The Lift Line
“Technology and process-based reforms are not enough for improving tax outcomes.” (Debarpita Roy, The Hindu)
Why This Editorial Matters for Your Exam
This op-ed in The Hindu of 8 October 2026 is by Debarpita Roy, Lead-Research at the Centre for Public Policy on Housing and Habitat, National Institute of Urban Affairs (NIUA), New Delhi. It asks a question every city in India faces: why, after years of digital mapping and online payment portals, do property tax collections stay so low?
Its answer, drawing on a Chennai study by Nobel laureate Esther Duflo and co-authors and the author’s own research on Bengaluru, Pune and Ghaziabad, is that the problems are structural: people, elections and accounts. That makes the piece directly usable for GS2 questions on local self-government and the 74th Amendment and for GS3 questions on urban finance and infrastructure investment. For an earlier view of the same weakness from the governance side, see our editorial on the city governance problem.
GS Paper 2: Devolution of powers and finances to local levels; challenges therein. GS Paper 3: Mobilisation of resources; infrastructure investment.
Background and Context
How low is India’s property tax?
| Group | Property tax as share of GDP (as given by the author) |
|---|---|
| India | 0.15-0.2 per cent |
| Low-income countries | 0.3 per cent |
| Middle-income countries | 0.6 per cent |
India collects less, relative to its economy, than even low-income countries. That matters because property tax is the most important own revenue source of municipal bodies, and because urban investment depends on municipal creditworthiness: a city with weak own revenues has a weaker credit case.
What has been tried
Successive Finance Commissions and national schemes, the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) and the Atal Mission for Rejuvenation and Urban Transformation (AMRUT), have pushed technology and process reforms: digitised records, GIS mapping and online payment. Outcomes, the author says, “remain sub-optimal.”
The constitutional frame
The 74th Constitutional Amendment (1992) created Part IXA on municipalities. Under it, a State legislature may authorise municipalities to levy taxes, including property tax (Article 243X); State Finance Commissions review municipal finances (Article 243Y); and a municipality has a five-year term, with elections due before it expires or within six months of dissolution (Article 243U). The author’s findings on elections connect directly to the last provision.
The Analysis
The author follows property tax through its three life stages, and finds a structural problem at each.
1. Enumeration: maps need people. The first stage is identifying properties and keeping records. GIS mapping using satellite imagery and drones has become the favoured solution. But maps must be checked by physical inspection by municipal assessors, and repeated at regular intervals. India’s municipalities suffer a “perennial shortage” of staff, a lack of skills and inadequate training. Outsourcing can fill gaps, but with limited efficiency: municipal assessors carry institutional memory that outsourced ones lack. The Duflo study in Chennai confirms this, finding that municipal human resources are a critical determinant of tax outcomes and that a municipality’s own assessors achieve far better results than assessors from outsourced firms.
2. Valuation: the base rate waits for elections. The common recommendation is capital valuation, using the stamp duty-linked “circle rate” set and revised regularly by the State revenue department. But most municipalities instead use a “base rate” in rupees per sq ft per month, set by the municipality itself. Tax buoyancy then depends on how often that base rate is revised, which is far less often than circle rates. In Bengaluru, Pune and Ghaziabad, base rates were not revised at all when there were no elected municipal councils. “The link between municipal elections and tax performance is clear,” the author writes, at least for these three corporations. Since delayed municipal elections are common, so is stagnant revenue.
3. Billing and collection: you cannot fix what you cannot measure. Online payment and outsourced collection have been recommended, yet collection efficiency remains poor. Worse, credible estimates of collection efficiency are hard to produce because financial accounts are not properly maintained.
| Stage | Popular fix | Structural constraint found |
|---|---|---|
| Enumeration | GIS, satellite and drone mapping | too few, under-skilled municipal assessors; outsourcing loses institutional memory |
| Valuation and assessment | capital value via circle rates | municipal base rate revised rarely; not at all without elected councils |
| Billing and collection | online payment; outsourced collection | poor efficiency; no credible estimates without proper accounts |
4. The conclusion: broaden the reform agenda. More human resources, timely elections and publicly available financial data are the structural reforms the author calls for, and the author argues that policy should broaden its focus to structural reform of all aspects of urban governance and finance, property tax included.
