GS Paper 1: History, Geography & Society
Q1. The south-west monsoon of 2026 ended at 87 per cent of its Long Period Average, but the all-India figure hid sharp regional differences. Examine the factors behind the season’s pattern and its implications for drought management in India.
[GS-1 | 15 Marks | 250 Words]
Introduction: On 30 September 2026 the India Meteorological Department (IMD) closed the season at 759.4 mm against a normal of 868.6 mm: 87 per cent of the Long Period Average (LPA), a “deficient” season and the lowest since 2015. East and north-east India had its driest monsoon since records began in 1901.
Two Indias in One Season
- Near normal: north-west India was 5.9 per cent and central India 2.6 per cent below normal.
- Deep deficit: east and north-east India about 25.6 per cent short, and the south peninsula 24.3 per cent short, its fourth lowest since 1901.
- Uneven months: June came in at about 65 per cent of normal and August about 84 per cent; 17 of the 36 meteorological subdivisions, covering about 42 per cent of the land area, were deficient.
Why the Season Looked Like This
- El Nino: warming of the central and eastern equatorial Pacific weakens the Walker circulation and the monsoon. IMD had forecast 92 per cent (13 April) and then 90 per cent (29 May), so the seasonal forecast held even as monthly forecasts missed.
- Low-pressure systems: the country was under their influence on 77 days against a normal of 57; systems from the Bay of Bengal kept central India close to normal.
- The Madden-Julian Oscillation stayed unfavourable over the south, which depends more on it.
- A longer trend: the IMD Director-General pointed to diminishing rainfall over east and north-east India in recent years.
Implications for Drought Management
- Follow the regional map: contingency crop plans, power planning and relief must be district-specific, not set by the national average.
- Who declares drought: IMD classifies rainfall; States declare drought under the Manual for Drought Management, and central help from the NDRF follows an inter-ministerial team’s visit. Delays at either step cost farmers a season.
- Forecasts farmers can use: extended-range (two to four weeks) and block-level forecasts.
- Resilience: watershed development, micro-irrigation, diversification towards pulses and millets, and crop insurance.
Conclusion: A deficient season is no longer a single national event but a map of local shortfalls. Drought management must be as regional as the rain.
Key concepts: LPA; El Nino; Walker circulation; MJO; low-pressure systems; Manual for Drought Management; NDRF.
Q2. September 2026 marked 120 years since the oath of non-violent resistance at the Empire Theatre, Johannesburg. Trace how Satyagraha developed from a South African protest into a method of India’s national movement.
[GS-1 | 15 Marks | 250 Words]
Introduction: On 11 September 1906, about three thousand Indians gathered under Gandhi’s leadership at the Empire Theatre, Johannesburg, and took an oath to resist a proposed Transvaal law requiring Indians to register, the “Black Act” (passed as the Asiatic Registration Act in 1907), without violence. The method had no name yet; “satyagraha” was coined later, through a naming competition in Gandhi’s paper Indian Opinion.
The South African Origin
- The grievance: the Act required every Indian in the Transvaal to register, be fingerprinted and carry a certificate, on pain of fine, prison or deportation.
- The method: refuse to obey, accept the punishment, and never answer with violence.
- Three tenets: truth (satya) as the moral basis, non-violence (ahimsa) as the discipline, and self-suffering as the means of persuasion.
- Why a new word: “passive resistance” suggested weakness; satyagraha meant holding firmly to truth.
Taking It to India
- Local tests after 1915: Champaran (1917) for indigo cultivators, Kheda (1918) for peasants unable to pay revenue, and Ahmedabad (1918) for mill workers.
- National movements: the Non-Cooperation Movement (1920 to 1922), withdrawn after Chauri Chaura because discipline had broken; the Civil Disobedience Movement opened by the Salt March of 1930; and Quit India (1942).
What Made It Work
- It turned the ruler’s need for legitimacy into a weakness, before a moral audience at home and abroad.
- It allowed women, peasants and the poor to join without arms.
- It joined constructive work (khadi, removing untouchability) to protest.
Limits
- Withdrawals such as that after Chauri Chaura frustrated many followers.
- Revolutionaries and others doubted that suffering alone could move the Empire.
