The Lift Line
The BRICS rhetoric on AI may be multipolar, but technological power at the frontier remains concentrated in the United States and China.
Why This Editorial Matters for Your Exam
Emerging technologies are now a standing theme in GS2 (India’s interests and great-power relations) and GS3 (science and technology, security). This column is valuable because it gives you a historical analogy (Cold War arms control), a dated chronology of US-China AI diplomacy, and a clear three-part framework for India’s position, which converts neatly into a Mains answer structure.
GS Paper 2: Effect of policies and politics of developed and developing countries on India’s interests; bilateral, regional and global groupings. GS Paper 3: Science and technology: developments and their applications; indigenisation of technology.
| Concept | Meaning | Why it is testable |
|---|---|---|
| Frontier AI | The most capable general-purpose models at the leading edge | Where power, and risk, is concentrated |
| Strategic stability | Arrangements that reduce incentives for accident, miscalculation or pre-emption | The Cold War concept now applied to AI |
| Incident notification | Agreed channel to report AI incidents with national-security consequences | The concrete mechanism being discussed |
| Technology condominium | Two powers jointly setting rules that bind others | India’s fear, drawn from the nuclear order |
Background and Context
The trigger: President Xi Jinping is due in Washington to open a formal US-China dialogue on artificial intelligence, days after offering a Chinese vision of AI cooperation at the BRICS summit in New Delhi.
Chronology of US-China engagement on AI, as the author sets it out:
| When | Where | What happened |
|---|---|---|
| November 2023 | Woodside, California | Biden and Xi open a tentative channel on AI |
| November 2024 | Lima | The two leaders affirm that humans, not AI, must control decisions on the use of nuclear weapons |
| May 2026 | Beijing | Trump and Xi discuss possible AI “guardrails”; no formal arrangement |
| 12 to 13 September 2026 | New Delhi (18th BRICS Summit) | Xi offers a Chinese vision of AI cooperation and invites BRICS members to join WAICO, proposing an open-source AI community |
| Weekend before this column | New York | Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Vice-Premier He Lifeng consider a standing AI dialogue and an incident-notification system |
| Scheduled: 24 September 2026 | Washington | Trump to receive Xi; the two are to initiate a formal bilateral dialogue on AI, their third summit in less than ten months |
India’s position. India is part of the US-led Pax Silica initiative on technology and supply chains, and has stayed out of WAICO, which China launched in Shanghai. It hosted the AI Impact Summit in New Delhi in 2026, where its emphasis on AI for developing societies found resonance.
The Analysis
1. Two faces of the same revolution. In Delhi, Xi spoke of openness, access and diffusion. In Washington, the conversation is to be about dangers: accidents, miscalculation and misuse of frontier models. The author’s point is that both conversations are led by the same two powers, which are together beginning to shape AI’s security architecture.
2. The Cold War is the right analogy. The United States and the Soviet Union competed in nuclear and space technology while negotiating rules to reduce mutual risk, and those rules affected everyone else. A US-China notification system for AI incidents would resemble a crisis-management channel: in a crisis the first need is to establish what happened, whether it was accidental or deliberate, and who is responsible.
3. Divergence limits the deal. Washington wants a framework for the risks of powerful models and military applications. Beijing suspects “safety” is a way to preserve American advantage and legitimise export controls on advanced computing. They also disagree on open-source models, data governance, state regulation and export controls. What they seek is a narrow understanding on strategic stability, not a grand bargain.
4. India’s three dilemmas.
- Alignment: India is inside Pax Silica and outside WAICO, which follows from its integration with the American digital ecosystem and its security problems with China. But as a BRICS member it cannot avoid AI rhetoric shaped by the forum’s dominant power.
- The Global South: India’s pitch of AI for development resonated, but China can offer a wider package of computing, infrastructure, hardware and models.
- Discriminatory rules: a dialogue that begins with strategic stability could become an effort to set rules for everyone else. India’s experience of the nuclear order gives it reason for caution.
5. The answer is capability. Rivalry between Washington and Beijing, and their competition for markets, may limit collusion and create leverage for emerging technology powers. But India’s standing will depend on its compute, semiconductors, models, research, capital and talent, where the gap with the two leaders is large.
The precision that earns marks. The Washington meeting was scheduled at the time of writing: write that Trump and Xi “are to initiate” a dialogue, not that they “launched” one. The Lima 2024 understanding on human control of nuclear decisions is the only concrete US-China AI outcome the author identifies.
Data and Institutions Vault
Prelims-grade facts:
US-China AI diplomacy:
- Woodside, California, November 2023: Biden-Xi meeting opens a channel on AI.
- Lima, November 2024: the two leaders affirm human control over decisions on the use of nuclear weapons.
- WAICO (World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organisation) was launched by China in Shanghai; India has stayed out.
- Pax Silica is a US-led initiative on technology and supply chains; India is part of it.
The global AI summit series:
- Bletchley Park, UK (November 2023): AI Safety Summit.
- Seoul (May 2024) and Paris AI Action Summit (February 2025), which India co-chaired.
- New Delhi AI Impact Summit (2026), hosted by India.
India’s capability programme:
- The IndiaAI Mission was approved by the Union Cabinet in March 2024 with an outlay of about 10,372 crore rupees over five years.
The Cold War precedents the analogy draws on:
- The Moscow-Washington hotline was set up in 1963, after the Cuban Missile Crisis.
- The US-Soviet Incidents at Sea Agreement was signed in 1972.
- The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (opened for signature 1968) recognises only five nuclear-weapon States; India has not signed it, calling it discriminatory.
