The Lift Line
“Delhi’s ever-growing thirst for drinking water is now going to be Doon Valley’s curse.” (Lokesh Ohri, The Indian Express)
Why This Editorial Matters for Your Exam
This signed column in The Indian Express of 13 October 2026, “Kishau Dam project: Can the Dehradun Valley and its people afford the risk?”, is by Lokesh Ohri, who is described as “an anthropologist and author”. It is his argument, not the paper’s. It follows the agreement that six States signed in September 2026 on the Kishau Multipurpose Project on the Tons, a major tributary of the Yamuna.
His case, in one line: a dam meant largely to supply water to the plains will submerge tribal villages and forest in the Dehradun district, and its planning has not reckoned with ecology, displacement or earthquake risk.
Read it with care. The column’s concerns are real questions for any Himalayan dam, but several of its numbers and labels do not match the official record, and the project is less advanced than “the decks have been cleared” suggests. The section “The column’s figures, checked” below sets each one beside its source. Our September roundup covered the earlier consensus among the six States.
GS Paper 3: Infrastructure (dams, irrigation, energy); conservation and environmental impact assessment; disaster management (landslides, earthquakes). GS Paper 2: Inter-state water issues and cooperative federalism. GS Paper 1: Displacement and the effects of development on tribal communities; physical geography of the Himalaya.
In the news: six States signed the Kishau agreement in September 2026, and the project’s next announced step is Union Cabinet approval. Lokesh Ohri asks whether the Dehradun valley and its people can bear the cost.
Background and Context
Key terms first
| Term | What it means |
|---|---|
| Multipurpose project | A dam built for several uses at once; Kishau’s stored water is for “irrigation, power generation and to augment drinking water supply” |
| Concrete gravity dam | A concrete dam that holds back water mainly by its own weight; Kishau is planned as one |
| Live storage | The part of a reservoir’s water that can actually be drawn and used |
| Submergence area | The land a reservoir will flood, including farmland, forest and settlements |
| National Project | A water project the Centre declared for special central funding; in 2008 the proposal was a central grant of 90 per cent of the cost of the irrigation and drinking water component |
| Terms of Reference (ToR) | The scoping stage of environmental appraisal, which sets what the impact assessment report must study; it comes before the report and before any environmental clearance |
The project in brief
| Item | What the record shows |
|---|---|
| River and site | The Tons, “a major tributary of the Yamuna River”, in Uttarakhand’s Dehradun district and Himachal Pradesh’s Sirmaur district |
| Dam | A 232.6-metre-high concrete gravity dam with a live storage capacity of 1,562 million cubic metres |
| Benefits | Irrigation for about 0.97 lakh hectares; about 1,476 million units of energy a year |
| Who gets the water | Irrigation, power and drinking water, “particularly in Rajasthan and the National Capital Territory of Delhi”, and flows for the Yamuna’s rejuvenation |
| Who builds it | Kishau Corporation Limited, “a joint venture of the Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand governments” |
| Who pays | The Centre bears 90 per cent of the cost of the water component; the six States share the remaining 10 per cent (PIB, June 2026) |
The figures in the table, except the last row, are from the Government’s statement on the signing, as reported by PTI in Business Standard.
How it got here
| When | What happened |
|---|---|
| 12 May 1994 | The Yamuna basin agreement, which said separate agreements would be signed for each storage project in the basin (the Home Ministry, as reported by Down To Earth) |
| February 2008 | Kishau was among 14 water projects declared National Projects; the Central Water Commission’s record shows “Investment clearance granted” in February 2008 |
| January 2026 | The proposal, from Kishau Corporation Limited, was on the agenda of the 47th meeting of the Environment Ministry’s Expert Appraisal Committee (River Valley and Hydroelectric Projects), held on 28 and 30 January, for Terms of Reference |
| 16 June 2026 | A meeting at the Home Ministry reached an in-principle consensus among the six States and decided the 90 per cent central share of the water component (PIB) |
| 15 September 2026 | The Chief Ministers of Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh, Rajasthan, Delhi and Haryana signed the Memorandum of Agreement in New Delhi, in the presence of the Union Home Minister (Akashvani; PTI) |
| Next | “With the MoA signed, the project will be placed before the Union Cabinet for approval” (PTI). No Cabinet decision is on record as of 13 October 2026 |
Kishau is the third such project. Agreements for the Renuka ji and Lakhwar multipurpose projects “have already been executed, and these projects are under construction” (PTI).