Conclusion: Satyagraha began as a protest against a registration law and became a theory of political action. Its afterlife in movements such as Chipko (1973), which drew on the older Bishnoi sacrifice at Khejarli (1730), shows that non-violent resistance has deep Indian roots.
Key concepts: Black Act; Indian Opinion; satya, ahimsa, self-suffering; Champaran; Non-Cooperation; Civil Disobedience; Chipko.
Q3. In September 2026 a Kakatiya temple was declared a Monument of National Importance, an Ahom ensemble entered the UNESCO Tentative List, and a Zanskar village became Ladakh’s first Heritage Village. Discuss how these different instruments protect India’s heritage, and their limits.
[GS-1 | 15 Marks | 250 Words]
Introduction: September 2026 showed three tools of heritage protection at work: the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) declared Gollala Gudi at Palampet, Mulugu (Telangana), a Monument of National Importance; the Rangpur-Sivasagar Historic Ensemble, the Ahom capital complex in Assam, was added to India’s UNESCO Tentative List; and Kumik in Zanskar district was declared Ladakh’s first Heritage Village.
1. Statutory Protection: Monuments of National Importance
- Under the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958, construction is prohibited within 100 metres of the protected limits and regulated in a further 200 metres; the 2010 amendment created the National Monuments Authority.
- Declaration moves a site into the Union List and the ASI’s care. Gollala Gudi, a trikutalaya (three-shrined temple) beside the Ramappa Temple, gains a buffer that also protects a World Heritage setting.
2. International Recognition: the World Heritage route
- Under the World Heritage Convention, 1972, a site must stay on the Tentative List for at least a year before it can be nominated; ICOMOS evaluates cultural sites.
- The Ahom ensemble (Rang Ghar, Talatal Ghar, the tanks and temples) was filed under criteria (iii) and (iv). A Tentative List entry is a filter, not an inscription.
3. Living Heritage: the Heritage Village
- Kumik is valued for its Ladakhi houses and the Kanjur manuscripts kept in homes and the monastery. The designation is administrative, not under the 1958 Act, and aims at conservation with heritage tourism as a livelihood.
Limits
- Capacity: the ASI already protects more than 3,600 monuments.
- Living communities: prohibited zones can freeze residents’ lives unless heritage bye-laws are notified.
- Climate: many Kumik families moved to Lower Kumik as the glacier-fed stream shrank; a label cannot conserve a village people must leave.
Conclusion: Monuments need law, ensembles need global recognition, and living villages need livelihoods. Constitutional duties under Article 49 and Article 51A(f) are met only when all three work together.
Key concepts: AMASR Act, 1958; National Monuments Authority; Tentative List; outstanding universal value; living heritage; Article 49.
GS Paper 2: Polity, Governance & International Relations
Q4. “Procedural safeguards are the substance of personal liberty.” Discuss with reference to the Supreme Court’s rulings of September 2026 on arrest, re-arrest and preventive detention.
[GS-2 | 15 Marks | 250 Words]
Introduction: Article 21 promises that no person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. In September 2026 the Supreme Court gave that promise practical force in a series of rulings, showing that liberty is protected less by declarations than by procedures with consequences.
The September Rulings
- Re-arrest (21 September): in Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol v. State of Punjab, the Court held that a person released because the police did not supply the grounds of arrest under Article 22(1) cannot simply be arrested again. The police must give written grounds, obtain a Judicial Magistrate’s sanction on an application endorsed by the officer’s superior, and hand the investigation to another officer.
- Preventive detention (29 September): quashing a detention under the National Security Act, 1980 in the Sambhal case, the Court held that a confession to a police officer, which cannot be proved against an accused under Section 23 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, cannot by itself ground the detaining authority’s satisfaction. It called the detention more punitive than preventive and imposed Rs 10 lakh in costs.
- POCSO and custody disputes (24 September): where a parent is accused amid a matrimonial dispute, arrest is a discretion, not automatic, and an expert in child and adolescent psychiatry or clinical psychology must assist first, except in exceptional cases recorded with written reasons.
- Protest FIRs (1 September): using Article 142, the Court quashed FIRs across India against students who protested over the NEET (UG) 2026 paper leak.
Why Procedure Is Substance
- A right without a cost for its breach is routinely bypassed; judicial sanction takes the remedy out of the violator’s hands.
- Preventive detention falls outside Article 22(1) and (2), so the Advisory Board under Article 22(4) and the grounds under Article 22(5) are the main shield.
