The Lift Line
“The measure of space security should not be the accumulation of capabilities alone, but the capacity to preserve functions, withstand shocks and recover quickly.” (Advitya Madan, The Hindu, 18 November 2026)
Why This Editorial Matters for Your Exam
In the news: on 18 November 2026, Advitya Madan argued in The Hindu that India needs a comprehensive doctrine on space security, with thresholds, attribution standards and response principles for different forms of space disruption.
The column is an argument, not a report of an event. Its byline describes the author as an analyst of geopolitics, international affairs and defence who served as Brigadier, Operational Logistics, at HQ Western Command. He builds on two official documents, the Indian Space Policy 2023 and ISRO’s Indian Space Situational Awareness Report for 2025 (ISSAR-2025), and asks what they do not yet answer: how India should judge and respond to the jamming, spoofing or cyber disruption of its space systems.
GS Paper 3: awareness in the field of space; security challenges and their management; the role of technology in security. GS Paper 2: India’s position on international treaties on outer space. Prelims: the Outer Space Treaty, the Space Policy 2023 institutions, ISSAR-2025 figures, IS4OM, NETRA and the Debris Free Space Missions goal. Essay: technology, dependence and resilience.
Earlier on Ujiyari:
- IN-SPACe and the transfer of PSLV technology to industry (22 May 2026)
- SpaDeX, ISRO’s space docking experiment (14 January 2026)
The Crux in 60 Words
Satellites now carry communications, navigation, banking and military functions, and the threat to them has moved from destruction to disruption: jamming, spoofing, cyber interference. Advitya Madan argues that India’s existing space policy and situational awareness work do not say when such interference is an attack or how to respond. He proposes a doctrine built on resilience, awareness, attribution and recovery.
Advitya Madan argues that as India’s dependence on space grows, it needs a comprehensive space-security doctrine that sets thresholds, attribution standards and response principles for different forms of disruption.
- He says threats have shifted from destroying satellites to disrupting their services through jamming, spoofing, cyber interference and electronic warfare, which makes attribution and response harder.
- He says India is not starting from a policy vacuum: the Indian Space Policy 2023 and ISRO’s ISSAR-2025 exist, but they need to inform decisions on hostile disruption and crisis response.
- He says space security cannot be left to the military or the government alone, because commercial operators now run a growing part of the space ecosystem.
- He says the doctrine should begin with resilience, space-domain awareness, and reconstitution and recovery, so that India can deter, withstand, attribute and recover.
Spelling out thresholds and response principles could be read abroad as a step towards militarising space, and fixed thresholds may reduce the flexibility a government needs in a crisis where attribution is uncertain.
A doctrine built on resilience, redundancy, space-domain awareness and rapid recovery, worked out with the armed forces, ISRO and commercial operators, and framed within India’s stated commitment to the peaceful use of outer space.
Background and Context
From destruction to disruption
The column starts from dependence. Communications, navigation, weather forecasting, disaster management, agriculture, banking and logistics rely increasingly on satellites, and, the author writes, “In India, space capabilities support the armed forces through communications, positioning, surveillance, timing and situational awareness.” The risk he points to is not only a missile hitting a satellite. Jamming and spoofing can corrupt communications and navigation; cyber interference can target satellite networks and ground stations; electronic warfare can degrade signals. “Such methods can produce effects without physically damaging a spacecraft, making attribution and response more complex.”
The framework India already has
The author’s own words are that “India is not starting from a policy vacuum.” Two documents carry his case.
- The Indian Space Policy 2023 lays out the roles of IN-SPACe, ISRO, NSIL and the Department of Space. Its stated vision includes “the nation’s socio-economic development and security”. It asks the Department of Space to “enhance the national space situational awareness capabilities and share observation data with relevant stakeholders”, and IN-SPACe to authorise space activities keeping in mind “safety, national security, international obligations and/or foreign policy considerations”.
