The Lift Line

“This energy transition has made us surplus in solar hours, but we are facing deficits at night.” (Somit Dasgupta, The Indian Express, 26 October 2026)

Why This Editorial Matters for Your Exam

In the news: In a column in The Indian Express on 26 October 2026, “India’s power dilemma: Surplus during the day, deficits at night”, Somit Dasgupta argues that India’s capacity boom has left the grid with surplus solar power by day and deficits at night, and that storage, the fix, may stall because its price in competitive bids “is said to be non-remunerative”.

The writer, as the column’s closing line reads: “The writer is visiting professor, ICRIER and former member (economic and commercial), CEA. Views are personal”.

This page takes up the night-time deficit and the price of storage. For the background on curtailment, the duck and camel curves, viability gap funding and the CEA’s draft co-location rule, see our 20 October piece on solar curtailment and storage.

UPSC relevance:

  • GS Paper 3: infrastructure (energy); the energy transition; investment models (tenders, viability gap funding).
  • Prelims: the Electricity Act, 2003 (sections 26, 32, 66, 76, 79, 82, 86); CERC and State Commissions; load despatch centres and Grid-India; installed capacity by source (CEA, 30 September 2026); the National Electricity Plan 2023 storage projection; the Energy Storage Obligation; BESS and pumped storage; MW versus MWh.
  • Essay and Interview: energy security and the energy transition; reform that changes structures but not incentives.

The Crux in 60 Words

India once lacked power; coal and then solar additions have cut shortages to about 1 to 2 per cent, Somit Dasgupta writes. The transition has brought a new problem: surplus solar by day, deficits at night. Storage is the answer, the writer argues, but pumped storage is slow to build and storage prices from competitive bids are said to be non-remunerative.

Key Arguments at a Glance

The capacity boom that ended India’s chronic power shortages has created a new problem, surplus solar by day and deficits at night, and storage, the fix, is slow to build and said to be priced too low to pay.

Supporting
  • In the 1990s, the writer recalls, capacity grew about 5 per cent a year against demand growth of 7 to 8 per cent, with peak deficits near 15 per cent.
  • The Electricity Act, 2003 unbundled the State Electricity Boards and created regulators, but in the writer’s view governments kept their grip on tariffs and distribution stayed unviable.
  • Coal and then solar additions cut peak and energy deficits to about 1 to 2 per cent, the writer says.
  • Night deficits now come from unplanned coal outages, heavy air-conditioning load and poor reservoir levels, in the writer’s account, while daytime solar is backed down after coal is ramped to its minimum.
Counter

Storage is one lever among several (the writer also lists transmission, demand-side management and markets that reward flexibility); recent tenders have discovered storage prices, so ‘non-remunerative’ is a claim about returns that needs evidence; and the column gives no figure for the size of the night deficit.

Way Forward

Publish dated night-time shortage data; design storage tenders and viability gap funding so that bids are bankable; build both batteries and pumped storage; keep coal and hydro plants available for the evening peak; and let regulators build markets that pay for flexibility.

Background and Context

From shortage to surplus, in the writer’s telling

Thirty years ago, the writer recalls, 40 per cent of India’s population had no access to electricity, according to the World Bank. In 1990-2000 capacity grew “about 5 per cent” a year while demand grew “about 7 per cent to 8 per cent”; peak deficits were “of the order of 15 per cent” and energy shortage “about 10 per cent”. The writer calls the vertically integrated State Electricity Boards “overstaffed, corrupt, and inefficient”, and a “poor and dilapidated distribution infrastructure” perhaps the bigger problem. The Electricity Act, 2003 allowed the Boards to be split into generation, transmission and distribution companies and set up regulatory commissions, but “the government was loath to give up its control over tariffs and continued to breathe down the regulators’ necks”, leaving distribution “financially unsustainable”.

Capacity then surged. After power exchanges opened “in Delhi and Mumbai around 2008”, spot prices rose and developers built, mainly coal: “A little more than 1,00,000 MW of coal-based capacity was added between 2010 and 2020”, about as much as in 1947-2010, Dasgupta writes. Banks lent “without ensuring that the developers had signed power purchase agreements (PPAs) and had fuel linkages”, stranding plants and raising bad loans. Solar got its push “around 2015”. The result, in the writer’s words: “This massive growth in installed capacity reduced our peak and energy deficits to about 1 per cent to 2 per cent.”