Prelims, the traps:
- India is in Pax Silica (US-led), not in WAICO (China-led).
- The 2023 Bletchley summit was about AI safety; the 2026 Delhi summit was framed around impact.
⚠️ Watch the trap: “Multipolar rhetoric” is not the same as “multipolar capability”. A forum can speak of a multipolar AI order while frontier capability remains with two states. Examiners reward answers that keep the two apart.
The Debate
India should welcome a US-China AI dialogue. Any mechanism that reduces the risk of AI-driven accidents or miscalculation between nuclear-armed powers makes the world safer, India included. Great-power rivalry also creates room for swing states to extract technology and investment from both sides.
India should be wary. Two powers that set rules for strategic stability can, intentionally or not, set rules for everyone. The nuclear order, in which India was treated as an outsider for decades, shows how “stability” regimes can freeze a hierarchy. If export controls on compute and models become part of a US-China understanding, India could be on the wrong side of them.
The balanced verdict. Support risk reduction, insist on a place in rule-making through plurilateral forums, and above all build capability. Rules are negotiated among those who have something to bring to the table.
How to Think About This
Separate rhetoric, capability and rules. For any emerging technology, ask three questions: who talks about it (forums and declarations), who has it (capability at the frontier), and who writes the rules (standards, controls, treaties). They are often different sets of countries. India’s policy options depend on where it stands on each. The same frame works for semiconductors, space, quantum technology and critical minerals.
Diagram-in-Words
Artificial intelligence is becoming a domain of both competition and cooperation between the United States and China. Discuss the implications of a US-China dialogue on AI risks for India's technology and foreign policy. (250 words)
Artificial intelligence has moved from a commercial technology to an instrument of national power. As with nuclear weapons and space in the Cold War, the two leading powers now compete fiercely while beginning to negotiate rules to limit shared risks, and those rules will shape the options of every other state.
The emerging US-China dialogue builds on the 2023 Woodside channel and the 2024 Lima understanding that humans must control nuclear-use decisions, and now contemplates a standing dialogue and an incident-notification system. Such crisis-management mechanisms mirror the superpower hotline and incidents-at-sea arrangements of the Cold War, whose purpose was to establish quickly what had happened and whether it was deliberate.
For India this raises three issues. First, alignment: India is part of the US-led Pax Silica initiative on technology supply chains and has stayed out of China’s World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organisation, yet as a BRICS member it cannot avoid Chinese-shaped rhetoric on AI. Second, competition for the Global South: India’s message of AI for development resonated at the AI Impact Summit it hosted in 2026, but China’s deeper capabilities in computing, hardware and models let it offer a larger package.
Third, rule-setting: India’s experience of the nuclear order, in which the Non-Proliferation Treaty divided the world into haves and have-nots, gives it reason to fear that strategic stability between two AI powers may produce discriminatory technology controls. Against this, rivalry between the two limits collusion and creates room for swing states.
India’s influence over the rules of AI will rest on capability rather than declarations. The pragmatic course is to support risk reduction, participate in rule-making from the inside, and close the capability gap in compute, chips, models and talent through trusted partnerships and domestic investment.
Interview Angle
"India sits in the US-led Pax Silica initiative and in China-dominated BRICS at the same time. On artificial intelligence, is that strategic autonomy or strategic confusion?"
Takeaway Box
- Woodside 2023 opened the channel; Lima 2024 produced the one concrete outcome: human control over nuclear-use decisions.
- Trump and Xi were scheduled to meet in Washington on 24 September 2026 to start a formal AI dialogue; a standing dialogue and incident notification are under discussion.
- India is in Pax Silica, outside WAICO, and inside BRICS: the alignment dilemma in one line.
- Three dilemmas: alignment, the Global South, and the risk of discriminatory rules modelled on the nuclear order.
- Lift line for answers: influence over AI rules follows capability in compute, chips, models and talent.
Sources: The Indian Express
C. Raja Mohan argues that while BRICS rhetoric on AI is multipolar, frontier AI power is concentrated in the United States and China, whose emerging bilateral dialogue on AI risks resembles Cold War superpower arms control, and that this poses three difficult questions for India: how to navigate the US-China contest, how to compete with China’s offer to the Global South, and how to prevent superpower rules from becoming discriminatory controls on others.
- About ten days after using the New Delhi BRICS summit to offer a Chinese vision of AI cooperation, including an invitation to join the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organisation (WAICO) and an open-source AI community, President Xi Jinping is scheduled to meet President Donald Trump in Washington to initiate a formal AI dialogue.
- US-China AI engagement began after the Biden-Xi meeting at Woodside, California, in November 2023; its most concrete outcome, at Lima in November 2024, was the affirmation that humans, not AI, must control decisions on the use of nuclear weapons.
- After talks in New York between US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Chinese Vice-Premier He Lifeng, Washington said the two sides had considered a standing AI dialogue and a notification system for incidents with national-security consequences.
- The two powers still diverge: the US wants to manage the risks of powerful models and military uses, while China fears safety talks will entrench American advantages and legitimise curbs on its access to advanced computing.
A US-China arrangement that reduces the risks of accidents, miscalculation and misuse of AI is in everyone’s interest, including India’s, and rivalry between the two powers is itself likely to limit any collusion and to create leverage for emerging technology powers.
India should welcome any US-China agreement that reduces AI dangers, but its immediate imperative is to deepen cooperation with trusted partners while building indigenous capability in computing power, semiconductors, models, research, capital and talent.
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