- ISSAR-2025, ISRO’s report on space situational awareness, was released on 8 April 2026. For 2025 it records 328 launch attempts worldwide, 315 of them successful, and more than 1,50,000 alerts for ISRO’s Earth-orbiting satellites analysed, with 4 collision avoidance manoeuvres in geosynchronous orbit and 14 in low Earth orbit.
- The institutions behind it: the ISRO System for Safe and Sustainable Space Operations Management (IS4OM) is “the nodal entity to concert all space sustainability efforts, including Space Situational Awareness (SSA)”. Under the NETRA (Network for Space Objects Tracking and Analysis) project, an optical telescope at Hanle, Ladakh, is still being set up, and a national expert committee completed the design and review of an indigenous phased array space object tracking radar in 2025.
Where India stands on weapons in space (background; the column names none of this)
- Mission Shakti: on 27 March 2019, DRDO “successfully conducted an Anti-Satellite (A-SAT) missile test” in which an interceptor hit an Indian satellite in low Earth orbit in “Hit to Kill” mode (PIB).
- India’s stated policy: the Ministry of External Affairs said the same day: “India has no intention of entering into an arms race in outer space. We have always maintained that space must be used only for peaceful purposes. We are against the weaponization of Outer Space”.
- The treaty gap: the MEA also noted that “The Outer Space Treaty prohibits only weapons of mass destruction in outer space, not ordinary weapons.” On that reading, disruption by jamming or cyber means falls outside the Treaty’s main bans.
The Analysis
The column makes its case in five steps.
1. Space is now essential infrastructure. The author says space has moved “from a specialised domain of scientific exploration” into an area that “hosts essential infrastructure underpinning everyday life, economic activity and national security”. It is “no longer a separate technological sector but an essential component of national resilience and strategic autonomy.” The point for an aspirant: a satellite outage is now a governance problem, not only a technical one.
2. The threat has changed shape. “This shift from destruction to disruption has made space security a more complex challenge for states.” A destroyed satellite is visible and attributable. A jammed signal or a spoofed navigation fix may be temporary, deniable and routed through many networks. The author adds that the vulnerability lies “in the wider architecture connecting space assets to users on Earth”, so ground stations and links matter as much as the spacecraft.
3. Six questions without answers. He lists the questions a decision-maker would face in a crisis: what counts as an attack; whether destruction differs from jamming, spoofing or cyber interference; how to attribute interference that “originates through complex networks or involves multiple actors”; what to do about temporary disruption with large effects; how to tell accident from attack; and “when attribution remains uncertain, how should a response be determined without inadvertently escalating a crisis?” This list is the core of the column: a doctrine is a set of answers worked out before the crisis.
4. Policy exists; thresholds do not. The author credits the Space Policy 2023 and ISSAR-2025, and then names the gap: “India needs a clearer framework establishing thresholds, attribution standards and response principles for different forms of space disruption.” Situational awareness tells India what happened near its satellites. A doctrine would say what that means and what follows.
5. Resilience first, and not only the state’s job. “Space security cannot be treated solely as a military or government responsibility,” he writes, because commercial operators run a growing part of the ecosystem, and a disrupted commercial system can hit public services and national security. His doctrine would begin with resilience (multiple systems, redundancy, flexibility), add space-domain awareness and plan for reconstitution and recovery, built through partnerships among government agencies, the armed forces, ISRO and commercial operators. He draws a line against reading this as militarisation: “A space-security doctrine need not mean an unrestricted push towards weaponisation.”
Data and Institutions Vault
Prelims-grade facts:
ISSAR-2025 (ISRO):
- Full name: Indian Space Situational Awareness Report for 2025; released 8 April 2026 at SMOPS-2026, Bengaluru.
- Global launches in 2025: 328 attempts, 315 successful, placing 4198 known operational satellites.
- Objects added to the space object population in 2025: 4651.
- More than 1,50,000 CSpOC alerts for ISRO’s Earth-orbiting satellites analysed; 4 CAMs in GEO, 14 in LEO.
- Close-approach alerts of about 1,60,000, which the report reads as a sign of congestion in space.