Capacity, with the date on every number

The Central Electricity Authority’s latest monthly table gives the background: India’s installed capacity as on 30 September 2026 was:

Source (CEA, as on 30 September 2026) Capacity (MW)
Thermal (coal, lignite, gas, diesel) 250,869.87
Large hydro 52,064.66
Renewable energy sources (excluding large hydro) 247,181.87
of which solar 171,051.47
Nuclear 8,780.00
Total 558,896.39

MNRE’s table for the same date gives renewable capacity including large hydro as 299,246.53 MW, about 299.2 GW. That is 53.5 per cent of the total. MNRE notes that its large hydro figure includes 7,425.6 MW of pumped storage.

The column’s figures match earlier months. It puts renewable capacity including large hydro at “a little less than 292 GW”, about 53 per cent, and solar at “about 162 GW”, all as “Today”. Against CEA’s monthly tables:

  • its 292 GW and 53 per cent match 31 July 2026 (renewable sources plus large hydro, 291.7 GW, or 52.8 per cent of the total);
  • its 162 GW of solar matches 30 June 2026 (162.14 GW).

The night-time problem, in the data

The background is the record day. On 21 May 2026 peak demand met hit an all-time high of 270.8 GW at 3:45 pm, as our 20 October piece reported. The night matters as much. An EAC-PM working paper (EAC-PM/WP/53/2026, July 2026), drawing on Grid-India’s SCADA data, traces that day: “This evening rise pushes demand back up to a second peak of about 252 GW near 10:45 PM.” The day ended near 248.8 GW, well above its morning low of 224.1 GW at 8 am. And after dark, the paper notes, “In the dark, solar contributes nothing, and the net load (demand minus solar) is simply equal to total load. The whole of the country’s night-time appetite falls on the conventional plants, i.e. thermal, hydro and nuclear.”

The column gives no figure for the size of the night deficit. It names causes: “unplanned outages in our coal plants, excessive air conditioning load, poor reservoir levels affecting hydro generation, etc.”

The Analysis

The writer’s argument, step by step

  1. Shortage was the old problem, and reform changed structures more than incentives: tariffs stayed political.
  2. Capacity ended the shortage, with excesses: stranded coal plants and bad loans.
  3. The transition creates a two-sided problem. “The surplus in solar hours is forcing us to back down our solar generation, even after ramping down our coal generation sometimes to the minimum technical load in order to balance the grid.” The cost is twofold: “First, we are wasting our solar power by backing down. Second, we are decreasing the longevity of our machines by this frequent ramping up and down.”
  4. Storage is the answer. “The answer is to build storage so that excess generation in the daytime can charge our batteries, which may also ensure less frequent ramping up and down of our coal-based generation.” Dasgupta adds: “Along with storage, we also need to strengthen our transmission system, improve demand-side management, and create a market mechanism that properly rewards flexibility.”
  5. But storage may stall. “However, building storage, especially pump storage, is time-consuming, and moreover, the price of storage, as determined through competitive bids, is said to be non-remunerative. This may mean that many of the storage projects will not see the light of day, which will only prolong our agony of losing valuable solar power.”

How much storage, and how much there is

  • The need: the CEA’s National Electricity Plan (NEP) 2023 projects an energy storage requirement of 82.37 GWh in 2026-27 (47.65 GWh pumped storage, 34.72 GWh battery), rising to 411.4 GWh in 2031-32 (175.18 GWh pumped storage, 236.22 GWh battery).
  • What runs: about 9.08 GWh of battery storage was operational in August 2026, by the count of Rubix Data Sciences, a private research firm.
  • The push: an Energy Storage Obligation, set by a Ministry of Power order of 22 July 2022, rises from 1 per cent in 2023-24 to 4 per cent by 2029-30, calculated on an energy basis, and counts as met only when at least 85 per cent of the stored energy comes from renewable sources.

