The Lift Line

If “multipolarity” was the theme song in Delhi, “bipolarity” will be the signature tune in Washington. India might want a multipolar world, but we are not there yet; arguably, we might even be moving away from it. (C Raja Mohan)

Why This Editorial Matters for Your Exam

Multipolarity is one of the most frequently repeated phrases in Indian foreign policy and one of the least often examined. This column tests the term against measurable indicators of economic weight and against the strategic role of Russia. That framing (aspiration versus the actual distribution of power) is exactly the frame examiners use when they set questions on India’s foreign policy, groupings and the emerging world order.

GS Paper 2: India and its neighbourhood; bilateral, regional and global groupings and agreements involving India and affecting India’s interests; effect of policies and politics of developed and developing countries on India’s interests.

Concept Meaning Why it is testable
Multipolarity An international system with three or more roughly balanced great powers The standard Indian foreign-policy aspiration; frequently tested
G2 A world order shaped principally by two powers, here the US and China The column’s reading of the world economy
G3 A US-China-Russia great-power configuration The column’s frame for the strategic front, where Russia still matters
Strategic autonomy The capacity to make foreign-policy decisions without alliance obligations Persistent Indian doctrine; does not require the world to be multipolar
BRICS enlargement New members admitted in 2024 and 2025 Shows that numerical expansion can coexist with economic concentration

Background and Context

The Delhi BRICS summit. India hosted the 18th BRICS Summit at Bharat Mandapam, New Delhi, where, in Raja Mohan’s words, “multipolarity” was the theme song. On its sidelines, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping held a bilateral meeting, which he calls the summit’s highlight: an attempted reset of India-China relations. See Ujiyari’s report on the Modi-Xi bilateral.

The immediate calendar. Xi Jinping travels to Washington next week for the second Trump-Xi meeting this year. The two are likely to meet again in Shenzhen, China, on the margins of the APEC summit, where a trilateral with Vladimir Putin is being discussed, which would shift the focus from a G2 to a possible G3. Trump hosts the annual G20 summit in Miami on 14 and 15 December 2026.

The G20 finance ministers’ signal (background, as of 2026). The G20 finance ministers’ meeting held at Asheville, North Carolina on 31 August and 1 September 2026 ended without a joint statement, with China objecting to language on trade surpluses and export-led growth. China was the lone dissenter; the other members backed a chair’s statement instead. (The column places the meeting “in Washington this month”; the venue was Asheville.)

The internal composition of the two blocs.

  • BRIC at formation (2006): four members, China less than half of combined GDP.
  • BRICS today (after enlargement in 2024 and 2025): China roughly three-fifths of combined GDP.
  • G7 three decades ago: United States less than two-fifths of nominal output.
  • G7 today: United States close to three-fifths of nominal output.

The Analysis

1. Summits are venues, not engines (Raja Mohan’s argument). BRICS, APEC and the G20 are routine annual affairs; despite the glamour, significant collective progress is rare. Their value lies in the bilateral meetings they host, and in Delhi that meant the attempted Modi-Xi reset. Organisations such as APEC, BRICS, the EU, G7 and NATO, he argues, do not shape the world order; they operate within parameters set by great-power politics.

2. One dominant power inside each bloc (Raja Mohan’s argument). Both BRICS and the G7 are increasingly marked by the overwhelming economic weight of a single member: China in the first, the United States in the second. In the G7, Japan’s stagnation, Europe’s weaker growth and demographic pressures, and American advantages in energy, capital markets and artificial intelligence have widened the gap. Trump’s willingness to turn harshly on close partners, from Canada and Britain to NATO and the EU, rests in part on this expanding preponderance.

3. A G2 economy, but not a condominium (Raja Mohan’s argument). He does not claim the world is already a G2. He argues that the world economy is developing a G2 structure, because only Washington and Beijing have the scale to shape economic order, technology standards and supply chains, and because they are too interdependent to escape each other. Disputes over trade, technology and Taiwan rule out a condominium; the Trump-Xi meetings are about managing rivalry, and how that is managed has implications for everyone else.

4. Russia keeps the strategic picture complex (Raja Mohan’s argument). Economically diminished, Russia still has the military power, geographical reach and diplomatic weight to influence the balance between the two giants across Eurasia. Moscow has drawn closer to Beijing than ever, while Trump has made an overture to Moscow. Detaching Russia from China will not be easy, and the Ukraine conflict complicates it, but progress on Trump’s peace initiative could enable a US-Russia rapprochement, a G3 summit and Putin’s presence at the G20.

5. The G20 shows the cost of G2 friction (Raja Mohan’s argument). The G20 matters because it includes China, Russia, India, Brazil, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and South Africa alongside the US, Europe and Japan. When Washington and Beijing disagree, as at the finance ministers’ meeting, they undermine hopes of collective economic action; when they strike bilateral bargains, others may pay.

6. Ujiyari analysis: what this means for India’s doctrine. The column’s conclusion is a warning to the Indian foreign-policy elite to wake up from its “self-indulgent reverie”. The exam-ready move is to separate three claims: the world is multipolar (an empirical claim the column disputes), India should work towards multipolarity (an aspiration), and India should retain strategic autonomy (a policy). Strategic autonomy survives without the first claim. The attempted reset with China, and the need to read the US-China-Russia triangle, show autonomy being exercised inside a great-power game rather than in a multipolar order.

