The Lift Line
Malacca was a quarrel about safety settled inside a treaty; Hormuz is a quarrel about security taking place outside one.
Why This Editorial Matters for Your Exam
Chokepoints appear in the Prelims map questions and in Mains questions on maritime security and energy security. This piece gives you what most answers lack: the legal mechanics of passage through a narrow strait, and a real precedent in which littoral and user States found a cooperative solution. It builds directly on our earlier article on India raising Hormuz with Iran, which set out the geography and Iran’s UNCLOS position.
GS Paper 2: Important international institutions, their structure and mandate; effect of policies of developed and developing countries on India’s interests. GS Paper 1: Important geophysical features and their location, including water bodies.
| Concept | Meaning | Why it is testable |
|---|---|---|
| Innocent passage | Passage through a territorial sea that is not prejudicial to the coastal State; can be temporarily suspended in the territorial sea generally; submarines surface; no overflight | The default regime; the one Iran would prefer |
| Transit passage | Continuous and expeditious passage through straits used for international navigation; cannot be suspended | Created by UNCLOS Part III; the heart of the Hormuz dispute |
| Archipelagic State | A State made up of groups of islands, which may draw straight baselines around them (UNCLOS Part IV) | Indonesia’s price for accepting transit passage |
| Traffic separation scheme | Separate inbound and outbound lanes with a buffer zone | Exists in both Malacca-Singapore and Hormuz |
Background and Context
The Straits of Malacca and Singapore. The Strait of Malacca runs for about 800 km between the Malay Peninsula and the Indonesian island of Sumatra, joining the Andaman Sea to the Strait of Singapore. The Strait of Singapore, about 105 km long, continues east to the South China Sea.
How the dispute arose and was settled, as the author traces it:
| Year | Development |
|---|---|
| 1957 | Indonesia declares that all waters “surrounding, between and connecting the islands” are Indonesian waters |
| 1958 | First UN conference on the law of the sea; the stance taken by the Federation of Malaya (Malaysia was formed in 1963), later revised |
| 1963 | Armed conflict between Malaysia and Indonesia over Borneo; the two nonetheless later cooperated on the Straits |
| 1971 | Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore jointly challenge the idea that the Straits are “international” and propose a coordinating body of the three |
| 1970s | During the UNCLOS negotiations the United Kingdom introduces transit passage; Indonesia accepts it with reservations |
| 1982 | UNCLOS adopted; archipelagic States recognised in a separate Part |
| 2007 | The Cooperative Mechanism is agreed, with an Aids to Navigation Fund financed by users and administered with the littoral States |
Hormuz today. The Strait of Hormuz is similar in that the territorial seas of Iran and Oman intersect. The author notes that Iran, which has not ratified UNCLOS, passed a law in 1993 requiring foreign warships to seek its authorisation to pass. Iran and Oman have apparently agreed on a framework for reopening the Strait, and Qatar has supported the talks and mooted the Malacca-Singapore model, but the Strait has not reopened and the United States has not accepted the arrangement.
The Analysis
1. Geography makes law decisive. Where a strait is narrower than 24 nautical miles, two 12-mile territorial seas meet and there is no high seas corridor. Passage then depends entirely on which legal regime applies. Under the older regime of innocent passage, the coastal State decided whether a passage was “innocent”, submarines had to navigate on the surface and aircraft had no right of overflight. (The 1958 Territorial Sea Convention did bar the suspension of innocent passage through straits used for international navigation, but that did not satisfy naval powers that wanted submerged transit and overflight.) That is why the user States cared so much.
2. The Malacca outcome was a bargain inside a larger treaty. Transit passage gave user States a non-suspendable right that covers warships. Indonesia accepted it because the same negotiation recognised archipelagic States, securing the waters between its islands. Malaysia’s concerns (environmental safety, insurance, permissible vessel draught) were technical and could be met. The bargain worked because it was one trade among many in a convention meant to govern all the oceans.
3. Cooperation without tolls. The 2007 Cooperative Mechanism is the institutional heart of the model. User States, industry and foundations such as The Nippon Foundation and the International Foundation for Aids to Navigation contribute voluntarily to the Aids to Navigation Fund, which pays for navigation aids, hydrographic surveys and safety projects. A committee of the three littoral States and the contributors administers it by rotation. The contributions are not tolls, and the littoral States levy no fees for transit passage.
