India-US Ties: Trade, Defence and American Unilateralism

The Lift Line

“The relationship between the world’s oldest democracy and the world’s largest democracy can flourish only through equality, respect and trust, not unilateral imposition of will.” (Rajeev Agarwal, The Hindu)

Why This Editorial Matters for Your Exam

This op-ed in The Hindu of 14 October 2026, “India-U.S. ties and the hurdle of American unilateralism”, is by Rajeev Agarwal, a retired colonel and strategic affairs expert. It is his argument, not the paper’s view. For context, it follows the US announcement on 8 October 2026 that, as reported, eight employers, including four Indian IT groups, had been suspended from the PERM green-card process. Our earlier analysis of the PERM suspension covers that step in detail; for background, see also our pieces on the green card crackdown, the India-US trade deal terms and the US sanctions law on Russian and Iranian oil.

Agarwal widens the lens. He audits the whole relationship (immigration, trade, defence, technology and Pakistan) and asks whether ties have reached “a breaking point”. His answer is that India’s “strategic restraint and efforts at accommodation are increasingly met with American pressure, unilateralism and outright disregard for India’s strategic interests”.

For the exam, this is a ready-made audit of India’s most important strategic partnership, and a lesson in separating what is announced, signed, in force and delivered.

GS Paper 2: Bilateral, regional and global groupings and agreements involving India and/or affecting India’s interests; effect of policies and politics of developed countries on India’s interests, and the Indian diaspora. GS Paper 3: Science and technology, indigenisation of technology; the external sector (trade and tariffs).

Background and Context

PERM: what was suspended

• What PERM is: a permanent labor certification issued by the US Department of Labor allows an employer to hire a foreign worker. The Department certifies to US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) that there are not enough able, willing, qualified and available US workers; the employer then files Form I-140 with USCIS. It is a step towards an employer-sponsored green card. The H-1B is a separate, temporary work visa.
• Who was named: as reported, the US suspended eight employers’ use of PERM: Microsoft, Adobe, Cognizant, Infosys, Tata Consultancy Services, Wipro, HCL and France’s Capgemini. Infosys, TCS, Wipro and HCL are Indian groups. Agarwal’s list of “Indian companies named” also includes Cognizant.
• India’s response: the next day, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) said, as reported, that “PERM is distinct from the H-1B visa programme”, that the suspension “does not, by itself, affect the validity of existing H-1B visas”, but that “there could be some impact on the permanent-residency/Green Card process of eligible employees of the affected companies”. It added: “The steps announced by the US do not advance the shared ambitions of both countries.”
• The stakes: in FY2023, 72% of approved H-1B petitions were for workers born in India, according to the US Congressional Research Service.

The trade picture

The defence and technology record (background)

The MEA’s bilateral brief of 2023 put India’s defence procurements from the US at “almost US$20 billion”.

The Pakistan factor (background)

• Operation Sindoor (May 2025): the Indian Armed Forces hit “terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir”, targeting nine sites.
• Asim Munir: Field Marshal Asim Munir was appointed Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff and, concurrently, Chief of Defence Forces in December 2025, as reported.
• The Mecca Alliance for Defence: Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye signed it in August 2026. Under it, “an attack on any of the three nations will be treated as an attack on all”. It was invoked for the first time in early October 2026, as reported.

The Analysis

Agarwal’s audit runs from one trigger to a structural question.

1. The trigger is part of a pattern. The PERM action, he argues, is “not an isolated incident” but part of a series of US actions, including “the ill-treatment of Indians and racist attacks against them”, that are “placing bilateral ties under severe strain”. Read his framing precisely. He writes that the US “suspended the Permanent Labour Certification (PERM) programme for eight global IT companies”; as reported, the action suspended those eight employers’ use of PERM, not the programme itself. He attributes his figures, “more than 2,30,000 H-1B visa approvals and over 1,00,000 permanent labour certifications since 2009”, to the US government. His claim that Indian professionals account for “more than 70% of approved H-1B petitions annually” holds for FY2023, when the US Congressional Research Service recorded 72%.

