The Lift Line

A collegial body is designed so that one member’s doubts can stop a mistake. When the doubts go unanswered, the design has failed, whoever is right on the substance.

Why This Editorial Matters for Your Exam

The Indian Express editorial of 24 September follows the paper’s own investigation, published on 23 September, into the Election Commission’s functioning during the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls. The same day, a two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court split on whether the challenge to the 2023 appointments law should go to a larger Bench (see our deep dive on the split verdict). Set aside the political heat and a textbook question remains: how should a multi-member constitutional body take decisions, and how much of that should the public see? That question links Article 324, the Seshan judgment, the 2023 law on appointments, and the right to vote under Article 326. We have covered the SIR through the Maharashtra draft roll, the Form 7 objections in Godda and the case for an independent audit.

GS Paper 2: Appointment to various constitutional posts, powers, functions and responsibilities of various constitutional bodies; salient features of the Representation of People’s Act. GS Paper 4: Accountability and ethical governance; probity; transparency in public institutions.

Concept Meaning Why it is testable
Article 324 Vests superintendence, direction and control of elections and electoral rolls in the ECI The source of the Commission’s power
Multi-member ECI CEC plus Election Commissioners; permanent since 1993 Seshan (1995) upheld it
First among equals The CEC presides but does not outrank the other members in decisions Decisions are collective, by majority if needed
Special Intensive Revision A fresh, door-to-door revision of the rolls ordered by the ECI Carried out under Section 21 of the RP Act, 1950
Form 6 The application for inclusion of a new elector Changes to it were among the objections

Background and Context

What the report says. According to The Indian Express investigation, Election Commissioners Sukhbir Singh Sandhu and Vivek Joshi recorded objections 14 times in ten months to decisions taken in the Commission’s name during the SIR, while Gyanesh Kumar was Chief Election Commissioner. The objections reportedly concerned changes to Form 6, decisions on additions and deletions taken without the full Commission, and the centralisation of the voter database, which they said moved control away from district and State electoral officers. When the objections went unaddressed, the two appealed to the Cabinet Secretary.

What the Commission says. In a statement issued on 23 September (PIB), the Election Commission said that all decisions, including those on the SIR, “are the outcome of unanimous decisions of the full Commission”, that differing views and observations are a normal part of deliberation, and that its orders follow the procedures laid down in the 2023 Act. It described members’ written notes and technical suggestions as standard practice.

The constitutional frame:

Provision What it says
Article 324(1) Superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of electoral rolls and the conduct of elections to Parliament, State legislatures, and the offices of President and Vice-President vest in the ECI
Article 324(2) The ECI consists of the CEC and such number of other ECs as the President may fix
Article 324(3) When other ECs are appointed, the CEC acts as Chairman
Article 324(5) The CEC can be removed only like a Supreme Court judge; other ECs only on the CEC’s recommendation
Article 326 Elections on the basis of adult suffrage: every citizen aged 18 or above, not otherwise disqualified

How the Commission became multi-member. Two Election Commissioners were first appointed in October 1989 and the posts were abolished in January 1990. The Commission became multi-member again on 1 October 1993. In T.N. Seshan v. Union of India (1995), a Constitution Bench upheld this, holding that the CEC and the ECs share power and that the Commission decides as a body, by majority if members differ.

Appointments today. Under the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023, the President appoints on the recommendation of a Selection Committee of the Prime Minister, a Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the Prime Minister, and the Leader of Opposition (or leader of the largest opposition party) in the Lok Sabha. The term is six years or up to age 65. The Act followed Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (2023), where the Supreme Court had set an interim committee that included the Chief Justice of India.

The Analysis

1. The dissent is the story, not the politics. The editorial accepts that roll revision is the ECI’s duty and calls the link between deletions and electoral outcomes “more political than empirical”. Its point is institutional: all three members were appointed by the present government, yet two of them objected repeatedly on record, which makes the concerns hard to dismiss as partisan.

2. Collective functioning. The Commissioners said they were kept in the dark in a body meant to reach consensus or abide by the majority. For a collegial body, this matters more than any single decision: a decision taken without the full Commission lacks the legitimacy the Constitution designed in.

