice of chair compromised its independence from the start.

He also writes that “Section 23 still lets the Centre issue binding directions on what may or may not be broadcast”. The text is narrower. Section 23(1) lets the Centre direct the Corporation not to broadcast on a specified matter, or to broadcast on a specified matter of public importance, only “in the interests of the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India or the security of the State or preservation of public order”. The Corporation may announce that a broadcast was made on a direction (Section 23(2)), and “A copy of every direction issued under sub-section (1) shall be laid before each House of Parliament” (Section 23(3)).

5. No complaints, or nowhere to complain? For context, on 5 August 2026, in a written reply in the Lok Sabha, Minister of State for Information and Broadcasting L. Murugan said: “In the last one year, no grievances or formal representations received from journalists, employees or media bodies concerning autonomy, appointments or editorial functioning of public broadcasters. However, seven complaints regarding appointment were received from the applicants” (as reported by PTI). Borker cites the first half and answers: “The absence of filed grievances is not evidence of independence.” With no Broadcasting Council, he argues, a complaint has nowhere to go.

The legal anchor. Borker rests his case on the Supreme Court’s 1995 judgment in Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting vs Cricket Association of Bengal (9 February 1995; bench of Justices P.B. Sawant, S. Mohan and B.P. Jeevan Reddy). The Court held that “The airwaves or frequencies are a public property”, whose use must be regulated by a public authority in the public interest; that access to telecasting is limited by this, in addition to the restrictions under Article 19(2); and that “The Central Government shall take immediate steps to establish an independent autonomous public authority representative of all sections and interests in the society to control and regulate the use of the airwaves.” The author says this direction “has still not been carried out”.

He ends with the Chanda Committee, which he says concluded in 1966 that “a psychological transformation is necessary” in the government’s approach to broadcasting, and argues that it has not come. His remedy: approach the courts to enforce the Act and the 1995 direction, or wait for a Lok Sabha willing to act.

Data and Institutions Vault

Prelims-grade facts:

The law:

  • Prasar Bharati (Broadcasting Corporation of India) Act, 1990: Act No. 25 of 1990, dated 12 September 1990.
  • In force: 15 September 1997 (S.O. 509(E) of 22 July 1997); the Corporation came into existence on 23 November 1997.
  • Headquarters: New Delhi (Section 3(3)); a body corporate with perpetual succession (Section 3(2)).
  • Section 12(1): primary duty to inform, educate and entertain the public, and balanced development of radio and TV.
  • Section 13: Parliamentary Committee of 22 MPs: 15 from the Lok Sabha, 7 from the Rajya Sabha, by single transferable vote.
  • Section 14: Broadcasting Council, to consider complaints under Section 15 and advise the Corporation.
  • Section 23: directions only for sovereignty, unity and integrity, security of the State or public order; laid before each House.
  • Section 10: Recruitment Boards of outsiders; for posts at Joint Secretary pay and above, the Board’s own Members recruit.

The Board:

  • Composition: Chairman, Executive Member, Member (Finance), Member (Personnel), six part-time members, two DGs, a Ministry nominee, two staff members.
  • Appointment: by the President, on the binding recommendation of a committee chaired by the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha (Section 4).
  • Committee members: Chairman of the Rajya Sabha, Chairman of the Press Council of India, a nominee of the President.
  • Chairman’s term: part-time; three years or until age 70, whichever is earlier (Section 6(1)).
  • Executive Member: the Chief Executive of the Corporation (Section 5).
  • Office-holders (Board page, 22 October 2026): Chairman Prasoon Joshi; CEO Gaurav Dwivedi.

The ruling and the record:

  • Cricket Association of Bengal (9 February 1995): airwaves are public property; Centre to set up an independent autonomous public authority.
  • Standing Committee on Information Technology, 10 December 2010: Sections 10, 11, 13 and 14 “never implemented”.
  • Lok Sabha reply, 5 August 2026: no grievances on autonomy in the past year; seven appointment complaints from applicants.
  • Verghese Working Group: appointed August 1977; reported 24 February 1978; proposed Akash Bharti.

⚠️ Watch the trap: the Act came into force on 15 September 1997; the Corporation came into existence on 23 November 1997. The Section 13 committee has 22 MPs (15 + 7). The committee that recommends the Chairman is chaired by the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha, not the Speaker. Section 23 directions are limited to three grounds and are laid before Parliament. The CEO is the Act’s Executive Member.

The Debate

The case for Borker’s line. The Act says “shall”, yet in 2010 Parliament’s own committee found its key safeguards never implemented, thirteen years after the Act came into force. A broadcaster whose Board is appointed by the government, whose staff came from government departments and whose money comes from the Ministry is hard to call autonomous. And without a Broadcasting Council, the citizen has no statutory forum to complain about bias, which is why, he argues, the absence of formal complaints proves little.

The other side. The government’s August 2026 reply, as reported by Indian Television, said editorial matters are regularly reviewed by the Editor-in-Chief and senior editorial teams for accuracy and balance, and that viewer complaints are forwarded to editorial teams. The Act itself carries checks: the Chairman and Members are chosen on the binding recommendation of a committee chaired by the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha, and Section 23 directions are confined to three grounds and laid before Parliament. Parliament can and does question the Ministry, as the Lok Sabha question of August 2026 shows. Full financial independence for a broadcaster that depends on public money may also be hard to design.

The balanced verdict. The design of the 1990 Act is not the main problem; its incomplete implementation is. The verifiable part of Borker’s case, that the Section 13 Committee and the Broadcasting Council were not implemented as of 2010, is serious on its own, and the 1995 judgment gives it constitutional weight. Whether those bodies exist today is the first fact a reformer would need to settle.