- “Process as punishment”: arrest itself can ruin lives before any trial.
The Other Side
- Investigators need room to act against organised crime and threats to public order.
- A forward-looking bar on FIRs, as in the Article 142 order, can look like an amnesty, a function of the legislature or executive.
Way Forward
- Train police in the BNSS duties to state the grounds of arrest (Section 47) and to inform a relative or friend (Section 48); record every arrest digitally.
- Reasoned detention orders with quick Advisory Board review; costs and departmental action for misuse.
Conclusion: September’s rulings show that the Constitution’s guarantees live or die in police stations and district offices. Liberty is secure only when procedure has teeth.
Key concepts: Article 21; Article 22(1) to (5); BNSS, 2023; NSA, 1980; Article 142; “process as punishment”.
Q5. The split verdict of September 2026 on the Election Commissioners Act, 2023 has sent the question of appointments towards a Constitution Bench. Examine how the methods of appointing and removing Election Commissioners bear on the independence of the Election Commission of India.
[GS-2 | 15 Marks | 250 Words]
Introduction: On 23 September 2026, Justices Dipankar Datta and Satish Chandra Sharma split on the Union’s plea to refer the challenge to the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 to a larger Bench; both agreed the papers should go to the Chief Justice of India to consider a Constitution Bench. The case asks a basic question: who should choose the referees of Indian democracy?
Appointment
- Article 324(2): the President appoints the CEC and ECs, subject to any law made by Parliament.
- Anoop Baranwal (March 2023): the Court set an interim committee of the Prime Minister, the Leader of Opposition and the CJI, until Parliament legislated.
- The 2023 Act: a Selection Committee of the Prime Minister, a Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the Prime Minister, and the Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha, choosing from names suggested by a Search Committee headed by the Law Minister.
- The critique: the executive holds a two-to-one majority, so, in Justice Datta’s prima facie view, the Leader of Opposition risks being “largely ornamental”; independence must also be seen.
- The defence: Article 324(2) gives Parliament the power to legislate, and the Court’s committee was meant to last only until a law was made.
Removal
- Under Article 324(5) only the CEC has protection like a Supreme Court judge: removal on proved misbehaviour or incapacity through a special-majority address of both Houses. Other ECs can be removed on the CEC’s recommendation.
- Critics argue this unequal protection lets a CEC dominate a collegial body. Section 16 of the 2023 Act bars court proceedings against a serving or former CEC or EC for acts in official duty; The Hindu explained that it is not a blanket immunity from arrest.
Reforms Discussed
- A more balanced Selection Committee, with an independent or bipartisan element.
- Removal protection for all Election Commissioners alike.
- A narrow reading of Section 16, limited to good-faith official acts.
- A permanent Constitution Bench, so that such references do not wait for years.
Conclusion: An election body is trusted when both winners and losers accept its neutrality. How its members are chosen and removed is therefore not a technical detail but the foundation of electoral democracy.
Key concepts: Article 324(2) and (5); Anoop Baranwal; Selection Committee; security of tenure; Article 145(3); institutional independence.
Q6. The Union government proposed a new Article 371(K) for the Union Territory of Ladakh in September 2026. Critically examine whether this route can meet Ladakh’s demands for representation and safeguards.
[GS-2 | 15 Marks | 250 Words]
Introduction: On 9 September 2026, at a High-Powered Committee sub-committee meeting chaired by Minister of State for Home Nityanand Rai, the Ministry of Home Affairs proposed inserting Article 371(K) to give the Union Territory of Ladakh a directly elected body with legislative competence on specified subjects. It was placed before the Leh Apex Body and the Kargil Democratic Alliance, which have led the agitation for statehood and the Sixth Schedule.
The Background
- The Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019 made Ladakh a Union Territory without a legislature from 31 October 2019.
- Local self-government rests on the Leh (1995) and Kargil (2003) Hill Councils under the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Councils Act, 1997.
- Ladakh is not under the Sixth Schedule, which covers tribal areas of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram.
What 371(K) Could Offer
- Representation: an elected body where none exists today.
- Constitutional entrenchment: protection that a statutory body lacks; the Article 371 series (such as 371A for Nagaland and 371G for Mizoram) already protects customs and identity in other regions.
