A Confrontation That Reshaped the Election Commission: Seshan Case

Source: Original editorial ↗ The Indian Express

The Lift Line

“He did more than perhaps any predecessor to make the CEC’s office visible and formidable. Yet the case bearing his name helped establish that the commission itself was larger than its chief.”

Why This Editorial Matters for Your Exam

Shubham Kumar, a constitutional lawyer specialising in public law, writes in The Indian Express of 4 October 2026 on the 1993 confrontation between Chief Election Commissioner T.N. Seshan and the government, and the Constitution Bench judgment of July 1995 that settled how a multi-member Election Commission decides. The writer’s peg is “recent differences within the Election Commission”; press reports in late September described the two Election Commissioners differing with the CEC on aspects of the Special Intensive Revision, which the Commission answered by saying its decisions were unanimous. The piece is a compact history of Article 324 that Prelims and Mains both reward.

GS Paper 2: Appointment to various constitutional posts; powers, functions and responsibilities of constitutional bodies; the Election Commission.

Background and Context

Date	Event
October 1989	The Rajiv Gandhi government appoints S.S. Dhanoa and V.S. Seigell as Election Commissioners alongside CEC R.V.S. Peri Sastri, weeks before the general election
1 January 1990	After a change of government, the President returns the Commission to a single-member body
December 1990	T.N. Seshan, a former Cabinet Secretary, becomes CEC
1991	S.S. Dhanoa v Union of India: the Supreme Court holds the Constitution requires a CEC but does not oblige the appointment of other commissioners, observing in passing that the chief stands in a “distinctly higher position”
1 October 1993	The President appoints M.S. Gill and G.V.G. Krishnamurthy as Election Commissioners; an ordinance of the same day provides for decisions by unanimity where possible and by majority otherwise
13 and 26 October 1993	Cho Ramaswamy, then Seshan himself, challenge the ordinance and the appointments; the matter goes to a Constitution Bench
4 January 1994	Legislation replaces the ordinance without material change
14 July 1995	A five-judge Bench led by Chief Justice A.M. Ahmadi upholds the 1993 arrangement and the appointments

The constitutional text. Article 324(2): the Commission consists of the CEC and “such number of other Election Commissioners, if any, as the President may from time to time fix”, all appointed by the President subject to any law made by Parliament. Article 324(5), proviso: the CEC can be removed only in the manner and on the grounds applicable to a Supreme Court judge; other Election Commissioners can be removed only on the CEC’s recommendation.

The Analysis

1. Independence versus hierarchy. Seshan read the CEC’s judge-like tenure protection as proof that the chief stood above the others, so the hierarchy should extend to decision-making. The Court separated the two ideas: removal protection guards independence; it says nothing about voting power.

2. What “collective” means. Once a multi-member Commission exists, its members decide together. If the chief could override them, the others would be advisers with titles. The statutory rule, unanimity first and majority otherwise, gives the body a way to act when members disagree.

3. First among equals. The CEC chairs; he does not outrank. The writer calls this the position of primus inter pares.

4. The irony of Seshan’s legacy. Seshan made the office of CEC formidable in public life; the case in his name established that the institution is bigger than its chief.

5. Why it matters now. Reports of the two Election Commissioners differing with CEC Gyanesh Kumar on aspects of the SIR, which the Commission says ended in unanimous decisions, revive the 1995 question: disagreement is permitted; the test is whether it is recorded and resolved by the rule of majority rather than by the chair.

Data and Institutions Vault

Prelims-grade facts:

Article 324:

• 324(2): CEC plus “such number of other Election Commissioners, if any” as the President fixes; appointments subject to any law made by Parliament.
• 324(5) proviso: CEC removable only like a Supreme Court judge; other ECs removable only on the CEC’s recommendation.
• The Commission became multi-member on 16 October 1989 (briefly) and permanently from 1 October 1993.

The statute:

• CEC and Other ECs (Conditions of Service) Act, 1991: amended by Ordinance No. 32 of 1 October 1993, replaced by Act 4 of 1994 on 4 January 1994.
• The 1993-94 amendment inserted Chapter III (Sections 9 and 10); Section 10 requires unanimity where possible and majority decisions otherwise.
• The 1991 Act was repealed by the 2023 Act (Section 21); the majority rule now sits in Section 18 of the 2023 Act.
• 2023 Act: selection committee of the Prime Minister, Leader of the Opposition and a Union Cabinet Minister; search committee headed by the Law Minister.