4. Why Hormuz is harder. The author isolates three differences. Legal: Iran has not ratified UNCLOS and asserts an authorisation requirement for warships. Substantive: the Malacca question was safety and environment, while the Hormuz question is Iran’s security. Political: even if the Gulf States agree on a framework, the United States may reject it, and a mechanism that the principal naval user does not accept cannot function.
5. The parallels are technical, the context is not. Both straits have traffic separation schemes and both involve overlapping territorial seas. What differs is the moment. Malacca was settled while a global convention was being written; Hormuz is being negotiated in the middle of a conflict.
The precision that earns marks. Do not write that Iran “can legally close” the Strait. On the majority view, transit passage cannot be suspended. Iran’s argument is that transit passage binds only parties to UNCLOS, which it is not, while the United States, also not a party, treats transit passage as customary international law. Write the triangle out in those terms.
Data and Institutions Vault
Prelims-grade facts:
UNCLOS basics:
- UNCLOS was adopted in 1982, opened for signature at Montego Bay, Jamaica, and entered into force in 1994.
- Territorial sea: up to 12 nautical miles from the baseline (Article 3).
- Innocent passage in the territorial sea: Articles 17 to 19; submarines must navigate on the surface (Article 20).
- A coastal State may temporarily suspend innocent passage in specified areas for security (Article 25(3)).
- Part III (Articles 34 to 45) governs straits used for international navigation; transit passage is defined in Article 38.
- Transit passage cannot be suspended (Article 44).
- Article 43: user and bordering States should cooperate on navigation aids and pollution control; the basis of the 2007 Cooperative Mechanism.
- Part IV covers archipelagic States; archipelagic sea lanes passage is in Article 53.
The straits:
- Strait of Malacca: about 800 km, between the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra; Andaman Sea to the Strait of Singapore.
- Strait of Singapore: about 105 km, linking the Malacca Strait to the South China Sea.
- Littoral States of Malacca-Singapore: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore.
- Strait of Hormuz: between Iran and Oman, about 21 nautical miles wide at its narrowest, joining the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman.
- The Cooperative Mechanism on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore was agreed in 2007.
- Iran signed UNCLOS in 1982 but has not ratified it; the United States is not a party; India is a party.
Prelims, the traps:
- Transit passage applies to straits used for international navigation, not to every territorial sea.
- The Aids to Navigation Fund is financed by voluntary contributions; it is not a toll.
- The concept of transit passage was put forward by the United Kingdom, not by the littoral States.
⚠️ Watch the trap: “Territorial waters” and “international strait” are not opposites. A strait can lie wholly within territorial seas and still be a strait used for international navigation, which is exactly why the transit passage regime was needed.
The Debate
The Malacca model can work for Hormuz. The technical ingredients already exist: overlapping territorial seas, a traffic separation scheme, littoral States (Iran and Oman) that have reportedly agreed a framework, and Gulf States such as Qatar willing to back it. A fund-based mechanism would give user States a stake without conceding tolls, and would let Iran claim a role in managing the Strait without claiming a right to close it.
The model does not transfer. Malacca’s littoral States wanted safety and sovereignty; Iran wants security guarantees against the very powers that use the Strait. Iran stands outside UNCLOS, and so does the United States. A cooperative mechanism presupposes trust among the parties, which a live conflict destroys.
The balanced verdict. The model is a destination, not a route. Its institutions (navigation aids, shared surveys, a jointly administered fund) are useful once a political settlement exists. Until then, the relevant precedent is not the 2007 mechanism but the 1970s bargain that preceded it, in which each side gave up something it valued for a regime all could accept.
How to Think About This
Separate the technical layer from the political layer. Many international disputes look similar at the technical level (overlapping zones, shared resources, common infrastructure) and differ entirely at the political level (who fears whom, who is party to which treaty). A template transfers only when both layers match. Apply this test whenever an answer proposes importing a model: the Indus Waters Treaty to other rivers, the Antarctic Treaty to the Arctic, or the Malacca mechanism to Hormuz.
