The Lift Line
“Delhi should consider the opportunities from US-Russian cooperation as carefully as the costs of hostility.” (C. Raja Mohan, The Indian Express)
Why This Editorial Matters for Your Exam
This column in The Indian Express, published on 13 October 2026, is by C. Raja Mohan, who is, in the paper’s words, “a contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express” and “professor and director at the Motwani Jadeja Institute of American Studies, Jindal Global University, Delhi”. Delhi’s usual worry is a US-China “G2”. Raja Mohan asks it to think about another one: a strategic accommodation between America and Russia. India, he writes, “has fewer reasons to fear it, although it would bring complications of its own.”
For the US-China side of the G2 debate, read our editorials on Kevin Rudd’s case that there is no G-2 and on Raja Mohan’s earlier column on a world economy taking a G2 shape. The diesel licence itself is explained in our earlier editorial on General License 135, and the US tariff law in our editorial on PERM and the Russian-oil tariff law. This piece adds what those did not: the US-Russia side, its limits, and what it means for India.
GS Paper 2: Effect of policies and politics of developed and developing countries on India’s interests; bilateral, regional and global groupings and agreements affecting India’s interests. Essay: great-power politics and strategic autonomy.
In the news: in a column published on 13 October 2026, C. Raja Mohan weighs what a US-Russia thaw means for India. The context: on 9 October 2026, after a telephone call between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin, the US Treasury issued General License 135, which authorises transactions in Russian-origin diesel until 7 April 2027.
Background and Context
Key terms first
| Term | What it means here |
|---|---|
| G2 | Two powers steering world affairs together. In Indian debate it usually means a US-China pair that, in the author’s words, “might produce geopolitical duopoly over Asia”. Trump used the label himself in late October 2025, posting “THE G2 WILL BE CONVENING SHORTLY!” as he arrived in Busan to meet Xi Jinping. |
| The other G2 | The author’s term for a US-Russia accommodation, which Trump “has long championed” |
| Entente | An understanding between states, short of an alliance; the author’s word for what a US-Russia thaw could become |
| General licence | An authorisation issued by the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) that permits transactions sanctions would otherwise prohibit, without a case-by-case licence |
What happened on 9 October 2026
| What | The record |
|---|---|
| Trump-Putin call | The Kremlin’s readout says the conversation “took place late in the evening on October 9” and “lasted an hour and a half” |
| Oil on the agenda | The Kremlin says “the Russian side confirmed its willingness to supply oil and petroleum products to the US market and global markets at large”; Presidential Aide Yury Ushakov, in a separate readout, spoke of “possible supplies of Russian oil products to the US and global markets” |
| The licence | OFAC’s General License 135, dated 9 October 2026 |
What General License 135 does. It authorises transactions prohibited under two US sanctions regulations, 31 CFR part 587 and 31 CFR part 589, that are “related to the sale, delivery, offloading, or importation, including importation into the United States, of diesel fuel of Russian Federation origin”. The authority runs until 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on 7 April 2027. It keeps one carve-out: it “does not authorize any debit to an account on the books of a U.S. financial institution of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, or the Ministry of Finance.”
So the column’s “Washington authorised diesel imports until April 2027” is right but narrow: the licence covers sale, delivery and offloading as well as imports, and it is a time-limited licence, not a lifting of sanctions. Trade press has carried tonnage figures attributed to Trump; those are his claims, and the Kremlin’s own account speaks only of possible supplies.
Why diesel, and why now
The author ties the step to prices at the pump and to the US calendar. The background figures come from the US Energy Information Administration’s Gasoline and Diesel Fuel Update, which put the US on-highway diesel price at $6.529 a gallon on 21 September, $6.382 on 28 September and $6.199 on 5 October 2026. US law fixes the day of congressional elections as “The Tuesday next after the 1st Monday in November, in every even numbered year”, which in 2026 is 3 November. Hence his line that “cheaper fuel for farmers and truckers is an urgent political priority for Trump.”
The tariff law beside it
The irony the author points to has a legal background: a law Trump signed on 18 September 2026, Public Law 119-111 (often called the Graham Act). Its Section 113(a) says: “Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment ... the President shall ... increase the rate of duty ... to a rate of up to 100 percent ad valorem”. It applies to the top five buyers that make new purchases after those 30 days, which run to 18 October 2026, and Section 115 gives the President a waiver.
Note the wording. The column speaks of “sweeping powers to impose tariffs of up to 100 per cent on countries like India buying Russian oil”. The statute does more than empower: it directs the President to act, while allowing a waiver. It does not fix a flat 100 per cent rate; that is a ceiling.