- Asymmetric federalism: a fit for a small, predominantly tribal, ecologically fragile region.
- Strategic balance: the Union keeps land, security and public order in a region on the Line of Actual Control.
Its Limits
- It falls short of the two core demands, statehood and Sixth Schedule status.
- Everything depends on the list of “specified subjects”; without land and jobs, safeguards may be thin.
- A UT body with constitutional status but limited powers would be a new, untested category between a State and a UT.
- It needs a constitutional amendment, and the subjects it would cover were still under negotiation.
The Way Ahead
- Publish the draft and the list of subjects; consult the Hill Councils.
- Include protection for land, employment and culture, as other 371 provisions do.
- Keep the dialogue continuous; the next round was scheduled for 6 October 2026.
Conclusion: Article 371(K) is a middle path between a UT without a voice and a full State on a sensitive border. Its worth will be judged by how much real power the specified subjects give the people of Ladakh.
Key concepts: Article 371 series; Part XXI; Sixth Schedule; asymmetric federalism; LAHDC; Union Territory.
Q7. “BRICS is most useful to India as a platform for practical cooperation, not as a bloc.” Examine this statement with reference to the 18th BRICS Summit hosted by India in September 2026.
[GS-2 | 15 Marks | 250 Words]
Introduction: India hosted the 18th BRICS Summit at Bharat Mandapam, New Delhi, on 12 and 13 September 2026. The eleven-member grouping adopted the New Delhi Declaration, about 140 paragraphs, unanimously on 12 September, and Chinese President Xi Jinping made his first in-person visit to India since the Mamallapuram informal summit of October 2019.
What India Gained: Practical Outcomes
- Terrorism: the declaration condemned the Pahalgam attack of 22 April 2025, the second year running after the Rio declaration of 2025, in a text signed by China.
- Multilateral reform: backing for comprehensive UN Security Council reform with greater roles for India and Brazil, reinstatement of the WTO Appellate Body and realignment of IMF quotas.
- Trade and climate: opposition to unilateral tariffs, secondary sanctions and WTO-incompatible carbon border measures, a concern India shares with other developing economies.
- Finance: support for the New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement; payments work framed as settlement diversification, not de-dollarisation.
- Critical minerals: the Prime Minister warned against weaponising critical minerals and supply chains.
- India-China channel: the Modi-Xi meeting committed to a “fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable” boundary resolution, and direct Guangzhou-Delhi flights were announced to resume.
Why Not a Bloc
- BRICS works by consensus; its members range from close Western partners to Russia and Iran.
- India rejects an anti-Western or de-dollarisation agenda; it is also in the Quad and deepening ties with the US and Europe.
- China’s weight inside the grouping and its unresolved border with India limit how far India can align.
- Wider membership brings diversity of interests and makes common positions harder.
How India Can Use It
- Keep the agenda on development finance, UN reform, counter-terrorism and supply-chain resilience.
- Use BRICS for issue-based coalitions while protecting strategic autonomy.
- Use summit-level contact with China to stabilise the relationship without conceding on the boundary.
Conclusion: The New Delhi Declaration shows BRICS at its most useful to India: as a forum to win consensus on terrorism, reform and fair trade. Treated as a bloc, it would constrain India; treated as a platform, it extends India’s reach.
Key concepts: New Delhi Declaration; consensus; UNSC reform; NDB; CRA; strategic autonomy; multi-alignment.
GS Paper 3: Economy, Environment, Science & Security
Q8. India’s economic data in September 2026 sent mixed signals: strong headline growth alongside weakening factory jobs, rising tax refunds and capital outflows. Examine how these indicators should be read together.
[GS-3 | 15 Marks | 250 Words]
Introduction: Real GDP grew 7.8 per cent in the April to June quarter of 2026-27, yet the data released in September 2026 told a more uneven story. Reading the economy well means reading several indicators together and knowing what each one measures.
The Signals
- Manufacturing PMI: 52.8 in August, down from 53.5 and the lowest since August 2021; new orders grew at their slowest in five years and factory employment fell for the first time in about two and a half years.
- IIP on the new 2022-23 base: up 8.0 per cent in August, with manufacturing at 9.0 per cent and capital goods at 16.9 per cent, but mining down 5.6 per cent and consumer non-durables up only 2.1 per cent.