- 144 Indian spacecraft launched in all; Government of India operational satellites: 22 in LEO, 31 in GEO.
Institutions and programmes:
- IS4OM: ISRO System for Safe and Sustainable Space Operations Management; dedicated to the nation in July 2022.
- NETRA (Network for Space Objects Tracking and Analysis): optical telescope at Hanle, Ladakh, under way.
- NETRA radar: design and review of an indigenous phased array tracking radar completed in 2025.
- Debris Free Space Missions (DFSM): debris-free missions by all Indian space actors by 2030; declared in 2024 at the 42nd IADC meeting, Bengaluru.
- Space Policy 2023: IN-SPACe authorises; ISRO is the National Space Agency; NSIL is the PSU under DOS.
Treaties and positions:
- Outer Space Treaty: adopted by UNGA resolution 2222 (XXI), 19 December 1966; opened for signature 27 January 1967; in force 10 October 1967.
- Article II: outer space is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty.
- Article IV: no nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit, on celestial bodies or stationed in outer space.
- Article IV also keeps the Moon and other celestial bodies for peaceful purposes only, with no military bases or weapon tests there.
- India ratified the Outer Space Treaty in 1982 (MEA).
- Mission Shakti: DRDO A-SAT test, 27 March 2019, from Dr APJ Abdul Kalam Island, Odisha; target in LEO.
- India supported UNGA resolution 69/32 on No First Placement of Weapons (MEA); PAROS has been on the Conference on Disarmament’s agenda since 1982.
The traps:
- ISSAR: ISRO’s 2025 release is titled “Indian Space Situational Awareness Report”; its own text and the 2023 and 2024 editions say “Situational Assessment Report”.
- 1,50,000+ is the CSpOC alerts for ISRO satellites; about 1,60,000 is the close-approach alert count. Do not merge them.
- 328 is launch attempts in 2025; 315 is successful launches.
- The Outer Space Treaty bans weapons of mass destruction in orbit, on celestial bodies or anywhere in outer space.
- The Outer Space Treaty bars military bases and weapon tests on the Moon and other celestial bodies; it does not ban ordinary weapons in orbit or jamming.
- The NETRA telescope at Hanle is under way, not complete.
The Debate
The case for the author’s line. Disruption is cheaper, quicker and more deniable than destruction, and the column’s six questions are exactly the ones that cannot be settled in the middle of a crisis. India’s own record shows the stakes: ISRO analysed more than 1,50,000 alerts for its satellites in 2025 and moved them 18 times to avoid collisions, and that is the routine, non-hostile load. The commercial point also stands: the Space Policy 2023 gives IN-SPACe (set up under the 2020 space reforms) the mandate to promote, hand-hold, guide and authorise space activities, and if commercial operators run a growing part of the ecosystem, as the author says, a doctrine that protects only government satellites would miss much of what society depends on.
The other side. A published doctrine with thresholds can be read abroad as a step towards militarising space, sitting uneasily with India’s stated opposition to weaponisation. Fixed thresholds can also tie a government’s hands: if attribution is uncertain, a public red line may create pressure to respond. And one of the author’s pillars, space-domain awareness, is already assigned: the Space Policy 2023 asks the Department of Space to “enhance the national space situational awareness capabilities”, and IS4OM and NETRA pursue it.
The balanced verdict. The author anticipates the first objection: his doctrine is about resilience and recovery, “while preserving the peaceful use of outer space”, not about weapons. The real gap is decision-making: who judges that interference is hostile, on what evidence, and with what range of responses. That can be settled through a doctrine that leads with resilience and keeps some thresholds internal, consistent with India’s position on the peaceful use of space.
How to Think About This
Use the author’s own four verbs as a lens for any question on space or critical-infrastructure security:
- Deter: what makes disruption costly or pointless? (Redundancy, so that one jammed system does not stop a function.)
- Withstand: can essential services continue during disruption? (Multiple systems, flexibility, ground-segment protection.)