The record the column draws on
| Date | Event | What the record says |
|---|---|---|
| 24 March 2014 | The Hague Declaration of G7 leaders, after the Crimea crisis | “We will suspend our participation in the G-8 until Russia changes course”; the planned Sochi summit was replaced by a G7 meeting in Brussels |
| 8 June 2018 | Trump leaves for the G7 summit at Charlevoix | “Why are we having a meeting without Russia being in the meeting?” |
| 16 July 2018 | Trump-Putin joint press conference, Presidential Palace, Helsinki | Asked about calling Putin “an adversary, a rival”, Trump said: “Actually, I called him a competitor. And a good competitor he is.” |
| 2019 | The 116th Congress | “After picking up 41 seats in the 2018 midterm elections, the Democratic Party held the House majority” |
| 18 February 2025 | US-Russia talks in Riyadh | Senior US and Russian officials met for about four and a half hours and agreed to set up negotiating groups, as reported at the time |
| 15 August 2025 | Alaska summit | Putin and Trump “held talks at the Arctic Warrior Convention Centre” in Anchorage |
| 5 September 2026 | Envoys in the Kremlin | Putin received US Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, founder of Affinity Partners; it was “their eighth visit to our country”, Ushakov said, and the talks ran “three hours and ten minutes” |
| 9 October 2026 | Call and licence | Trump-Putin call; General License 135 |
The column says the G8 “suspended Russia”. The G7 leaders’ own text says they suspended their participation in the G8; write it that way in an answer.
The Analysis
1. Two G2s, two kinds of worry. A US-China G2 frightens Delhi because it could settle Asia over India’s head. A US-Russia accommodation is different: India has close ties with both, and better relations between them “could reduce the friction that its Russian partnership creates with Washington”, the author writes. He adds that many would hope that, “having carved out an exemption on diesel for himself, Trump would hesitate to impose fresh oil sanctions on India.” That is a hope, not a policy; the tariff law’s 30-day clock still runs to 18 October 2026.
2. Why Trump wants it. The author sees three drivers. The first is domestic: diesel prices and inflation before the 3 November elections. The second is an old instinct: in his first term Trump pressed for Russia’s return to the G8, and at Helsinki in 2018 he called Putin a “competitor”. The author also says Trump has invoked the US-Soviet alliance of the Second World War as a precedent; that is the author’s account. The third is commerce. In the author’s reading: “He wants economic cooperation to open a path to peace, rather than follow a settlement. Profitable ventures, he believes, can soften political antagonisms.” The author adds that Trump has pressed Kyiv to stop attacking Russian refineries.
3. The second-term track. Talks in Riyadh in February 2025, the author writes, “reopened high-level engagement”, and Putin’s investment envoy, Kirill Dmitriev, offered opportunities in energy, Arctic development and minerals; that list is the author’s. (The Kremlin styles Dmitriev “Special Presidential Representative for Investment and Economic Cooperation with Foreign Countries”.) The Alaska summit of August 2025 brought the two presidents together but, as the author puts it, “failed to end the war so far”. For context, Witkoff and Kushner met Putin in the Kremlin on 5 September 2026.
4. What is floated, not fixed. The author writes that Trump could meet Putin at the APEC summit in Shenzhen in November, “where the Kremlin has floated a meeting” that would include China’s Xi Jinping, and might host Putin at the G20 summit in Miami in December, an invitation Moscow “has yet to accept”. The record matches that caution:
| Meeting | What the record shows |
|---|---|
| APEC, Shenzhen, November | Ushakov said on 1 September, “This issue was discussed, yes”; the White House said: “We have no announcements regarding President Trump’s attendance at APEC at this time.” |
| G20, Miami, December | Marco Rubio said for Washington on 23 September, “We’ve invited president Putin to the G20”; Peskov replied for the Kremlin, “We’re grateful to the U.S. for the invitation, and we welcome it.” |
The author’s own verdict: “Neither encounter is assured, but the diplomatic possibilities are expanding.”
5. Why it is hard. The obstacles are mostly American. Democrats, the author recalls, spent Trump’s first term “arguing that Russian interference had helped put him in the White House”, and after taking the House in 2019 pursued investigations into his Russian connections. (For balance: the Special Counsel’s report found that “the investigation did not establish that members of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with the Russian government in its election interference activities.”) If Democrats regain Congress, or even the House, the author says, they could use investigations, sanctions legislation and spending powers to obstruct a rapprochement; Republican opposition to concessions for Putin adds a second constraint. He notes that some on America’s Christian right favour engagement with Putin, but judges that this “cannot overcome the wider opposition”. Beyond Washington, Ukraine will resist a bargain that compromises its security, and Europeans fear being left exposed to Russia.
6. Why Putin would bargain. The author writes: “Putin has reasons to bargain. Sanctions relief promises revenue, investment and technology.” Engagement with Washington restores standing “and could reduce dependence on China”, and a settlement on his terms would let him claim victory at home. But “translating these shared interests into concrete results has proved difficult.”
7. Three lessons for India.
- US-Russia relations are not static. “Their confrontation need not last forever.” Delhi should weigh the opportunities of cooperation as carefully as the costs of hostility; a thaw could ease American pressure on India’s Russian energy purchases and defence ties.
- Moscow is not an ideological foe of America. Russia does not see confrontation with America as a “sacred ideological obligation”, “as some in Delhi might believe”. (The quotation marks are the column’s; it names no speaker.) “Russia values engagement with America as a great-power peer, even if it is no economic equal.” The author’s warning from history: in the early 1990s, Russia’s eagerness to build relations with America pushed India down Moscow’s priorities. “Delhi should remember that experience.” That is his historical judgement, and a useful one to test in an interview.