2. Trade: discord and asymmetry. Agarwal gives three reasons. First, India’s surplus of $33.8 billion in bilateral trade of more than $140 billion in 2025-26. Second, US demands for access to India’s dairy and agriculture sectors, which, he writes, “India cannot afford to concede”. Third, he says India “has refused to halt Russian oil imports despite additional U.S. tariffs and sanctions”. That last point needs context: Washington’s own account of February 2026 is that India committed to stop buying Russian oil and that the extra 25% tariff was removed. The additional duty Indian goods face now, 10% under Section 301, comes from forced-labour investigations, not from Russian oil. The new risk lies in the sanctions law of September 2026.

3. A framework, not a deal. The February 2026 framework for an interim agreement has not ended the strain, he argues, and he cites Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman as saying talks had “plateaued”. As reported, she said talks had “levelled off” and that further “giving or taking might be very, very difficult”. She also said the “balance of trade is very much in our favor”.

4. Defence, judged by delivery. Agarwal says India has acquired “over $22 billion worth of American military hardware” since 2002, but “meaningful co-production and technology transfer remain elusive”. He writes that the US “agreed” in February 2025 to expand defence sales and co-production; the joint statement of that visit announced “plans to pursue” Javelin and Stryker procurement and co-production in India. The 10-year framework followed in October 2025. His test is the right one for an answer: a partnership “must be assessed by what it delivers, not merely the number of agreements signed”. He cites prolonged delays in the supply of GE F404 engines for the Tejas as evidence of “the risks of relying on foreign suppliers for critical military components and the strategic cost of supply-chain vulnerabilities”.

5. Technology: declarations and outcomes. He calls the 2008 civil nuclear agreement “a historic breakthrough” whose “commercial promise of American-designed nuclear reactors in India remains largely unrealised”. Of iCET, launched in 2023, “much remains on paper”. He describes TRUST as “signed”; it was launched in a joint leaders’ statement. “The key challenge, however, remains translating declarations into measurable outcomes.”

6. Pakistan. Since Operation Sindoor, he argues, Pakistan has been a sharper source of friction. In his account, US President Donald Trump’s “repeated claims that he ended the conflict have irked India, although New Delhi has refrained from direct confrontation”; US courting of Asim Munir “has also been a major irritant”; and the Mecca Pact, signed “reportedly with Washington’s blessings”, in his words, “has raised further security concerns for India”.

7. Phase or structure? His conclusion is the thesis quoted above, with a hedge: “Whether this is a difficult phase or a deeper structural problem remains to be seen.” He ends on External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, who has spoken of “a radical repositioning of the United States”, which “has deliberately become a lonelier power”. That observation, Agarwal writes, “may convey more than what the words suggest”.

Data and Institutions Vault

Prelims-grade facts:

Immigration:

• PERM: a US Department of Labor certification that lets an employer hire a foreign worker; a step towards a green card, distinct from the H-1B visa.
• H-1B: 72% of approved H-1B petitions in FY2023 were for workers born in India (US Congressional Research Service).

Trade:

• US duty on Indian goods: an additional 10% under Section 301 of the US Trade Act of 1974, since July 2026; 12.5% had been proposed.
• About 45% of India’s exports to the US fall outside the 10% duty (Ministry of Commerce).
• February 2026: a US-India joint statement announced a framework for an Interim Agreement on reciprocal trade.
• Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 (Public Law 119-111): duties of up to 100% on goods from top-five importers of Russian oil or gas.
• The duty applies to new purchases of Russian crude oil or natural gas; the President may waive it on national-interest grounds.

Defence and technology:

• iCET: launched by the National Security Advisors, January 2023. INDUS-X: launched June 2023.
• TRUST: launched in a joint leaders’ statement, February 2025.
• Framework for the US-India Major Defence Partnership: signed October 2025 in Kuala Lumpur; runs 10 years.