Data and Institutions Vault
Prelims-grade facts:
- Property tax: India 0.15-0.2 per cent of GDP; middle-income countries 0.6 per cent; low-income countries 0.3 per cent.
- Schemes that pushed reform: JNNURM; AMRUT; recommendations of successive Finance Commissions.
- Three stages: enumeration; valuation and assessment; billing and collection.
- Chennai study: working paper by Esther Duflo and co-authors; the city’s own assessors outperform outsourced ones.
- Author’s study: Bengaluru, Pune, Ghaziabad; gaps in staff, elections and financial reporting.
- Circle rate: stamp duty-linked rate set by the State revenue department; base rate: municipal rate in rupees per sq ft per month.
- 74th Amendment (1992): Article 243X, municipal taxes as authorised by State law; 243Y, State Finance Commission for municipalities.
- Article 243U: five-year term for municipalities; elections within six months of dissolution.
- Author: Debarpita Roy, NIUA, New Delhi.
⚠️ Watch the trap: Municipalities have no inherent power to tax: under Article 243X, they levy only the taxes a State law authorises. Also, the State Finance Commission (constituted under Article 243I, applied to municipalities by 243Y) is distinct from the Union Finance Commission under Article 280, though the latter must recommend measures to augment States’ funds for municipalities.
The Debate
The author’s case. Technology has been oversold as a fix for property tax. Without staff to verify maps, elected councils to revise rates and accounts to measure collection, digital tools deliver little.
The other side. Technology still matters: GIS maps and digitised records widen the base and cut the discretion that breeds under-assessment and corruption, and online payment lowers the cost of paying. The election link may also cut both ways: elected councillors can resist rate revisions to avoid upsetting voters, so councils alone do not guarantee buoyancy. And three cities are a small sample from which to generalise.
The balanced verdict. Technology and structure are complements, not rivals. The strongest lesson is about sequence: digital tools pay off only when there are trained assessors to use them, a regular revaluation cycle, ideally tied to circle rates so it does not depend on politics, and audited accounts that show whether collection is improving.
How to Think About This
Use the three-stage frame (enumerate, value, collect) for any question on municipal revenue, and pair each stage with its constraint. Then tie the argument to the 74th Amendment: the Constitution guarantees elected municipalities on a five-year cycle, but delays in elections are common, and this op-ed shows a concrete fiscal cost of that delay. The broader point for Mains is capacity before technology: a recurring theme across Indian governance, from land records to health data.
Diagram-in-Words
Property tax: three stages, three structural gaps
Why technology and process reforms have not lifted India’s property tax yield, stage by stage.
Takeaway Box
- Core idea: India’s property tax yield (0.15-0.2 per cent of GDP) stays low because of structural constraints, not a lack of technology.
- Three constraints: municipal staff shortages; irregular elections (no base-rate revision without councils); poor financial reporting.
- Evidence: Duflo and co-authors (Chennai): own assessors beat outsourced ones; author’s study of Bengaluru, Pune, Ghaziabad.
- Mains use: 74th Amendment (Articles 243X, 243Y, 243U); municipal creditworthiness; “capacity before technology”.
Revision Flowchart
Property tax and municipal finance
Know the terms, Prelims pointers and traps, Mains pointers, and a practice question.
Sources: The Hindu, op-ed by Debarpita Roy, 8 October 2026; Ujiyari editorial, September 2026.
Source: Property Tax Reform: Why Cities Need More Than Technology — Ujiyari.com | Free UPSC & State PCS Editorial Analysis