- India’s stakes in Europe have risen. Trade, technology, investment and defence give Delhi a direct interest in European stability. Even if Trump and Putin strike a deal, Russia’s confrontation with Europe could continue, so an American-Russian accommodation would meet only part of India’s needs.
8. What Delhi should do. The author concludes: “Delhi should contribute wherever it can to peace in Ukraine.” Delhi should also encourage direct dialogue between Russia and Europe on ending the war and “shaping a sustainable security order in Europe and more broadly in Eurasia.”
Data and Institutions Vault
Prelims-grade facts:
- General License 135: issued by OFAC (US Treasury), dated 9 October 2026; covers transactions in Russian-origin diesel.
- GL 135 validity: through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, 7 April 2027; issued under 31 CFR parts 587 and 589.
- GL 135 carve-out: no debit to US-held accounts of Russia’s Central Bank, National Wealth Fund or Ministry of Finance.
- Public Law 119-111 (Graham Act): signed 18 September 2026; Section 113 directs duties of up to 100 per cent ad valorem; Section 115 allows a presidential waiver.
- US congressional elections 2026: 3 November, the Tuesday after the first Monday in November of an even-numbered year.
- G8 to G7: on 24 March 2014 (The Hague Declaration) the G7 leaders suspended their participation in the G8.
- Helsinki summit: 16 July 2018; Alaska summit: 15 August 2025, Arctic Warrior Convention Centre, Anchorage.
- US diesel (EIA): $6.199 a gallon on 5 October 2026, down from $6.529 on 21 September.
⚠️ Watch the trap: Russia was not “expelled” from the G8; the G7 leaders suspended their participation in 2014. General License 135 is a time-limited licence for Russian diesel, not a lifting of sanctions. Public Law 119-111’s 100 per cent is a ceiling, it directs the President to act, and it carries a waiver. A Trump-Putin-Xi meeting at APEC and a Putin visit to the Miami G20 are floated or invited, not scheduled.
The Debate
| A thaw helps India | The cautions |
|---|---|
| Less friction between India’s Russia ties and its US partnership | A Russia that courts America as a great-power peer may rank India lower, as the author says happened in the early 1990s |
| Could ease US pressure on India’s Russian energy purchases and defence ties | The diesel licence is narrow and time-bound; the tariff law still directs duties, subject to a waiver |
| More room for India’s multi-alignment | US politics may block it: a Democratic House, Republican opposition to concessions |
| Better odds of talks that end the war in Ukraine | Ukraine will resist a bargain that compromises its security, and Europe fears exposure |
| Russia less dependent on China, in the author’s reading | Russia’s confrontation with Europe could continue even after a US-Russia deal |
How to Think About This
Draw a triangle with Washington, Moscow and Delhi at its corners, then add a fourth point: Europe. Hostility along the US-Russia side squeezes India, because it must justify its Russia ties to Washington. A thaw along that side relieves the squeeze, but it also makes Russia less dependent on its old partners. Meanwhile the Russia-Europe side may stay hostile whatever Washington does, and India now has large stakes there. A good answer moves around all four points.
Read the column’s argument as a test of strategic autonomy: India’s choices should rest on its own interests in each relationship, not on whether the great powers are friends or rivals this year. In an interview, be ready to say why India’s Russia partnership is not a bet on US-Russia hostility, and why Europe is a partner in its own right.
Diagram-in-Words
The other G2: a US-Russia thaw and India
What set it off, what drives it, what holds it back, and the lessons for Delhi.
Takeaway Box
- The argument: Delhi fears a US-China G2 but should also weigh a US-Russia one; India “has fewer reasons to fear it, although it would bring complications of its own”.
- The trigger: a Trump-Putin call and OFAC’s General License 135 on 9 October 2026, for Russian-origin diesel until 7 April 2027.
- The irony: Public Law 119-111 (18 September 2026) directs duties of up to 100 per cent on top buyers of Russian oil, with a waiver.
- The limits: US domestic politics, Ukraine’s security, Europe’s fears; APEC and G20 meetings are floated, not fixed.
- The lessons: US-Russia ties are not static; Moscow is no ideological foe of America; India’s stakes in Europe have risen.
Revision Flowchart
The Other G2: US-Russia Thaw and Three Lessons for India
Covers the terms, Prelims pointers and traps, Mains pointers, what to watch next and a practice question.
Sources: The Indian Express, C. Raja Mohan, “The other G2 and three lessons that follow for India”; OFAC, General License 135; Kremlin, telephone conversation with Donald Trump; Kremlin, Yury Ushakov on the conversation; Kremlin, meeting with Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner; US EIA, Gasoline and Diesel Fuel Update; 2 U.S.C. 7; The Hague Declaration, 24 March 2014; US House of Representatives, History, Art and Archives: the 116th Congress
Source: The Other G2: US-Russia Thaw and Three Lessons for India — Ujiyari.com | Free UPSC & State PCS Editorial Analysis