Data and Institutions Vault

Prelims-grade facts:

BRICS:

  • Original BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) formed in 2006; first leaders’ summit 2009; South Africa joined in 2010.
  • Enlargement in 2024 (Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, UAE; Saudi Arabia invited, accession status ambiguous) and in 2025 (Indonesia).
  • China: less than half of BRIC combined GDP in 2006; roughly three-fifths of BRICS combined GDP today.
  • 18th BRICS Summit hosted by India at Bharat Mandapam, New Delhi; Modi-Xi bilateral on its sidelines.

The immediate diplomatic calendar:

  • Xi Jinping visits Washington next week for the second Trump-Xi meeting this year.
  • Likely Trump-Xi meeting in Shenzhen, China, on the margins of the APEC summit; a trilateral with Putin (G3) is being discussed.
  • G20 summit hosted by the US in Miami, 14 and 15 December 2026.

The G7 arithmetic:

  • United States: close to three-fifths of G7 nominal output today, against less than two-fifths three decades ago.
  • G7 members: United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Canada; the European Union also participates.

The G20 signal:

  • G20 finance ministers’ meeting, Asheville, North Carolina (background: held 31 August to 1 September 2026).
  • No joint statement: China objected to language on trade surpluses and export-led growth; the others backed a chair’s statement.
  • G20 includes China, Russia, India, Brazil, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, as well as the US, European members and Japan.

India’s declared position:

  • Strategic autonomy is the standing doctrinal position.
  • A multipolar world is the standing aspiration.
  • India held the G20 Presidency in 2023 and hosted the BRICS Summit in 2026.

⚠️ Watch the trap: Do not write that Raja Mohan says the world is already a G2. His claim is narrower: the world economy is developing a G2 structure, while the strategic front is more complex because of Russia. And strategic autonomy does not depend on the world being multipolar.

The Debate

FOR (plan for a G2 economy and a possible G3 strategic order): China dominates BRICS economically and the US dominates the G7; only the two have the scale to set economic rules, technology standards and supply chains; and US-China friction already stalls the G20. Treating the system as multipolar risks misreading where decisions affecting India are actually made.

AGAINST (the G2 lens is too narrow): GDP shares understate usable power. Russia’s strategic weight, which the column itself stresses, shows the system is not simply bipolar; middle powers can still shape outcomes on issues they care about; and groupings such as BRICS give India platforms, including for bilateral diplomacy with China, whose value does not depend on economic share.

Balanced verdict: Both readings have force. The prudent Indian position is to keep multipolarity as an aspiration, base operational choices on the real distribution of power, use multilateral forums for the bilateral openings they create, and exercise strategic autonomy with a close eye on the US-China-Russia triangle.

How to Think About This

Distinguish three claims that get bundled together. One: the international system is multipolar. Two: India should pursue a multipolar order. Three: India should retain strategic autonomy. Only the third is a policy position; the first is an empirical claim and the second is an aspiration. It is possible to defend strategic autonomy without asserting current multipolarity, and to work towards multipolarity while acknowledging that the world economy is currently concentrating around two powers. Also separate the economic picture (a G2 structure) from the strategic one (where Russia keeps a G3 possibility alive).

Diagram-in-Words

BRICS: enlarged bloc China ~3/5 of combined GDP many members, one dominant economy G7: seven members US ~3/5 of nominal output many members, one dominant economy G2 world economy rivalry managed, no condominium Russia: possible G3 Trump-Xi Washington, APEC Shenzhen Miami G20 in December
Both headline groupings have many members but one dominant economy. The world economy is taking a G2 shape, while Russia keeps the strategic front more complex. The forward calendar runs through great-power meetings, not through forums.

Aspirant’s Desk

Model answer keywords: multipolarity as aspiration, G2 economic structure, possible G3, managed rivalry, interdependence, Russia’s Eurasian weight, BRICS enlargement, internal concentration, strategic autonomy, G20 paralysis, forums as bilateral venues.

Mains way-forward paragraph: Treat multipolarity as a long-term aspiration rather than a description of today’s world; read groupings by their internal distribution of weight; use summits for the bilateral openings they create, as with the attempted India-China reset in New Delhi; exercise strategic autonomy on defence, energy and technology choices; and track the US-China-Russia triangle closely, since a G2 bargain or a G3 settlement could narrow India’s room to manoeuvre.

Ethics and interview angle: How much of a country’s foreign-policy vocabulary should describe the world as it is, and how much should express the world it wants? What are the costs when the two drift apart?

Takeaway Box

Lift line: If multipolarity was the theme song in Delhi, bipolarity will be the signature tune in Washington. India might want a multipolar world, but we are not there yet; arguably, we might even be moving away from it.

Prelims hooks: BRIC formed in 2006; BRICS enlarged in 2024 and 2025; China roughly three-fifths of BRICS combined GDP; US close to three-fifths of G7 nominal output; Xi visits Washington next week; likely Trump-Xi meeting at APEC in Shenzhen; G20 summit in Miami on 14 and 15 December 2026; G20 finance ministers’ meeting at Asheville ended without a joint statement after China objected to language on trade surpluses.

Mains keywords: multipolarity versus a G2 economy, G3, Russia’s strategic weight, managed rivalry, strategic autonomy, BRICS enlargement, internal concentration, G20 collective action.

PYQ linkage: Connects to Mains themes on India’s foreign policy, bilateral and multilateral groupings involving India, and India’s role in an emerging world order.

Sources: Indian Express

Source: Multipolar in Delhi, Bipolar in Washington: C Raja Mohan on Why India Must Wake Up to a World Economy Taking a G2 Shape — Ujiyari.com | Free UPSC & State PCS Editorial Analysis