Neighbourhood:

• Operation Sindoor (May 2025): strikes on terrorist infrastructure at nine sites in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir.
• Mecca Alliance for Defence: Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye; signed August 2026; an attack on one is treated as an attack on all.

⚠️ Watch the trap: PERM is a green-card step; the H-1B is a temporary work visa. As reported, the US suspended eight employers’ use of PERM, not the programme. TRUST (February 2025) was launched, not signed as an agreement, and Javelin and Stryker co-production was an announced plan. The February 2026 trade text is a framework for an interim agreement. And the present 10% US duty comes from Section 301 forced-labour investigations, not from Russian oil.

The Debate

Agarwal’s case. One irritant is a phase; a pattern is a problem. Across immigration, trade, defence, technology and Pakistan, India has shown restraint and the US has answered with pressure. Agreements are signed, but co-production, technology transfer and supplies lag, and Washington’s dealings with Pakistan cut across India’s security interests.

The other side.

• Targeted, not general. As reported, the PERM action names eight employers, four of them not Indian, and the MEA was reported as saying it does not by itself affect existing H-1B visas.
• The record is still being built. The defence framework runs 10 years from October 2025; co-production and technology programmes take time to deliver.
• Trade still favours India. India runs a surplus with the US, and about 45% of its exports there fall outside the 10% duty, which is lower than the 12.5% first proposed.
• Agarwal hedges himself. He leaves open whether this is “a difficult phase or a deeper structural problem”.

The balanced verdict. The strain is real, but it is not yet a rupture. India’s best response is to measure the partnership by what it delivers, hold firm on its red lines in trade talks, build domestic capacity in critical military components to cut its supply-chain vulnerability, and keep engaging Washington. That combination protects India’s strategic autonomy without giving up a partnership whose shared interests remain strong.

How to Think About This

Unilateralism means one side acting alone and imposing its will rather than negotiating as an equal. Agarwal’s argument rests on a pattern, so test it as one:

• Phase or structure? A single irritant (one visa action, one tariff) suggests a phase. The same strain across trade, defence, technology and security suggests structure. List the irritants by area before you judge.
• Announced, signed, in force, delivered. Sort every item into one of four columns. TRUST was launched; Javelin and Stryker co-production was a plan; the defence framework was signed; the 10% duty is in force; engines are a matter of delivery. Agarwal’s own test is the last column: a partnership “must be assessed by what it delivers”.
• Whose account? On Russian oil, the US says India committed to stop buying it; Agarwal says India refused to halt imports. When sources differ, name each one rather than choosing silently.

Diagram-in-Words

Takeaway Box

• Core idea: Agarwal argues that India’s restraint is increasingly met with American pressure and unilateralism, across immigration, trade, defence, technology and Pakistan.
• Know the facts: PERM is a green-card step, not the H-1B; 72% of approved H-1B petitions went to India-born workers in FY2023; 10% Section 301 duty since July 2026; defence framework signed October 2025 for 10 years.
• Read precisely: the $22 billion since 2002, the engine delays, the 2008 nuclear deal’s record and the Mecca Pact’s “Washington’s blessings” are Agarwal’s claims.
• Mains use: GS2 India-US relations and the effect of developed countries’ policies on India; GS3 technology transfer and trade.

Revision Flowchart

Sources: The Hindu, op-ed by Rajeev Agarwal, 14 October 2026; White House, US-India joint statement, February 2026; White House fact sheet, February 2026; USTR, Section 301 forced labour action, July 2026; PIB, Ministry of Commerce on the Section 301 duty; Public Law 119-111; PIB, US-India defence framework, October 2025; White House, US-India Joint Leaders’ Statement, February 2025; MEA, India-US bilateral brief, 2023; PIB, Operation Sindoor, May 2025; Congressional Research Service, H-1B (IF12912); Al Jazeera on the Mecca Alliance, October 2026; Business Today on S. Jaishankar’s remarks, October 2026

Source: India-US Ties: Trade, Defence and American Unilateralism — Ujiyari.com | Free UPSC & State PCS Editorial Analysis