Diagram-in-Words
Distinguish between innocent passage and transit passage under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Can a cooperative arrangement of the Malacca-Singapore kind resolve the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz? (250 words)
The law of the sea gives coastal States a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea, and where a strait is narrower than 24 nautical miles the territorial seas of its littoral States meet. The Straits of Malacca and Singapore and the Strait of Hormuz both fit that description, which is why the regime of passage, rather than the geography of open water, decides who may pass.
Innocent passage, the general rule in a territorial sea, allows continuous and expeditious passage that is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State; the coastal State may temporarily suspend it in specified areas for security reasons, though not in straits used for international navigation, and submarines must navigate on the surface. Transit passage, created by Part III of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, applies to straits used for international navigation between one part of the high seas or exclusive economic zone and another.
It permits continuous and expeditious transit by all ships and aircraft, cannot be suspended, and in practice allows submarines to transit in their normal mode. The Malacca-Singapore settlement combined this legal regime with cooperation: the littoral States kept sovereignty, user States accepted a role in funding navigational safety, and the 2007 Cooperative Mechanism gave that cooperation an institutional form without tolls.
Hormuz differs in three ways. Iran has signed but not ratified the Convention and has argued that transit passage is owed only to parties; the dispute is about security, not safety; and the principal user and naval power, the United States, is not a party either and has not accepted the arrangement Iran and Oman are reported to have agreed.
The Malacca template shows that sovereignty and free navigation can be reconciled through shared institutions rather than contested through force. Its lesson for Hormuz is sequence: technical cooperation follows a political settlement, and cannot substitute for one.
Interview Angle
"The littoral States of the Malacca Strait turned a sovereignty dispute into a cooperation arrangement. Why can the same technical template not simply be copied to the Strait of Hormuz?"
Takeaway Box
- Under 24 nautical miles wide means no high seas: the legal regime of passage decides everything.
- Innocent passage leaves the coastal State to judge what is innocent, makes submarines surface and allows no overflight; transit passage (UNCLOS Part III, Article 38) cannot be suspended and covers overflight.
- Indonesia accepted transit passage in exchange for archipelagic recognition (UNCLOS Part IV): a textbook treaty trade-off.
- 2007 Cooperative Mechanism: user-funded navigation aids, jointly administered, no tolls.
- Hormuz differs in law (Iran and the US outside UNCLOS), in substance (security, not safety) and in politics (no US acceptance).
Sources: The Hindu
M. Kalyanaraman argues in The Hindu that the Straits of Malacca and Singapore offer a technical template for Hormuz, since in both cases the territorial seas of the littoral States meet in the middle, but that the Malacca settlement was reached while UNCLOS was being negotiated and turned on safety and environment, whereas Hormuz turns on Iran’s security and faces a United States that may not accept a regional framework.
- At their narrowest the Malacca and Singapore Straits are well under 24 nautical miles wide, so once Indonesia and Malaysia claimed 12-nautical-mile territorial seas, no strip of high seas or exclusive economic zone remained between them.
- Under the customary law of the time, that left only innocent passage, under which the coastal State judged what counted as innocent, submarines had to navigate on the surface and aircraft had no right of overflight; in 1971 Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore jointly challenged the idea that the Straits were international.
- The United Kingdom introduced “transit passage” during the UNCLOS negotiations, a continuous and expeditious right that also covers warships; Indonesia accepted it with reservations in exchange for recognition of its archipelagic status.
- The 2007 Cooperative Mechanism created an Aids to Navigation Fund fed by voluntary contributions from user States, industry and foundations, administered jointly with the littoral States, and none of the three littoral States charges tolls or fees for transit passage.
The author himself marks the limits: the Malacca bargain was struck as part of a global convention in which trade-offs were possible; Iran has not ratified UNCLOS and since 1993 has required foreign warships to seek authorisation; the core concern in Hormuz is Iran’s security rather than navigational safety; and even an agreed Gulf framework may be rejected by the United States.
Build on what already exists, the Iran-Oman framework and Gulf support for it, including Qatar’s interest in the Malacca-Singapore model, while recognising that a technical mechanism for safety, surveys and navigation aids can work only once the security question between Iran and the major user States is settled.
Cite this page: A Malacca-Singapore Model for Hormuz: What UNCLOS Solved in Southeast Asia, and Why the Gulf Is Harder — Ujiyari.com | Free UPSC & State PCS Editorial Analysis
