The Lift Line
“The question, therefore, is not simply whether India should offer investors more or less protection. It is about what India has learnt from the past decade and how those lessons should shape its new model.”
Why This Editorial Matters for Your Exam
Jyoti Singh, a Delhi-based advocate who has been a legal consultant to the Department of Economic Affairs, writes in The Hindu’s op-ed page of 3 October 2026 as the revised Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) is reported to be finalised and awaiting Cabinet approval. It complements the Indian Express column by Surjit S Bhalla of 2 October, which argued the old model cost India investment; this piece focuses on treaty design.
GS Paper 2: Bilateral agreements; important international institutions. GS Paper 3: Investment models; external sector.
Background and Context
| Year | Event |
|---|---|
| 2011 | White Industries Australia v India award: India held liable over delays in its courts |
| December 2015 | Revised Model BIT approved; most older BITs later terminated |
| 2024 | India-UAE BIT: three years of local remedies |
| 2024 | India-Uzbekistan BIT: state may bring counterclaims against investors |
| 2025-26 | Union Budget announces a revamped, more investor-friendly model |
| July 2026 | India-Israel Bilateral Investment Agreement enters into force: three years of local remedies |
The vocabulary.
| Term | Meaning |
|---|---|
| ISDS | Investor-state dispute settlement, usually arbitration |
| MFN | Most-favoured-nation: an investor can claim treatment given under other treaties |
| FET | Fair and equitable treatment |
| Exhaustion of local remedies | Investor must first use domestic courts for a set period |
| Counterclaim | A state’s claim against the investor within the same arbitration |
The Analysis
1. Practice has moved ahead of the model. The UAE and Israel treaties cut local remedies to three years; the model still says five.
2. MFN needs careful drafting. In Maffezini v Spain, an investor used an MFN clause to escape an 18-month local-court requirement by borrowing another treaty’s dispute terms. Plama v Bulgaria refused such importation without clear text. Recent treaties expressly exclude dispute settlement from MFN.
3. Obligations, not declarations. The Uzbekistan treaty’s counterclaim provision shows how to bind investors. Sustainable development should be written as legal obligations, not policy language.
4. Global reform. UNCTAD sees a shift to facilitation and narrower protections; UNCITRAL Working Group III is weighing a permanent tribunal, an appellate mechanism, rules on damages and dispute prevention.
5. A rule-shaper, not a rule-taker. Drawing on the scholarship of Makane Moïse Mbengue, the writer argues a developing state can shape investment law through its treaty practice.
Data and Institutions Vault
Prelims-grade facts:
India’s practice:
- Model BIT approved December 2015; requires five years of local remedies before arbitration.
- UAE (2024) and Israel (in force July 2026): three years of local remedies.
- India-Uzbekistan BIT: allows the host state to bring counterclaims.
Institutions and cases:
- UNCITRAL Working Group III: reform of investor-state dispute settlement.
- UNCTAD: UN Trade and Development, tracks investment treaties.
- Maffezini v Spain: MFN used to bypass an 18-month local-court rule; Plama v Bulgaria: importation refused.
⚠️ Watch the trap: UNCITRAL (UN Commission on International Trade Law) drafts rules and model laws; ICSID (World Bank) administers arbitrations. India is not a party to the ICSID Convention.
The Debate
For the writer’s view. A clearer, more workable model, with investor obligations in legal terms, serves India better than one tilted wholly towards investors or the state.
The other side. India’s treaty network collapsed after 2016; investors want familiar protections fast, and new obligations may slow negotiations.
The balanced verdict. Shorten local remedies, define MFN narrowly, keep the right to regulate explicit, and sign with major capital sources.
How to Think About This
A model is a starting point. Exam answers often treat a Model BIT as a fixed rulebook. It is the opening position in negotiations; what matters is the range it allows in actual treaties.
Diagram-in-Words
India's revision of its Model Bilateral Investment Treaty must reflect both its own treaty experience and the changing international investment regime. Discuss. (250 words)
A Bilateral Investment Treaty protects foreign investors against expropriation and unfair treatment, usually with access to investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). India adopted a cautious Model BIT in 2015 after arbitral awards such as White Industries (2011), and the Union Budget 2025-26 announced that it would be revamped to be more investor-friendly.
The 2015 model narrowed the definition of investment, excluded most-favoured-nation treatment, carved out taxation and required investors to exhaust local remedies for five years before arbitration. India then terminated most older treaties.
Its practice has since moved: agreements with the UAE, Uzbekistan and Israel signal flexibility, with a three-year local-remedies period, and the Uzbekistan treaty allows the state to bring counterclaims against investors. The global regime has changed too.
UNCTAD notes a shift toward investment facilitation and sustainable development, while UNCITRAL Working Group III is debating a permanent multilateral tribunal and an appellate mechanism. A new model should therefore define the scope of any MFN clause, so that it cannot import more favourable dispute settlement terms as in Maffezini; clarify fair and equitable treatment and indirect expropriation to protect the right to regulate; express investor obligations in binding terms; and add consultation and dispute-prevention steps.
The goal is a model that restores investor confidence without surrendering regulatory space: precise, predictable and adaptable. Signed with major capital-source countries, it can support India’s investment needs while protecting public policy.
Interview Angle
"India once ended most of its investment treaties to protect its right to regulate. Should its new Model BIT lean more towards investors or towards the state?"
Takeaway Box
- Status: revised Model BIT reportedly finalised, awaiting Cabinet approval.
- Practice: 5 years local remedies in the 2015 model; 3 in UAE and Israel treaties; counterclaims in the Uzbekistan BIT.
- Design asks: scoped MFN, clear FET and expropriation, investor obligations, dispute prevention.
- Global: UNCTAD facilitation shift; UNCITRAL WG III reform.
Sources: The Hindu, UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub, UNCITRAL Working Group III
Jyoti Singh argues that India’s new Model BIT should not simply give investors more or less protection but codify what a decade of practice has taught: clearer protections, a carefully scoped MFN clause, investor obligations with state counterclaims, and dispute settlement aligned with global reform.
- The 2015 model, shaped by the White Industries award (2011), narrowed the definition of investment and required five years of local remedies before arbitration; later treaties with the UAE and Israel cut this to three years.
- If an MFN clause returns, its scope must be clear: in Maffezini v Spain an MFN clause was used to bypass an 18-month local-court requirement, while Plama v Bulgaria refused to import dispute provisions without clear text.
- The India-Uzbekistan BIT lets a state bring counterclaims against an investor, a practice the new model can build on by setting out investor obligations in legal terms.
- UNCTAD records a shift to investment facilitation and sustainable development, and UNCITRAL Working Group III is weighing a permanent tribunal, an appellate mechanism and dispute prevention.
Not this writer’s view, but argued by Surjit S Bhalla in The Indian Express on 2 October: India’s network shrank sharply after 2016 and net FDI is weak, so the new model should restore strong, familiar protections quickly, including MFN and a short consultation period, rather than add investor obligations and counterclaims.
The writer wants a model that is clearer and more workable, neither uniformly pro-investor nor pro-state, with room for negotiation in individual treaties; it is reportedly finalised and awaiting Cabinet approval. Ujiyari’s synthesis: a two-to-three-year remedies window with mandatory consultation, precise FET and expropriation clauses, an MFN clause excluding dispute settlement, and enforceable investor obligations.
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