- GST: gross collections of Rs 1,99,853 crore grew 14.8 per cent, but refunds rose 67.9 per cent, so net collections grew only 8.3 per cent; import IGST grew far faster than domestic revenue.
- Balance of payments, Q1 2026-27: the current account deficit was a modest USD 4.2 billion (about 0.5 per cent of GDP), yet the balance of payments drew down reserves by USD 8.1 billion, as a portfolio-led capital outflow of about USD 5.5 billion came on top of the deficit.
How to Read Them
- Breadth versus size: the PMI is a diffusion index of how many firms report improvement, not how much output grew.
- Base effects: a high year-on-year IIP figure can reflect a low base; output in August was lower than in July.
- Gross versus net: refunds return tax on inverted duty structures and exports; net GST is what the exchequer keeps.
- Current versus capital account: a fall in reserves with a small CAD points to volatile portfolio flows, not a trade crisis.
What It Means
- Investment-led and capital-goods strength sits beside weak mass consumption, a K-shaped pattern.
- Falling factory employment is a warning that growth is not yet creating enough jobs.
- External finance depends on flighty capital; FDI and stable flows matter more than headline growth.
Way Forward
- Policies that support labour-intensive manufacturing and rural demand.
- Correct inverted duty structures systematically.
- Keep improving statistics, as the move of the IIP to a 2022-23 base aims to.
Conclusion: One survey or one month is not a turning point, but several series pointing the same way deserve attention. Good policy starts with reading the data whole.
Key concepts: diffusion index; base effect; inverted duty structure; capital account; portfolio flows; K-shaped growth.
Q9. A deficient El Nino monsoon tests both the farmer and the consumer. Examine how India’s price, procurement and trade instruments were used in September 2026 to manage food security, and assess the trade-offs involved.
[GS-3 | 15 Marks | 250 Words]
Introduction: The 2026 monsoon ended about 12 per cent short, and Kharif sown area fell about 1 per cent, led by paddy. In September 2026 the Centre responded with a production target, a Rabi price signal and an import duty cut, each aimed at a different part of the food chain.
The Instruments Used
- Production target: a foodgrain target of 373.93 million tonnes for 2026-27, with the Rabi season expected to supply 177.72 million tonnes, against output of 376.56 million tonnes in 2025-26.
- Price signal: on 30 September 2026 the CCEA approved Rabi MSPs for 2027-28; wheat rose only Rs 25 to Rs 2,610 a quintal while safflower rose Rs 675, mustard Rs 413 and lentil Rs 390.
- Assured procurement: 100 per cent procurement of tur, urad and masoor at MSP to pull area into pulses.
- Trade: on 24 September 2026 basic customs duty on crude sunflower oil was cut from 10 per cent to nil, and on crude soybean and palm oil from 10 to 5 per cent, keeping the crude-refined differential at 19.25 per cent.
The Trade-offs
- Consumer versus farmer: cheaper imported oil eases food inflation, but can depress domestic oilseed prices near harvest and blunt the NMEO-Oilseeds goal of 69.7 million tonnes by 2030-31.
- Signal versus support: MSP has no statutory backing and works only where procurement exists; the Shanta Kumar Committee (2015) found that about 6 per cent of farm households sold at MSP to a procurement agency.
- Cost measure: the 1.5-times rule is applied on A2+FL, not on the fuller C2 cost.
- Water and stocks: El Nino can leave reservoirs and soil moisture low for Rabi, and surplus grain carries a fiscal cost.
Way Forward
- A rules-based duty band for edible oils instead of frequent changes.
- Price-deficiency payments and wider procurement for pulses and oilseeds under PM-AASHA.
- Water-smart cropping, rice-fallow pulses and quality inputs.
Conclusion: India meets about 57 per cent of its edible oil demand through imports (Union Cabinet, October 2024). Short-term relief for consumers must not undercut the long-term goal of self-reliance in pulses and oilseeds.
Key concepts: MSP; CACP and CCEA; A2+FL and C2; landed cost; crude-refined differential; NMEO-Oilseeds; PM-AASHA.
Q10. UNEP’s report “Limiting Overshoot” (September 2026) treats exceeding 1.5 degrees Celsius as unavoidable. Discuss what the shift from preventing overshoot to limiting it means for global climate policy, with reference to India’s recent mitigation measures.