The column’s figures, checked
| The column says | The sourced position |
|---|---|
| “The proposed 236 m dam” | The Government’s figure at the signing was 232.6 metres |
| “a massive 2950-hectare reservoir” | 2,950 hectares is the total submergence area in the appraisal document, as reported by Down To Earth, not the reservoir alone |
| “about 2,438 acres of biodiversity-rich forest land” | A 2018 Himdhara report, as reported by Down To Earth, said the 2,950-hectare submergence area included 2,438 hectares of forest and 512 hectares of private farmland. 2,438 acres would be only about 987 hectares. The January 2026 appraisal document lists 689 hectares of forest |
| Jaunsar-Bawar is “a tribal, Schedule V region” | A Ministry of Tribal Affairs reply, as reported by The Tribune in April 2022, said the Jaunsar-Bawar area had not been notified as a Scheduled Area under the Fifth Schedule, nor as a Tribal Area under the Sixth Schedule |
| “the decks have been cleared” | Union Cabinet approval was the next step, and the proposal was on the appraisal committee’s agenda for Terms of Reference in January 2026. No environmental clearance is on record |
| “More than 17 villages”, “upwards of four thousand families” | These are the writer’s figures. The 2018 Himdhara report, using 1997 data, estimated about 5,498 people from 701 families would be affected |
| “the tenth instance of a resolution of a long-standing inter-state dispute” | The Union Home Minister’s own count at the signing (Akashvani); it is a claim, not an official list |
| Himachal’s power liability shared “in a 75:25 ratio” | PIB’s account gives no ratio. It says only that Himachal Pradesh’s share of water goes to Delhi and Rajasthan “in return for sharing the cost of Himachal Pradesh’s portion of the power component” |
The record does support his wider point that the numbers keep changing. Down To Earth reports that the January 2026 appraisal document gives 422 MW (four units of 105.5 MW) against 660 MW (four units of 165 MW) on the Himachal power corporation’s website and in a 2022 appraisal agenda, and a water benefit of 1,324 million cubic metres against the 1,562 announced at the signing.
The Analysis
1. The human cost comes first. Ohri opens with a folk song and with fear in the hamlets west of the Dehradun valley. The signing, he writes, “rang out for many as the death knell for some of the most picturesque and resource-rich villages of the Tons Valley.” He describes tribal villages, from Kwanu up to the Tiuni bridge, that live on ginger, tomato, turmeric, cabbage and groundnut, on horticulture, animal husbandry, forests and fisheries. His charge is a lack of care: “There seems to be no room for empathy for the thousands who will lose their precious land, homesteads, and an ancient way of life.”
2. A plan built on shifting numbers. His central complaint about planning is that “the impacts on ecology and human settlements have not been accounted for at all”, which he sees in “completely differing figures” on the websites of the two States’ hydropower corporations and in the agreement. Here the record backs him: power capacity appears as 660 MW in older documents and 422 MW in the January 2026 appraisal document, the water benefit as 1,562 or 1,324 million cubic metres, and the column itself prints a different height from the Government’s 232.6 metres.
3. Rivers, slopes and earthquakes. He warns that a dam “will definitely alter natural sediment deposition, water currents, and benthic habitats”, threatening fish nurseries and migration, and that a long reservoir “will saturate the surrounding fragile mountain slopes, accelerating slope failures and flash landslides”. He also raises “catastrophic reservoir-induced seismicity risks”. These are the questions an impact assessment must answer; the column states them as certainties, and its specific seismic and height-ranking claims are the writer’s own.
4. Who gains and who pays. The water goes mainly downstream: the official statement names Rajasthan and Delhi. Ohri argues that Himachal Pradesh “seems to have driven a hard bargain” while Uttarakhand stayed silent, and he criticises the Uttarakhand Chief Minister’s “mysterious silence and acquiescence”. The official record shows one such term: Himachal’s share of water goes to Delhi and Rajasthan in return for their sharing the cost of Himachal’s part of the power component. The Centre’s 90 per cent share covers the water component, not the whole project.
5. Where the column overreaches. Three of its claims weaken a strong case. The project is not cleared: Cabinet approval and environmental clearance are still ahead, so this is the stage at which the valley’s questions can still change the outcome. Jaunsar-Bawar is a tribal region, but on the official record it is not a notified Fifth Schedule area, so the protections that come with Scheduled Area status cannot simply be assumed. And the forest figure is in hectares, not acres, which makes the loss larger than the column states, not smaller.
6. Are there alternatives? He argues that “alternatives such as solar and wind energy can produce power without permanently changing river ecosystems or displacing large communities”. That answers the power part of the project. It does not answer the storage part: the stated purposes include irrigation and drinking water for water-short States, which only stored water can provide. The real choice is about how much storage, where, and on what terms for the people who host it.
Data and Institutions Vault
Prelims-grade facts:
The project:
- River: the Tons, a major tributary of the Yamuna; site in Dehradun (Uttarakhand) and Sirmaur (Himachal Pradesh) districts.