- Attribute: can India say who did it, and how sure is it? (Space-domain awareness, SSA, IS4OM, NETRA.)
- Recover: how fast can capability be restored? (Reconstitution, commercial partners.)
Then separate the record from the argument: the Space Policy 2023, ISSAR-2025, the Outer Space Treaty and Mission Shakti are the record; the call for a doctrine and its contents are the author’s argument.
Diagram-in-Words
Interference (jamming, spoofing, cyber, electronic warfare) → awareness (what happened near Indian assets) → attribution standards (who did it, how sure) → thresholds (is it an attack?) → response principles (how to act without escalation) → recovery (restore the function). Resilience runs under the whole chain: the more redundant the system, the less depends on the later steps.
Read it left to right: the column’s claim is that India has the second box and lacks the third, fourth and fifth.
Threats to space systems are shifting from the physical destruction of satellites to disruption through jamming, spoofing and cyber interference. Discuss why India needs a space-security doctrine, and how it can be reconciled with India's commitment to the peaceful use of outer space. (250 words)
Space now carries essential infrastructure: communications, navigation, weather forecasting, banking and logistics depend on satellites. The threat to these systems is shifting from physical destruction to disruption by jamming, spoofing, cyber interference and electronic warfare, which leaves no debris and is hard to attribute.
This makes a space-security doctrine necessary.
Why a doctrine. Disruption raises questions that current policy does not answer: what counts as an attack, whether temporary jamming differs from destruction, how to attribute interference that passes through many networks, and how to respond without escalation.
What exists. The Indian Space Policy 2023 is an overarching framework that assigns roles to IN-SPACe, ISRO, NSIL and the Department of Space, and tasks the Department with enhancing national space situational awareness.
ISRO’s ISSAR-2025 records that more than 1,50,000 collision alerts for its satellites were analysed in 2025 and 18 collision avoidance manoeuvres performed, while the Debris Free Space Missions goal targets debris-free missions by 2030. What is missing.
Thresholds for treating interference as hostile, standards of attribution, and principles of response. Commercial operators, now a growing part of the ecosystem, need a role in information sharing and recovery.
Reconciling with peace. The Outer Space Treaty, 1967, which India ratified in 1982, bars weapons of mass destruction in orbit; India has stated that it is against the weaponisation of outer space.
A doctrine centred on resilience and recovery rather than offensive capability fits that position.
The test of space security is not the number of capabilities but the ability to preserve functions, withstand shocks and recover quickly. A resilience-first doctrine, prepared with the armed forces, ISRO and industry, would protect India’s growing dependence on space while keeping outer space peaceful.
Interview Angle
"India says it is against the weaponisation of outer space. Would a published space-security doctrine, with thresholds and response principles, weaken that position or strengthen it?"
Takeaway Box
- Core idea: the threat to space systems has shifted from destruction to disruption, and India needs agreed thresholds, attribution standards and response principles for it.
- Prelims hooks: ISSAR-2025 (Situational Awareness); IS4OM; NETRA at Hanle; DFSM by 2030; Outer Space Treaty (1967, India ratified 1982; bans WMD in space, and military bases and weapon tests on celestial bodies); Mission Shakti (2019).
- Mains frame: deter, withstand, attribute, recover; government, armed forces, ISRO and industry together.
- Probable question: “What is space situational awareness? Discuss its importance for the security of India’s space assets.” (GS3, 150 words)
Sources:
- Advitya Madan, “India needs a comprehensive doctrine on space security”, The Hindu, 18 November 2026
- ISRO, Indian Space Situational Awareness Report for 2025 (ISSAR-2025), released 8 April 2026
- Indian Space Policy 2023 (ISRO); PIB, 10 August 2023 (Department of Space); annexure to Rajya Sabha Starred Question No. 120, answered 5 December 2024
- PIB, 27 March 2019 (Mission Shakti); Ministry of External Affairs, Frequently Asked Questions on Mission Shakti, 27 March 2019
- United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs: Outer Space Treaty text, and status of international agreements as at 1 January 2025
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