[GS-3 | 15 Marks | 250 Words]
Introduction: On 2 September 2026 UNEP released Limiting Overshoot, a Spotlight Report that assesses exceedance of 1.5 degrees Celsius as now widely assessed as unavoidable. Its best case sees warming peak at about 1.8 degrees around midcentury before returning, while current policies point to a median of about 2.6 degrees by 2100.
What Overshoot Means
- Overshoot is exceeding a threshold and later returning below it, not stabilising at the higher level.
- Return requires deep cuts plus carbon dioxide removal; the 1.5 degree pathway needs emissions 55 per cent below 2019 levels by 2035 (a figure from the Emissions Gap Report 2025), and delay raises the required cut.
- Reversible temperature does not mean reversible impact: ice-sheet loss, sea-level rise and extinction do not run backwards.
Implications for Global Policy
- Peak temperature becomes a target in its own right, alongside end-of-century warming.
- Adaptation and loss-and-damage finance move to the centre of negotiations.
- Risk of a licence to delay: an overshoot framing can be misused to postpone cuts; the irreversibility finding is the answer.
- Equity: CBDR-RC and historical responsibility matter more when removal must be paid for.
India’s Measures in September 2026
- CAFE-III, notified on 29 September 2026 under the Energy Conservation Act, 2001, tightens the passenger-car fuel benchmark by about 16.7 per cent for 2027 to 2032, with super credits for electric vehicles.
- Green Energy Corridor Phase III, approved on 30 September 2026 with Rs 1,86,405 crore, will evacuate up to 135 GW of renewable power and adds 50 GWh of battery storage, the first storage component in the programme.
- These target the grid and transport bottlenecks; India’s net zero target year is 2070.
Conclusion: India’s case rests on the stock of carbon already in the atmosphere and on per capita emissions below the global average. Limiting overshoot needs both faster cuts by major emitters and finance for removal and adaptation in developing countries.
Key concepts: overshoot; carbon dioxide removal; irreversibility; Paris Agreement Article 2; CBDR-RC; super credits; battery energy storage.
Q11. September 2026 saw ISRO launch EOS-05 and uprate its CE20 cryogenic engine, even as its employee associations questioned the agency’s future role under the Indian Space Policy 2023. Discuss how India can expand private participation in space without weakening ISRO’s core research capability.
[GS-3 | 15 Marks | 250 Words]
Introduction: On 4 September 2026 GSLV-F17 launched EOS-05, an Earth imaging satellite built to operate from geosynchronous orbit; after its third and final orbit-raising manoeuvre on 7 September, it was being drifted to its operational slot at 85.5 degrees East. On 9 September ISRO hot-tested the CE20 engine at an uprated 220 kN. The same week, ISRO employee associations sought written clarification on the agency’s future role.
What September Showed About Capability
- EOS-05: at 2,367 kg, the heaviest satellite GSLV has placed in a transfer orbit; it can revisit a selected area about every five minutes, valuable for cyclones, fires and cloudbursts.
- CE20 uprating: about 450 to 500 kg of extra GTO payload for LVM3, and qualification of a tank pressurisation module for Gaganyaan.
- These are the fruit of decades of in-house research, including indigenous cryogenics after the technology denial of the 1990s.
The Policy Shift
- The Indian Space Policy 2023 says ISRO shall not undertake operational and production work and shall focus on research and development.
- IN-SPACe authorises and promotes non-governmental entities; NSIL is the commercial PSU; around 120 technologies, including the SSLV and PSLV, have been transferred to industry.
- The associations’ concern: no formal communication from the Department of Space explaining the policy, its legal basis or its timeline.
Balancing the Two
- Anchor customer: IN-SPACe’s chairperson linked the shift to a USD 44 billion space economy by 2033 and said the government has to be an anchor customer.
- Space legislation: India still has no comprehensive space law; a statute would give IN-SPACe a firm basis and settle liability.
- Protect R&D: ring-fence budgets for propulsion, human spaceflight and science missions.
- People: clear communication and career paths for ISRO staff during transition.
Conclusion: Private firms can take over production; frontier research and strategic missions still need a strong ISRO. The transition works best when it is explained, legislated and funded.
Key concepts: geosynchronous orbit; sub-GTO; CE20; LVM3 and HLVM3; IN-SPACe; NSIL; Indian Space Policy 2023; technology transfer.