3. The SIR’s design. The editorial argues that the process shifted the burden of proof onto the voter, demanded paperwork within tight time frames, and set up an appellate process without deadlines. In West Bengal, it says, nearly 27 lakh voters were disenfranchised; across States, 13 crore names were struck off the draft rolls. It calls the result an “opaque and heartless citizenship test”.

4. The court’s role. The editorial credits the Supreme Court’s Bihar interventions (accepting Aadhaar as a document, asking for reasons for deletions) but argues that it has since given the ECI the benefit of every doubt. In a May ruling on the SIR petitions, it says, the Court rightly underlined the ECI’s mandate to keep accurate rolls but also gave it “unfettered procedural latitude”; while holding that the ECI can make only a “limited inquiry into citizenship”, the ruling, in the editorial’s view, set the stage for a citizenship test by the government’s “Competent Authority”. It asks the court to take up the questions now on record.

5. What it wants. The CEC should answer the Commissioners point by point; Form 6 should be restored to its earlier version; and State election machinery should regain access to the voter database.

The precision that earns marks. Keep three things apart: the ECI’s power to revise rolls (Article 324 and Section 21 of the RP Act, 1950), the procedure it adopts (forms, documents, timelines, appeals), and the process of decision inside the Commission (collective, by majority). An answer that attacks or defends the power when the question is about procedure or decision-making misses the point.

Data and Institutions Vault

Prelims-grade facts:

Constitution and law:

  • Article 324 vests superintendence, direction and control of electoral rolls and elections in the Election Commission.
  • Under Article 324(5), an Election Commissioner can be removed only on the CEC’s recommendation.
  • The CEC is removable only in the manner and on the grounds of a Supreme Court judge.
  • Article 326 provides for elections on the basis of adult suffrage (18 years and above).
  • Section 21 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 lets the ECI order a special revision of rolls.
  • Form 6 is the application for inclusion of a new elector’s name.

The Commission:

  • The ECI has been multi-member continuously since 1 October 1993.
  • T.N. Seshan v. Union of India (1995) upheld the multi-member ECI; the CEC is first among equals.
  • The 2023 Act Selection Committee: Prime Minister, a Cabinet Minister nominated by the PM, Leader of Opposition in Lok Sabha.
  • Term of the CEC and ECs: six years or age 65, whichever is earlier.

Prelims, the traps:

  • The Chief Justice of India was on the interim committee set by Anoop Baranwal (2023), not on the 2023 Act’s committee.
  • The CEC’s removal protection does not extend equally to ECs, who can be removed on the CEC’s recommendation.
  • The ECI conducts elections to Parliament, State legislatures, President and Vice-President; municipal and panchayat polls are run by State Election Commissions (Article 243K, 243ZA).

⚠️ Watch the trap: The ECI’s decisions are not the CEC’s alone. The CEC presides, but in a multi-member Commission the body decides, by majority where members differ.

The Debate

The editorial’s case. Repeated written objections by two members, left unanswered, show a breakdown of collective functioning. Since the SIR affects the franchise of crores of citizens, the Commission owes an explanation and the courts a closer look.

The Commission’s case. Members’ notes and suggestions are part of normal deliberation; disagreement during drafting is not dissent from the final decision; orders carry full legal sanction. Cleaning the rolls is a constitutional duty, and aggressive revision removes dead, shifted and duplicate entries.

The balanced verdict. The facts of what each member agreed to are contested, and an aspirant should not take sides on them. The durable lesson is institutional: a multi-member body gains credibility when its decision-making is collective and recorded, when procedure affecting the vote carries notice, reasons and time-bound appeal, and when data on deletions are published. Those safeguards serve the integrity of the rolls and the right to vote at once.

How to Think About This

Ask how a collegial body decides. The same question applies to the Election Commission, the RBI’s Monetary Policy Committee (whose minutes and votes are published), the GST Council (which votes with weighted shares), SEBI’s board and the Supreme Court’s own Benches. Where votes and dissents are recorded, disagreement strengthens trust; where they are hidden, it looks like a crisis when it surfaces. In an answer, compare the ECI with bodies that publish their deliberations.