The cases:

• S.S. Dhanoa v Union of India (1991): additional commissioners not obligatory.
• T.N. Seshan v Union of India (14 July 1995): five judges, CJI A.M. Ahmadi; majority rule upheld; CEC is first among equals.
• Anoop Baranwal v Union of India (2 March 2023), the background ruling: interim committee of PM, LoP and CJI until Parliament legislated.

⚠️ Watch the trap: The CEC’s judge-like removal protection is in the proviso to Article 324(5); the other Election Commissioners’ protection (removal only on the CEC’s recommendation) is in the same clause. Neither gives the CEC a casting or overriding vote; that comes from the statute, which provides for majority decisions.

The Debate

For the writer’s view. A collective body is harder to capture or to intimidate than one office; majority rule contains disagreement without paralysing the Commission; the chief’s tenure protection remains intact as a shield.

The other side. If two commissioners appointed by an executive-dominated committee can outvote the one member with judge-like protection, the Constitution’s design of an independent chief is diluted. The 2023 Act, by removing the Chief Justice from selection, sharpens this worry.

The balanced verdict. Keep majority rule, but equalise the protection: give all three members the CEC’s removal safeguard, record dissents, and publish reasoned orders on contested decisions. Collegiality then strengthens independence instead of competing with it.

How to Think About This

Separate tenure from power. Many constitutional provisions protect an office-holder’s tenure (judges, the CAG, the CEC). Protection from removal is about independence from the executive; it does not by itself create authority over colleagues. Apply the same test to the UPSC, the CAG’s deputies and the Finance Commission.

Diagram-in-Words

Takeaway Box

• Event: IE column of 4 October 2026 on the 1993-95 confrontation, amid reported differences inside today’s Commission.
• Law: Ordinance of 1 October 1993, Act of 4 January 1994: majority rule, equal rank.
• Case: T.N. Seshan v Union of India, 14 July 1995, five judges, CJI Ahmadi: CEC is primus inter pares.
• Lesson: tenure protection is a shield for independence, not a source of hierarchy.

Sources: The Indian Express, Supreme Court judgment text, Digital SCR, Election Commission of India

Source: A Confrontation That Reshaped the Election Commission: Seshan Case — Ujiyari.com | Free UPSC & State PCS Editorial Analysis

Key Arguments at a Glance

Shubham Kumar argues that the 1993 ordinance making the Election Commission a three-member body deciding by majority, upheld by a Constitution Bench in July 1995, established that the Commission is larger than its chief, and that recent differences within the Commission should be read in that light.

✓ Supporting

• Article 324 never confined the Commission to one member: it provides for a CEC and “such number of other Election Commissioners, if any” as the President fixes; the 1989 appointments of S.S. Dhanoa and V.S. Seigell were reversed in January 1990 and the Court in Dhanoa (1991) held additional commissioners were not obligatory.
• The ordinance of 1 October 1993 appointed M.S. Gill and G.V.G. Krishnamurthy and laid down that business would be transacted unanimously where possible and by majority otherwise; Cho Ramaswamy and then T.N. Seshan challenged it, and legislation replaced the ordinance on 4 January 1994.
• Seshan argued that the CEC’s protection from removal (only in the manner of a Supreme Court judge, while other ECs can be removed on the CEC’s recommendation) placed the chief above the others; the five-judge Bench led by Chief Justice A.M. Ahmadi rejected this in July 1995, treating the protection as a safeguard of independence, not a source of greater voting power.
• The settlement made the CEC primus inter pares: chairperson of a body that decides collectively, by majority where unanimity fails; any other reading would reduce the other commissioners to advisers.

⚠ Counter

A different reading, which the writer does not develop: the Constitution deliberately gave the CEC alone a judge-like security of tenure, and a majority rule that lets two commissioners, removable on the CEC’s recommendation but appointed by the executive, outvote the protected office may dilute the very independence Article 324 sought; Seshan’s fear was of a packed Commission, not of collegiality.

→ Way Forward

The writer’s conclusion is that collegiality was never meant to eliminate disagreement, only to contain it within a constitutional framework; the Commission’s strength cannot rest on one office-holder. Ujiyari’s synthesis: record dissent in minutes, publish reasoned decisions on contested matters, and give all three members the same removal protection so that majority rule and independence reinforce each other.