Q12. India signed the UN Convention against Cybercrime in September 2026 after staying out of the Budapest Convention for over two decades. Examine the benefits of the new treaty for India’s fight against cybercrime and the safeguards it will need before ratification.
[GS-3 | 15 Marks | 250 Words]
Introduction: External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar signed the United Nations Convention against Cybercrime for India in New York on 25 September 2026. Adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 2024, it enters into force 90 days after the 40th ratification; the UN Treaty Collection showed 95 signatories but only 3 Parties on 26 September 2026.
Why India Signed This Treaty
- Negotiated at the UN by all members, unlike the Council of Europe’s Budapest Convention (2001), which India has not joined, arguing that it was drafted without developing countries and that some of its cross-border access provisions raise sovereignty concerns.
- Evidence across borders: electronic evidence for Indian cases often sits on servers abroad, and Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties are slow.
- Speed: Article 41 creates a 24/7 network of contact points, and the treaty provides for expedited preservation of data.
- Wide scope: e-evidence cooperation covers “serious crime” generally (an offence punishable with at least four years’ imprisonment), not only offences committed online.
The Risks
- Broad data-sharing powers can be misused against dissent if safeguards are weak.
- Dual criminality and differing definitions of offences can stall cooperation.
- Investigating agencies need the capacity to make and answer requests quickly.
Safeguards Before Ratification
- Signature does not bind India; ratification does, so the gap is the time to prepare.
- Judicial oversight of requests and a clear data protection regime.
- Domestic law aligned with the treaty’s procedural powers, with proportionality built in.
- Trained cyber cells and a single, well-staffed contact point for the 24/7 network.
Conclusion: The Convention can cut the delays that let cybercriminals escape across borders. Its value for India depends on ratifying it with strong protections for privacy and due process.
Key concepts: UN Convention against Cybercrime; Budapest Convention; MLAT; electronic evidence; expedited preservation; dual criminality; signature versus ratification.
GS Paper 4: Ethics, Integrity & Aptitude (Case Studies)
Q13. You are the District Magistrate of a district where thousands of students have protested for a week after the question paper of a State recruitment examination leaked. Most protests have been peaceful, but on one day a group blocked a highway and damaged two buses. Senior officials want FIRs registered against all identifiable protesters “to send a message”, while student groups demand that cases be dropped and the leak be probed. Several students tell you that a criminal case will end their chances of a government job.
(a) Identify the ethical issues involved. (b) What course of action would you take, and why?
[GS-4 | 20 Marks | 250 Words]
Context: On 1 September 2026 the Supreme Court used Article 142 to quash FIRs registered across India against students who protested over the NEET (UG) 2026 paper leak, and barred fresh FIRs over the July 2026 protest window. The case below is set in a different, fictional district, but it raises the same tension between order and fairness.
(a) Ethical Issues
- Rule of law: violence and damage to public property cannot go unanswered.
- Proportionality: a blanket FIR against every protester punishes the peaceful many for the acts of a few.
- Justice to the aggrieved: the students are victims of the leak; the system failed them first.
- Right to protest: peaceful assembly is protected by Article 19(1)(b).
- Consequences for careers: a criminal case can shut out a young person from public employment for years.
- Pressure from superiors: an order “to send a message” is about deterrence by example, not individual guilt.
(b) Course of Action
- Separate the acts: register FIRs only for specific acts of violence and damage, based on video and witness evidence, naming individuals, not crowds.
- No cases for peaceful protest; record the reasons in writing so the decision can be reviewed.
- Act on the cause: push for a time-bound inquiry into the leak, action against those responsible and a clear schedule for a re-test.
- Dialogue: meet student representatives, share the steps being taken and designate protest sites.
- Communicate upward: explain to superiors, in writing, why targeted action is lawful and more effective than mass FIRs.
Ethical Anchor: Fairness means punishing the act, not the crowd; an administrator who addresses the grievance as firmly as the violence restores both order and trust.
Key concepts: proportionality; right to peaceful assembly; individual culpability; compassion; courage of conviction; accountability.
Q14. You are the Regional Transport Officer in a city of the National Capital Region. With air quality forecast to turn “severe”, the revised Graded Response Action Plan has moved to a stage that bars older diesel goods vehicles. A transporters’ association warns of a strike that would hit vegetable and milk supply, and some small truck owners say they will lose their only income. One owner quietly offers your inspector money to let his trucks pass.