Diagram-in-Words

Article 324 power rolls and elections Multi-member Commission decides as a body (Seshan, 1995) Objections unanswered per the IE report "Standard practice" per the ECI’s response Recorded, collective decisions plus voter safeguards
Whichever account of the disagreement is right, the remedy is the same: decisions the whole Commission owns and records, and procedures that protect the elector’s right to be heard.
✍️ Mains Answer Framework
Question

The Election Commission of India functions as a multi-member constitutional body. Examine how its internal decision-making and transparency bear on public trust in exercises such as the revision of electoral rolls. (250 words)

Article 324 vests the superintendence, direction and control of elections, including the preparation of electoral rolls, in the Election Commission of India. Since 1993 the Commission has been a multi-member body, and the legitimacy of its decisions depends on how collectively and transparently they are taken.

Under Article 324(2), the Commission consists of the Chief Election Commissioner and such other Election Commissioners as the President fixes. In T.N. Seshan v. Union of India (1995), the Supreme Court upheld the multi-member structure and held that the Chief Election Commissioner is first among equals, with the Commission deciding as a body and by majority where members differ.
The law governing the Commission’s business requires decisions to be unanimous as far as possible and otherwise by majority. Internal disagreement is therefore not a defect; it is how a collegial body checks error.
The concern arises when members are not consulted, when their objections are not recorded in decisions, or when the process is opaque. Revision of electoral rolls, carried out under Section 21 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, directly affects the right to vote of citizens aged 18 and above under Article 326.
Any process that shifts the burden of proof onto the elector, sets tight documentary timelines or centralises databases must therefore carry strong safeguards: notice and hearing before deletion, reasons for decisions, time-bound appeals and outreach to vulnerable groups. Transparency, such as publishing the Commission’s decision-making record and deletion data by reason, strengthens rather than weakens institutional credibility.

An election body’s authority rests on public trust. Collective functioning, reasoned decisions and inclusive procedures, backed by judicial scrutiny where rights are at stake, protect both the integrity of the rolls and the right of every eligible citizen to vote.

Interview Angle

"The Election Commission is a three-member body headed by a Chief Election Commissioner. Should disagreements among its members be made public, or does that damage the institution's credibility?"

Takeaway Box

  • The report (IE, 23 September): ECs Sandhu and Joshi objected on record 14 times in ten months during the SIR.
  • The ECI’s response (23 September): all decisions, including the SIR, were unanimous decisions of the full Commission; differing views are a normal part of deliberation.
  • The law: Article 324; ECs removable only on the CEC’s recommendation (Article 324(5)); Seshan (1995): the Commission decides as a body.
  • The editorial’s asks: CEC to answer point by point; Supreme Court to examine; restore Form 6; restore State access to the voter database.
  • The exam lesson: collective, recorded decision-making and procedural safeguards sustain trust in a constitutional body.

Sources: The Indian Express, Election Commission of India

Key Arguments at a Glance

The Indian Express argues that its investigation, showing two Election Commissioners objecting on record 14 times in ten months to decisions taken during the Special Intensive Revision (SIR), points to a breakdown of collective functioning in the Election Commission, which the CEC must answer and the Supreme Court must examine.

Supporting
  • Commissioners Sukhbir Singh Sandhu and Vivek Joshi said they were kept in the dark in a body that should decide by consensus or, failing that, by majority; after their objections went unaddressed, they appealed to the Cabinet Secretary.
  • Their objections covered changes to Form 6 (the application for new electors) and the centralisation of the voter database, which they said undercut decentralised, accountable functioning.
  • The editorial argues that the SIR shifted the burden of proof onto the voter through difficult paperwork, tight timelines and an open-ended appellate process, turning a roll revision into what it calls an opaque citizenship test.
  • It argues that the Supreme Court, after intervening usefully in Bihar (accepting Aadhaar as a document, asking for reasons for deletions), has since given the ECI wide procedural latitude.
Counter

The Election Commission says written notes, observations and technical suggestions by members are standard practice, that differing views in deliberation are normal, and that all its orders carry full legal sanction; cleaning up electoral rolls is its constitutional duty, and the editorial itself says that linking deletions to electoral outcomes is more political than empirical.

Way Forward

The editorial asks the CEC to answer the Commissioners point by point, the Supreme Court to examine the questions, the original Form 6 to be restored, and State election machinery to regain access to the voter database.

Cite this page: When Commissioners Disagree: Collective Functioning of the ECI and the SIR — Ujiyari.com | Free UPSC & State PCS Editorial Analysis