The Lift Line
“The Constitution-makers could foresee the danger of a CEC acting in the interests of the ruling party and thereby subverting the entire constitutional scheme governing elections.”
Why This Editorial Matters for Your Exam
P.D.T. Achary, former Secretary General of the Lok Sabha, writes the lead article in The Hindu of 5 October 2026. It comes two days after the paper’s own editorial on the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) (Obstacle Race) and amid reported differences between Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar and Election Commissioners Sukhbir Singh Sandhu and Vivek Joshi. It is a sharp critique by a constitutional practitioner; its characterisations are his. Its value for the exam is the law it lays out: the Constituent Assembly debate, Section 21 of the RP Act, 1950, the limits of Article 324, and the removal and protection of Election Commissioners.
GS Paper 2: Appointment to various constitutional posts, powers, functions and responsibilities of constitutional bodies; salient features of the Representation of People’s Act.
Background and Context
What the Constituent Assembly decided. The Draft Constitution’s Article 289 proposed decentralised machinery: a chief election commissioner in each province for State elections, and one at the Centre for Parliament, President and Vice-President. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar himself moved a new article centralising the machinery, because provincial commissioners, mostly nominees of Chief Ministers, had struck off voters seen as opponents of the ruling party, the writer recounts. Shibban Lal Saxena proposed that a CEC appointed by the President be approved by a two-thirds majority of Parliament, on the lines of US Senate confirmation; the idea was not adopted.
The law on roll revision.
| Provision | Content |
|---|---|
| RP Act, 1950, s.21(1) | Roll prepared with reference to the qualifying date |
| s.21(2) | Revised before each general election and bye-election, and in any year if the ECI directs |
| Registration of Electors Rules, 1960, Rule 25 | A revision under s.21(2) may be intensive, summary, or partly each |
| s.21(3) | ECI may at any time, for reasons recorded, direct a special revision for “any constituency or part of a constituency”, in such manner as it thinks fit |
Removal and protection.
| Rule | Content |
|---|---|
| Article 324(5) | CEC removable only like a Supreme Court judge; ECs only on the CEC’s recommendation |
| Article 124(4) with the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 | Proved misbehaviour or incapacity; special majority in each House; the Speaker or Chairman may admit or refuse the motion |
| CEC and Other ECs Act, 2023, Section 16 | No court to entertain civil or criminal proceedings against a serving or former CEC or EC for acts done in the discharge of official duty |
| 2023 Act, Section 18 | Business transacted unanimously as far as possible, otherwise by majority |
The Analysis
1. An old fear, realised. The writer notes the irony that, almost 80 years on, the complaint that led the Assembly to centralise the machinery, large-scale deletion of voters without strict adherence to law, has returned, now voiced by Election Commissioners themselves.
2. A revision the law does not name. Section 21 knows intensive, summary and special revisions; the special one under Section 21(3) is meant for limited constituencies in special circumstances. “Special intensive revision”, he argues, is mentioned nowhere.
3. Article 324 fills gaps, it does not override. The ECI can act under Article 324 on matters the statute does not cover; otherwise it is bound by law (the principle of Mohinder Singh Gill v. CEC, 1978).
4. Scale and Article 326. Media reports put removals at about 13 crore, which the writer calls perhaps the largest disenfranchisement in any democracy; Article 326 is designed to include eligible voters, not exclude them.
5. Collective body, unilateral decisions. The two ECs say they were not kept in the loop. A decision taken by the CEC alone is not a valid decision of the Commission, the writer argues, so actions that follow lack legal validity.
6. Hard to remove, broadly shielded. Removal needs proved misbehaviour, and presiding officers can block a motion at the threshold. The writer reads Section 16 of the 2023 Act as lifelong immunity from civil and criminal liability that “even the President of India does not enjoy”. As enacted, Section 16 covers acts in the discharge of official duty; the President’s protection under Article 361 for official acts is likewise not limited in time, while immunity from criminal proceedings for personal acts lasts only during the term. The point about weak accountability stands; the comparison is overstated.
Data and Institutions Vault
Prelims-grade facts:
Constitution:
- Article 324: superintendence of rolls and elections; Article 324(5): CEC removed like a Supreme Court judge.
- Article 326: adult suffrage at 18; Article 361: protection of the President and Governors.
- Draft Article 289 became Article 324.
Statute:
- RP Act, 1950, Section 21: preparation and revision of rolls; 21(3): special revision.
- Registration of Electors Rules, 1960, Rule 25: intensive or summary revision.
- CEC and Other ECs Act, 2023: Section 16 (protection for official acts), Section 18 (majority rule).
- Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968: Speaker or Chairman may refuse to admit a removal motion.
Cases:
- Mohinder Singh Gill v. CEC (1978): Article 324 is a reservoir where law is silent.
- T.N. Seshan v. Union of India (1995): the CEC is first among equals; decisions by majority.
⚠️ Watch the trap: An Election Commissioner cannot be removed except on the recommendation of the CEC; only the CEC has the judge-like removal procedure. And Section 16 of the 2023 Act protects official acts, not every act.
The Debate
For the writer’s view. The Assembly built a central, independent commission precisely to stop partisan deletions; a revision the statute does not name, run without the full Commission’s assent, cuts against both the letter of Section 21 and the spirit of Article 326.
The other side. Section 21(3) lets the ECI direct a special revision “in such manner as it may think fit”, intensive revisions were last held nationally in the early 2000s, and, for background, the Supreme Court found the SIR lawful on 27 May 2026 while requiring safeguards. The Commission has said its decisions are collective. Immunity for official acts is common to many offices and protects decisions from vexatious suits.
The balanced verdict. The legal debate is best closed by Parliament: define the revision, the safeguards and the decision rule in statute, and narrow protection to good-faith official acts with a clear route to accountability.
How to Think About This
Ask where the power comes from. For any action by a constitutional body, trace it to its source: Constitution, statute, rules, or a gap-filling power. If a statute occupies the field, the gap-filling power cannot be used to depart from it. That three-step test structures most answers on the ECI, the Governor or tribunals.
Diagram-in-Words
Takeaway Box
- Thesis: the SIR lacks a clear statutory basis and unilateral CEC decisions are invalid, says the writer.
- Law: RP Act s.21(1), (2), (3); RER 1960 Rule 25; Article 324 fills gaps only (Mohinder Singh Gill, 1978).
- History: draft Article 289; Ambedkar centralised the machinery; Shibban Lal Saxena’s two-thirds confirmation idea.
- Accountability: removal like an SC judge (Art. 324(5)); 2023 Act s.16 shields official acts, s.18 majority rule.
Sources: The Hindu, Representation of the People Act, 1950, CEC and Other ECs Act, 2023, Constituent Assembly Debates
Source: ECI's Constitutional Mandate Under Strain: SIR and the Law — Ujiyari.com | Free UPSC & State PCS Editorial Analysis
