The Lift Line
“I would resist the debate as being simply ‘retain or abolish the veto’.” The real menu is longer, and most of it does not need the Charter to be amended.
Why This Editorial Matters for Your Exam
UN Security Council reform is a standing GS2 topic, and India’s candidature makes it a likely interview question. This conversation in The Hindu, between Amitabh Mattoo (Dean, School of International Studies, JNU) and Swaran Singh (formerly of the same school), moderated by Kallol Bhattacherjee, separates three questions that answers often merge: the use of the veto, accountability for a veto, and structural reform of the Council. It follows our coverage of India’s UNSC bid and support from the P4M group.
GS Paper 2: Important international institutions, agencies and fora, their structure and mandate; effect of policies of developed countries on India’s interests.
| Concept | Meaning | Why it is testable |
|---|---|---|
| Veto | A negative vote by a permanent member that blocks a substantive resolution | The word is not in the Charter; it flows from Article 27(3) |
| P5 | United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia and China | The only members with a veto |
| Veto restraint | A voluntary pledge not to use the veto in atrocity situations | The French-Mexican initiative |
| Veto accountability | A General Assembly debate after every veto, with the vetoing member invited to speak first | The Liechtenstein initiative (2022) |
| Charter amendment | Change to the UN Charter’s text | Article 108: two-thirds of the Assembly and ratification by two-thirds, including all P5 |
Background and Context
The trigger. In the current session of the General Assembly, France has argued that the use of the veto should be “regulated” in humanitarian crises such as those in Sudan and Lebanon, and that the veto is a matter of “responsibility”, not “privilege”. Mattoo places this in French President Emmanuel Macron’s address to the Assembly on 22 September.
Three initiatives, as the discussants describe them:
| Initiative | Year | What it asks |
|---|---|---|
| French-Mexican initiative | 2015 | P5 voluntarily refrain from the veto in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity and large-scale war crimes; 128 states now support it, with 21 joining in the last four months, and the UK has joined France |
| ACT code of conduct | 2015 (Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group) | All Council members, including non-permanent ones, not to vote against credible action to prevent or halt atrocity crimes |
| Liechtenstein initiative | 2022, adopted by the General Assembly | The Assembly meets within ten working days of a veto to debate it |
The origins. Swaran Singh traces the idea to 2013, when Chinese and Russian vetoes blocked Council action on the Syrian civil war and, after the Ghouta chemical attack, French President François Hollande proposed a code of good conduct for the P5.
India’s place in the debate. India seeks a permanent seat along with Brazil, Germany and Japan (the G4), and is a candidate for a non-permanent seat. The Uniting for Peace resolution of 1950 already lets the General Assembly take up a matter when the Council is deadlocked, which is the logic the Liechtenstein initiative builds on.
The Analysis
1. Three questions, not one. Mattoo distinguishes the use of the veto, accountability for its use, and the reform of the Council. Macron’s initiative addresses only the first: even if the veto remains, there must be circumstances of exceptional suffering in which a permanent member agrees not to use it.
2. Modest institutionally, significant normatively. The initiative changes the behaviour of permanent members without the “almost impossible” task of rewriting the Charter. With the UK joining France, two permanent members now back the French-Mexican initiative, which Mattoo calls a first and which gives it political momentum. (Both had already signed the broader ACT code of conduct in 2015.)
3. Power, not principle, decides. Swaran Singh is sceptical: the UK and France are “not the heavyweights among the P5”, so a principled position costs them less. An international organisation, he argues, cannot survive a decision against the fundamental interests of a major power, which is why none of the P5 is talking of giving up the veto.
4. Accountability as the practical step. Mattoo sees “great merit” in the Liechtenstein approach: a veto no longer ends the conversation, and the member that uses it must justify itself before the whole membership. That may make permanent members more cautious, even when it cannot stop them.
5. Beyond abolish or retain. The options include abolition, extending the veto to new permanent members, voluntary restraint, accountability after a veto, and structural reform. Formal abolition would need the consent of the very members whose privilege would go.
The precision that earns marks. The Charter never uses the word “veto”. Article 27(3) requires the “concurring votes of the permanent members” for non-procedural decisions; an abstention by a permanent member is, by long practice, not treated as a veto.
Data and Institutions Vault
Prelims-grade facts:
The Council and the Charter:
- The Security Council has 15 members: 5 permanent and 10 non-permanent members elected for two-year terms.
- Article 27(3) of the UN Charter requires the concurring votes of the permanent members for substantive decisions.
- Article 108: amendments need two-thirds of the General Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of members, including all P5.
- The Uniting for Peace resolution (1950) lets the General Assembly act when the Council fails to because of a veto.
The reform initiatives (as described in the discussion):
- The French-Mexican initiative on veto restraint in mass atrocities was launched in 2015; 128 states support it.
- The UK has joined France in backing it; both also back the ACT code of conduct (2015).
- The Liechtenstein initiative (General Assembly, 2022) requires a debate within 10 working days of a veto.
- The ACT code of conduct extends a no-veto-against-atrocity-action pledge to all Council members.
Prelims, the traps:
- The word veto does not appear in the UN Charter.
- An abstention by a permanent member does not block a resolution.
- Voluntary restraint and accountability measures are not legally binding.
⚠️ Watch the trap: The Liechtenstein initiative does not stop a veto; it only requires the General Assembly to debate it afterwards.
The Debate
For incremental reform. It is achievable without a Charter amendment, it raises the cost of vetoes in atrocity situations, and it has growing support, now including two permanent members.
Against overestimating it. Restraint and accountability are political pressures, not rules. The members most inclined to use the veto have not joined, and when core interests are at stake a veto will still be cast.
The balanced verdict. Incremental measures are worth supporting because they change the politics around the veto, but they do not remedy the Council’s unrepresentative composition, which only structural reform can address.
How to Think About This
Separate the rule from the behaviour. Many institutional reforms change conduct without changing law: codes of conduct, reporting duties, public justification. When a formal rule is hard to amend, ask what behavioural levers exist, who must consent, and what political cost they impose. The same frame works for parliamentary conventions, central bank communication and corporate governance codes.
Diagram-in-Words
Takeaway Box
- Three questions: use of the veto, accountability for it, and structural reform of the Council.
- Restraint: French-Mexican initiative (2015), 128 supporters, now backed by France and the UK.
- Accountability: Liechtenstein initiative (2022), a General Assembly debate within 10 working days of a veto.
- Constraint: Article 108 needs all P5 to ratify any Charter amendment.
- For India: back restraint and accountability while pressing for a more representative Council.
Sources: The Hindu, United Nations
Source: Restrain, Explain or Abolish? The Debate on the UN Security Council Veto — Ujiyari.com | Free UPSC & State PCS Editorial Analysis