What storage tenders have discovered

Battery tenders pay the storage owner a capacity tariff, in rupees per MW per month (1 lakh = 1,00,000). Each result below belongs to its own tender and date:

Tender Size Result Discovered tariff (Rs per MW per month) Viability gap funding
NHPC, intrastate standalone BESS, Andhra Pradesh (Tranche II) 500 MW / 1,000 MWh reported 26 June 2025 2.08 lakh to 2.22 lakh up to Rs 2.7 million per MWh or 30 per cent of capital cost, whichever is lower
SECI, standalone BESS, Odisha 125 MW / 500 MWh reported 2 March 2026 3.04 lakh, 3.05 lakh and 3.75 lakh capped at Rs 1.8 million per MWh
GUVNL 450 MW / 900 MWh awarded August 2026 2.32 lakh not reported
WBSEDCL 500 MW / 2,000 MWh (awards reported for 300 MW) awarded August 2026 4.35 lakh to 4.39 lakh not reported

Across these tenders, the discovered capacity tariffs lie between about Rs 2.1 lakh and Rs 4.4 lakh per MW per month, depending on the tender and its viability gap funding. They differ in date, size, storage hours and support, so they cannot be averaged into one “price of storage” or read as a trend. Nor can they show whether a developer earns a return: that turns on capital cost, viability gap funding, other revenue and the buyer. The writer’s “non-remunerative” is a claim about returns, and the results neither prove nor disprove it.

Where the column is strong, and where it stops

  • Strong: it names the shift that matters. India’s adequacy question has moved from “how much capacity” to “which hour”, and it links storage to the strain on coal plants as well as to wasted solar.
  • Its numbers carry no dates. Its “today” matches end-June or end-July 2026, two to three months before the latest CEA table.
  • The night deficit is asserted, not sized. The causes may be right, but the column offers no data on how large or frequent the shortfalls are.
  • “Is said to be” is hearsay. The column names no tender and no developer, so the claim that storage projects may not “see the light of day” rests on report, not evidence.
  • Its history is unsourced. The World Bank figure and the 1990s deficits come without a reference.

Way forward

  1. Size the problem: publish dated data on night-time shortages, so that storage targets follow measured need.
  2. Make tenders bankable: design viability gap funding and payment terms so that bids attract finance, then track whether awarded projects get built.
  3. Build both kinds of storage, as the NEP’s split between pumped storage and batteries already plans.
  4. Keep the night fleet ready: cut unplanned outages at coal plants, which the writer blames for night deficits.
  5. Pay for flexibility: regulators, whom section 66 of the Act asks to endeavour to promote markets, can design products that reward storage and demand response.

Data and Institutions Vault

Prelims-grade facts:

Installed capacity, CEA, as on 30 September 2026:

  • Total: 558,896.39 MW; renewable sources (excluding large hydro) 247,181.87 MW
  • Solar: 171,051.47 MW (MNRE: 171.05 GW)
  • Renewable including large hydro (MNRE): 299,246.53 MW, about 53.5 per cent of total
  • Large hydro includes 7,425.6 MW of pumped storage (MNRE)

Demand, 21 May 2026 (EAC-PM, Grid-India data):

  • Peak demand met 270.8 GW at 3:45 pm, an all-time high (EAC-PM)

Storage:

  • NEP 2023 need: 82.37 GWh in 2026-27; 411.4 GWh in 2031-32
  • Battery storage operational: about 9.08 GWh, August 2026 (Rubix Data Sciences)
  • Energy Storage Obligation (MoP order, 22 July 2022): 1 per cent (2023-24) to 4 per cent (2029-30)

The Electricity Act, 2003:

  • CERC: section 76; its functions, section 79; State Commissions: sections 82 and 86
  • Development of a power market: section 66
  • NLDC: section 26; SLDC: section 32; reorganisation of Boards: section 131

⚠️ Watch the trap:

  • “Renewable energy sources” in CEA tables excludes large hydro; “including large hydro” is a separate total
  • Storage capacity tariffs are in Rs per MW per month, not Rs per kWh
  • The column’s deficit figures and its 1990s history are the writer’s, not official data
  • Pumped storage sits inside MNRE’s large hydro figure, not in “renewable energy sources”

The Debate

Storage is the fix, and it is stalling Look wider before blaming bid prices
At night the whole load falls on thermal, hydro and nuclear plants The size of the night deficit has not been put on record in the column
Backing down solar wastes clean power; ramping coal wears machines Transmission, demand-side management and flexible markets also cut waste, as the writer concedes
Pumped storage takes years, the writer says Battery tenders are being awarded, in 2025 and 2026
Low bid prices may leave projects unbuilt, in the writer’s view A discovered price is not proof of loss; returns depend on VGF, capital cost and other revenue

How to Think About This

  1. Ask “which hour?” Annual shortage figures can look small while the evening and night run tight.
  2. Keep the units apart. MW is capacity, MWh is stored energy, and capacity tariffs are in Rs per MW per month.
  3. A price is not a return. Judge “non-remunerative” by projects built or abandoned, not by the bid alone.
  4. Date every number. Capacity changes month to month; an undated “today” can be months old.