How to Think About This

Use the “five-question autonomy test” for any statutory body (a regulator, a commission, a broadcaster):

  1. Who appoints? (Prasar Bharati: the President, on the binding recommendation of a committee chaired by the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha.)
  2. Who pays? (Does it have its own fund, or does the Ministry hold the purse?)
  3. Who can direct it, and on what grounds? (Section 23: three grounds; every direction laid before Parliament.)
  4. Who oversees it, and to whom does it report? (Section 13: a committee of MPs reporting to Parliament.)
  5. Where does a citizen complain? (Sections 14 and 15: the Broadcasting Council.)

A body can score well on paper and badly in practice. The test is applied twice: once to the statute, once to the record.

Diagram-in-Words

Argument map

Prasar Bharati: what the 1990 Act provides and what the record shows

Covers the Act’s duty, its two watchdogs, the 2010 record, the Section 23 power and the author’s remedy.

Prasar Bharati Act, 1990 in force 15 September 1997; Corporation from 23 November 1997 Section 12(2)(b) inform freely, truthfully and objectively; present contrasting views Section 13: Parliamentary Committee 22 MPs (15 Lok Sabha + 7 Rajya Sabha); reports to Parliament Sections 14 and 15: Broadcasting Council receives and considers complaints the watchdogs December 2010: "never implemented" Standing Committee on IT, on Sections 10, 11, 13 and 14 Today still not set up (the author’s claim) the record Section 23 directions only for sovereignty, unity and integrity, security of the State or public order; each laid before Parliament the Centre’s power Implement the Act (the author’s view) go to the courts to enforce the Act and the 1995 direction, or wait for a willing Lok Sabha the remedy
The author’s case: the Act’s accountability bodies were recorded as never implemented in 2010, and he says they still do not exist.

The figure sets what the 1990 Act provides against what the record shows.

✍️ Mains Answer Framework
Question

The Prasar Bharati Act, 1990 was meant to give India an autonomous public service broadcaster. Examine the gap between the Act's design and its working, and suggest reforms. (250 words)

Prasar Bharati, established under the Prasar Bharati (Broadcasting Corporation of India) Act, 1990 and in existence since 23 November 1997, runs Akashvani and Doordarshan with the primary duty to inform, educate and entertain the public. The Act promised an autonomous broadcaster, but several of its safeguards have stayed on paper.

Design. Section 12(2)(b) asks the Corporation to safeguard the citizen’s right to be informed freely, truthfully and objectively, and to present contrasting views without advocating its own.
Section 13 provides for a Parliamentary Committee of 22 MPs (15 from the Lok Sabha, 7 from the Rajya Sabha) to oversee it and report to Parliament; Section 14 for a Broadcasting Council to receive complaints; Section 10 for Recruitment Boards independent of the Corporation. The Chairman and Members are appointed by the President on the binding recommendation of a committee chaired by the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha.
Gaps. In December 2010 Parliament’s Standing Committee on Information Technology recorded that Sections 10, 11, 13 and 14 were never implemented, although the Act uses the word ‘shall’.
Without a functioning Council, complaints have no statutory forum. Constitutional frame.
In Cricket Association of Bengal (1995) the Supreme Court held the airwaves to be public property and directed the Centre to establish an independent autonomous public authority to regulate their use. Safeguards that exist.
Section 23 allows directions only in the interests of sovereignty, unity and integrity of India, security of the State or public order, and a copy of every direction must be laid before each House.

Autonomy needs institutions, not intent. Constituting the Section 13 Committee and the Broadcasting Council, transparent appointments and funding insulated from the Ministry would bring practice closer to the Act and to the 1995 judgment, while keeping the broadcaster answerable to Parliament.

Interview Angle

"Should a broadcaster funded by the public be free to criticise the government that funds it? How would you make it both independent and accountable?"

Takeaway Box

  • Lift line: “Public broadcasting is not state broadcasting.”
  • Core idea: the 1990 Act promised an autonomous broadcaster accountable to Parliament, but its Parliamentary Committee and Broadcasting Council were recorded as never implemented in 2010, and the author says they still do not exist.
  • Prelims hooks: Act 25 of 1990; in force 15 September 1997; Corporation from 23 November 1997; Section 12 (inform, educate, entertain); Section 13 (22 MPs, 15 + 7); Section 14 Broadcasting Council; Section 23 directions (three grounds); Cricket Association of Bengal (1995).
  • Ethics and Interview angle: independence and accountability of public institutions: how a publicly funded body serves citizens rather than the government of the day.
  • Probable question: “Examine the significance of the Supreme Court’s ruling that airwaves are public property for broadcasting regulation in India.” (GS2, 150 words)

Sources:

  • Suhas Borker, “Prasar Bharati is not a public service broadcaster”, The Hindu, 23 October 2026
  • The Prasar Bharati (Broadcasting Corporation of India) Act, 1990 (Act 25 of 1990), as amended
  • Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Prasar Bharati organisation page; Prasar Bharati Board page (updated 22 October 2026)
  • Standing Committee on Information Technology (2010-11), Fifteenth Lok Sabha, report on the Prasar Bharati (Amendment) Bill, 2010, presented on 10 December 2010
  • Supreme Court, Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting vs Cricket Association of Bengal, 9 February 1995, (1995) 2 SCC 161
  • PTI via Siasat, and Indian Television, 5 August 2026 (Lok Sabha written reply)
  • GKToday, B.G. Verghese Committee

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