- Dam: a 232.6-metre concrete gravity dam with a live storage of 1,562 million cubic metres.
- Benefits: irrigation for about 0.97 lakh hectares; about 1,476 million units of energy a year.
- Builder: Kishau Corporation Limited, a joint venture of Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand.
Status and money:
- National Project: declared in February 2008, with investment clearance granted (Central Water Commission).
- Six States: Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh, Rajasthan, Delhi and Haryana signed on 15 September 2026.
- Funding: the Centre bears 90 per cent of the cost of the water component; the six States share the rest.
- Next steps: Union Cabinet approval; the proposal was listed for Terms of Reference in January 2026, and no environmental clearance is on record.
Yamuna storage projects: Renuka ji and Lakhwar (agreements executed, under construction); Kishau is the third.
⚠️ Watch the trap: The Centre’s 90 per cent is of the water component, not of the whole project. 2,950 hectares is the submergence area, and the forest inside it is 2,438 hectares (2018 report), not acres. Jaunsar-Bawar is not a notified Fifth Schedule area on the official record. The dam is on the Tons, not on the Yamuna’s main stem. The project has no environmental clearance on record and awaits Union Cabinet approval.
The Debate
| Ohri’s case | The other view |
|---|---|
| The dam will submerge tribal villages and their livelihoods | The displacement figures in print vary; an impact study and a rehabilitation plan are still to come and should settle them |
| Planning ignores ecology and settlements | The proposal was listed for Terms of Reference in January 2026, the stage where such studies are set; the column’s “decks have been cleared” is premature |
| The figures keep changing | True on the record (422 or 660 MW; 1,324 or 1,562 million cubic metres), which argues for one reconciled set of numbers |
| Solar and wind can replace hydropower | They can replace power, not stored water for irrigation and drinking |
| Uttarakhand bears the cost while others gain | Himachal secured a term on its power-component cost; Uttarakhand can still seek a fair share before the project is finalised |
How to Think About This
Use three tests for any large dam. Need: who gets the water and power, and is there another way to meet that need? Cost: who loses land, forest and livelihood, and what does the river lose? Process: have the impacts been studied, have the affected people been heard, and is the rehabilitation plan public before the land is taken? Kishau scores well on the first test for Delhi and Rajasthan, and the column’s point is that the second and third are still unanswered for the Tons valley.
In an answer, keep the facts exact: the height (232.6 metres), the river (Tons), the funding rule (90 per cent of the water component) and the stage (Cabinet approval pending, Terms of Reference in January 2026). Then argue the trade-off.
Keep the keywords ready: multipurpose project, inter-state water agreement, submergence, displacement and rehabilitation, Terms of Reference, reservoir-induced seismicity and cooperative federalism.
Diagram-in-Words
Water for the plains, cost in the valley
Lokesh Ohri’s case against the Kishau dam, set beside the project’s actual stage.
Takeaway Box
- The argument: Lokesh Ohri warns that the Kishau dam will submerge tribal villages and forest in the Tons valley to meet the plains’ water needs, on planning that ignored ecology and people.
- The project: a 232.6-metre concrete gravity dam on the Tons, with 1,562 million cubic metres of live storage, agreed by six States in September 2026.
- The status: a National Project since 2008, with the Centre paying 90 per cent of the water component; Cabinet approval and environmental clearance are still ahead.
- The corrections: 232.6 metres, not 236; 2,950 hectares is submergence, with 2,438 hectares of forest; Jaunsar-Bawar is not a notified Fifth Schedule area.
- The line to quote: “Delhi’s ever-growing thirst for drinking water is now going to be Doon Valley’s curse.”
Revision Flowchart
Kishau Dam Project: Tons Dam Risks for the Dehradun Valley
Covers the terms, Prelims pointers and traps, Mains pointers, the way forward and a practice question.
Sources:
- The Indian Express, Lokesh Ohri, “Kishau Dam project: Can the Dehradun Valley and its people afford the risk?”, 13 October 2026
- Business Standard (PTI), report on the signing of the Kishau agreement, 15 September 2026
- Akashvani (News on AIR), report on the signing, 15 September 2026
- PIB (Ministry of Home Affairs), release of 16 June 2026 on the in-principle consensus
- Down To Earth, report on the Kishau agreement and its figures, September 2026
- Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, agenda of the 47th meeting of the Expert Appraisal Committee (River Valley and Hydroelectric Projects), January 2026
- Central Water Commission, reply to an RTI application, November 2020; The Tribune, report on National Projects, March 2008
- The Tribune, report on a Ministry of Tribal Affairs reply, April 2022
Source: Kishau Dam Project: Tons Dam Risks for the Dehradun Valley — Ujiyari.com | Free UPSC & State PCS Editorial Analysis