Diagram-in-Words

Argument map

India’s power dilemma: surplus by day, deficit at night

Covers the capacity boom, the daytime surplus, the night deficit, storage as the fix and the writer’s reasons for doubt.

From shortage to capacity coal first: a little more than 1,00,000 MW added in 2010-2020, the writer says then solar, which got its push around 2015 Solar hours: surplus solar is backed down, even after coal is sometimes ramped down to its minimum technical load the cost: wasted solar power and wear on machines from frequent ramping Night: deficit EAC-PM: solar contributes nothing; the load falls on thermal, hydro and nuclear EAC-PM: demand rose again to about 252 GW near 10:45 pm on the day of the record peak causes, the writer says: coal outages, air-conditioning load, low reservoirs the split Storage excess daytime generation charges batteries for the night batteries and pumped storage, as NEP 2023 plans plus transmission, demand-side management and markets that reward flexibility the fix Why it may stall, in the writer’s view building storage, especially pumped storage, is time-consuming bid prices are "said to be non-remunerative" What the tenders show tariffs of about Rs 2.1 lakh to 4.4 lakh per MW per month, by tender a discovered price alone is not proof of loss the catch
The writer’s case, with an EAC-PM paper’s night-time figures: a capacity boom, a day-night split, storage as the bridge, and the reasons the writer fears it may stall.

Read the figure from the top: the capacity boom splits into a daytime surplus and a night-time deficit, storage bridges the two, and the bottom band shows why the writer fears storage may stall.

✍️ Mains Answer Framework
Question

India's power system now has surplus solar power during the day and shortfalls at night. Examine the causes of this mismatch and discuss the role of energy storage, and the economics of storage tenders, in resolving it. (250 words)

Introduction

As of 30 September 2026, renewable capacity including large hydro stood at about 299.2 GW, or 53.5 per cent of India’s installed capacity, with solar at 171.05 GW (CEA and MNRE). The system can now have surplus power in solar hours and tight supply after sunset, when solar output falls to zero.

Body

On 21 May 2026 peak demand met reached a record 270.8 GW at 3:45 pm, yet demand climbed again to about 252 GW near 10:45 pm (EAC-PM, using Grid-India SCADA data). At night the whole load falls on thermal, hydro and nuclear plants, so unplanned outages at coal plants, a heavy cooling load and low reservoirs can open a shortfall.
In daytime, operators back down solar after cutting coal plants to their technical minimum, which wastes clean power and wears machines through frequent ramping. Storage shifts daytime energy into the night.
The National Electricity Plan 2023 projects a storage need of 82.37 GWh in 2026-27, rising to 411.4 GWh in 2031-32, against about 9 GWh of battery storage operational in August 2026 (Rubix Data Sciences). Battery tenders have discovered capacity tariffs that differ by tender: Rs 2.08 to 2.22 lakh per MW per month in NHPC’s Andhra Pradesh tender (results June 2025) and Rs 4.35 to 4.39 lakh in WBSEDCL’s tender awarded in August 2026, each with its own design and viability gap funding.
Whether such prices earn a return depends on capital cost, VGF and other revenue. Under the Electricity Act, 2003, the Central and State Commissions set tariffs (sections 79 and 86) and are to endeavour to promote power markets (section 66), so they can build markets that reward flexibility.

Conclusion

Night-time adequacy is now the test of India’s energy transition. Bankable storage tenders, transmission, demand response and markets that pay for flexibility, together with reliable coal and hydro for the evening peak, can turn the daytime surplus into round-the-clock supply.

Interview Angle

"Your State has surplus solar power at noon and shortages after dark. As its energy secretary, what would you fix first: storage, the reliability of coal plants or demand at night, and why?"

Takeaway Box

  • The shift: India’s power problem has moved from total capacity to the hour of supply: surplus at noon, deficits at night.
  • The fix and its catch: storage, against an NEP 2023 need; tender tariffs vary by tender, and “non-remunerative” is the writer’s claim.
  • In the exam: date every capacity figure (the latest CEA and MNRE tables are for 30 September 2026), keep MW and MWh apart, and quote the column’s history as the writer’s.

Sources:

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