(a) Identify the stakeholders and the ethical dilemmas. (b) How would you enforce the restrictions?
[GS-4 | 20 Marks | 250 Words]
Context: On 28 September 2026 the Commission for Air Quality Management revised the Graded Response Action Plan for Delhi-NCR: 48 actions across four stages linked to the Air Quality Index, triggered on forecast AQI as well as recorded AQI. EV, BS-VI, CNG and LNG trucks remain allowed even in Stage IV.
(a) Stakeholders and Dilemmas
- Citizens, especially children, the elderly and outdoor workers, whose health is at stake.
- Small truck owners and drivers, whose livelihood depends on daily trips.
- Consumers, who need uninterrupted supply of essentials.
- The administration, bound by a statutory plan and by its own integrity.
- Dilemmas: public health against livelihood; strict enforcement against continuity of essential supply; the bribe as a test of personal and institutional integrity.
(b) Enforcement
- Refuse and report the bribe at once, and act against the inspector if he accepts; enforcement that can be bought loses all credibility.
- Enforce uniformly, with checkpoints, cameras and records, so that large fleets get no easier treatment than small owners.
- Essential supplies: facilitate routing of permitted vehicles (EV, BS-VI, CNG, LNG) for milk and vegetables, coordinated with traders.
- Advance notice: publish forecasts and likely restrictions so transporters can plan.
- Dialogue with the association, to explain the health basis of the stage and hear practical problems.
- Recommend support: flag to the government the case for help with fleet upgrades for small owners.
Ethical Anchor: The right to breathe clean air is shared by everyone; enforcing it fairly, without favour and with care for those who bear its cost, is what makes it legitimate.
Key concepts: public interest; integrity; impartiality; compassion; enforcement parity; Article 21 and clean air.
Essay
Q15. “A drought tests the state more than it tests the soil.”
[Essay | 125 Marks | 1000-1200 Words]
Suggested outline for an essay grounded in September 2026 developments:
Hook and Thesis: Open with the 2026 monsoon: it ended at 87 per cent of the Long Period Average, with East and North-East India the driest since 1901. In Maharashtra, 265 of 358 talukas were declared drought-affected, and leaders compared the year to 1972. The rain fails the soil; whether the failure becomes a famine depends on the state. Thesis: rainfall decides how much water falls, but institutions decide who goes hungry.
Conceptual Frame:
- Meteorological drought (rainfall), agricultural drought (soil moisture and crops) and the human crisis that follows only when systems fail.
- Amartya Sen’s entitlement approach: people starve when they lose the means to command food, not only when food runs short.
- Resilience: preparedness, response and recovery as functions of governance.
Illustrations:
(a) Institutions born of drought: Maharashtra’s 1972 drought produced the Employment Guarantee Scheme, given statutory form in 1977 and a model for NREGA, 2005; its successor, the VB-G RAM G Act, has been in force since 1 July 2026 with a 125-day guarantee.
(b) Food management: a foodgrain target of 373.93 million tonnes for 2026-27, MSP signals for pulses and oilseeds, and assured procurement of tur, urad and masoor.
(c) Federal roles: drought is declared by States under the Manual for Drought Management; the Centre supplements relief from the NDRF after assessment.
(d) The unfinished task: water expert Pradeep Purandare says Maharashtra is “still stuck in a 19th-century irrigation system”.
(e) Science: IMD’s forecasts and El Nino tracking give months of warning; the test is whether the warning is used.
Historical Anchoring:
- The Bengal famine of 1943, which Amartya Sen read as a collapse of entitlements rather than of total food supply.
- The 1972 drought, when work on demand turned relief into a right.
Counter-arguments:
- Some droughts are so severe that no state can prevent loss.
- Climate change is making extremes harsher, so the soil’s test is real.
- Relief can breed dependence if it replaces long-term reform.
Synthesis: Nature sets the scale of the shock; governance sets its spread. A state that invests in watersheds, irrigation reform, crop diversification and timely employment turns each drought into a smaller crisis than the last.
Conclusion: Return to 1972. Fifty-four years later, the guarantee endures but drought-proofing does not. The real measure of a state is not whether the rain fails, but whether its people are protected when it does.