India's Stakes in the Global Pandemic Agreement: PABS Annex

The Lift Line

“Global Solidarity must be demonstrated through action.” (India’s statement at the UN High-Level Meeting, September 2026, quoted by the author)

Why This Editorial Matters for Your Exam

This op-ed in The Hindu of 8 October 2026 is by Priyadarshini Singh, a Research Fellow at the Centre for Social and Economic Progress (CSEP), and draws on a forthcoming CSEP working paper. It asks what India stands to gain or lose from the WHO Pandemic Agreement, the treaty adopted in 2025 that is still waiting for its key annex on Pathogen Access and Benefit-Sharing (PABS).

We covered India’s statement at the UN High-Level Meeting on Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness and Response in the 26 September roundup, and, for background, the case for a pandemic treaty in a 20 May editorial. This column adds the negotiating map: where the Global North and South disagree, and how India can lead.

GS Paper 2: Important international institutions, agencies and fora, their structure and mandate; issues relating to the development and management of health; effect of policies of developed countries on India’s interests.

Background and Context

From COVID-19 to a treaty

COVID-19 exposed how unequal the world’s response to a pandemic could be: rich countries pre-ordered vaccines, while poorer ones waited. In December 2021, a special session of the World Health Assembly (WHA) set up an Intergovernmental Negotiating Body to draft a pandemic accord, the origin of the present text. After more than three years of talks, the WHA adopted the WHO Pandemic Agreement on 20 May 2025. The day before, the committee vote was 124 in favour, none against and 11 abstentions.

The Agreement is a treaty under Article 19 of the WHO Constitution, which lets the Assembly adopt conventions by a two-thirds vote. The only earlier treaty negotiated this way is the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (2003).

The missing annex

The Agreement’s Article 12 sets out a PABS system: countries share samples and genetic sequence data of pathogens with pandemic potential quickly, and in return the benefits, such as vaccines, medicines and diagnostics, are shared fairly. The text sets a target for manufacturers taking part: 20 per cent of real-time production for WHO in a pandemic emergency, at least 10 per cent as a donation and the rest at affordable prices.

The operational details were left to an annex, negotiated by an Intergovernmental Working Group (IGWG). The Agreement opens for signature only after the WHA adopts that annex, and it enters into force after 60 ratifications. The IGWG could not finish in time for the WHA in May 2026; the Assembly extended its work, and the annex is now due no later than the WHA of May 2027.

The wider regime

The United States announced its withdrawal from the WHO in January 2025, and the withdrawal took effect in January 2026. At the September 2026 meeting it rejected the Declaration.

The Analysis

1. A regime exists even before ratification. The author’s starting point is that the Agreement, though not yet open for ratification, has already created a “first-of-its-kind global legal regime” for pandemic prevention, preparedness and response (PPPR). How countries operationalise it will decide whether it “further entrench[es] the inequities of the COVID-19 pandemic” or makes global health governance truly inclusive. Countries such as India, which straddle the interests of high-, middle- and low-income countries, will shape that outcome.

2. The fault lines. The negotiations hinged on balancing national sovereignty with international cooperation and solidarity, and exposed the divide between the Global North and the Global South. The author lists the hard questions:

• Can a global treaty set binding targets for measures such as One Health without securing funding for countries with fragile health systems?
• Can national pandemic regulations be harmonised through global frameworks?
• Can private manufacturers be required to share vaccines in real time at affordable prices?

3. What India said in New York. At the UN High-Level Meeting, India reiterated its commitment to global preparedness, and the author says it succeeded in placing the Agreement’s multilateral components within the principle of national sovereignty. India named two conditions for effective international coordination:

• Equitable access to drugs, vaccines and therapeutics, and the creation of global public goods such as digital infrastructure, which, the author notes, “admittedly align with its own national priorities”.
• Respect for national sovereignty and the primacy of member-states in shaping policy to national circumstances.

The contrast is the United States, which rejected the Declaration and called PABS and the WHO’s role in declaring pandemics a challenge to its national interests.

4. Sovereignty is everyone’s red line. The author shows that both camps used sovereignty to protect their interests:

India’s remarks, she argues, acknowledged the concerns of both sides.

5. Three ways for India to lead. India is already engaged in the PABS talks; the author wants it to lead the Global South once PABS is settled, through three routes:

• Technical partnerships on One Health, surveillance and the health workforce, to build trust with other Southern countries and a “store” of operational solutions to tricky sovereignty problems.
• Existing groupings. The H20 summit, a health and development partnership of the G-7 and G-20, will take place under the United Kingdom’s G-20 presidency at the end of 2027, with pandemic preparedness as a core agenda. During its 2023 G-20 presidency, India launched the Global Initiative on Digital Health. India is also a co-sponsor of Partners for Multilateralism, launched by the European Union in 2026 with Australia, Barbados, Brazil, Canada, India and Kenya.
• Domestic rules. “Global leadership always rests on domestic strengths.” India’s own policies on access to biological material and the distribution of benefits should meet the standard of equity it demands abroad.

6. Why equity is in India’s own interest. India is the “pharmacy of the world” and makes one of the largest shares of the world’s vaccines by volume. Yet:

• the patents on the vaccines it manufactures are held by global pharmaceutical firms;
• it is import-dependent for Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (APIs);
• it needs technology from the Global North for high-grade personal protective equipment and medical devices.

So India needs an equitable distribution regime as much as it can offer one. It must also lead South-South cooperation and share its own technological strengths.

7. A two-way bargain. India’s health system works at continental scale, and its Health Secretary told the meeting that India’s work on digital health infrastructure, laboratory networks and One Health is valuable as a global public good. The author’s closing line sums up the argument: “An effective PA needs an engaged India, and a strong PA will strengthen India’s own pandemic management.”

Data and Institutions Vault

Prelims-grade facts:

The Agreement (background):

• WHO Pandemic Agreement: adopted by the 78th WHA on 20 May 2025; committee vote on 19 May: 124 for, 0 against, 11 abstentions.
• Adopted under Article 19 of the WHO Constitution (two-thirds vote); the only earlier Article 19 treaty is the FCTC (2003).
• PABS (Article 12): target of 20 per cent of real-time production for WHO in a pandemic emergency, at least 10 per cent donated, the rest at affordable prices.
• Opens for signature after the WHA adopts the PABS annex; enters into force after 60 ratifications. Annex now due no later than the WHA of May 2027.

The wider regime:

• IHR (2005) amended in 2024; amendments in force from 19 September 2025: new alert level “pandemic emergency”; each country to name a National IHR Authority.
• UN High-Level Meeting on PPPR: 25 September 2026, New York; it took up a new Political Declaration (the first was adopted in 2023); the US rejected it.
• Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework (2011): the earlier WHO model for sharing influenza viruses in exchange for benefits.
• Nagoya Protocol (in force 2014): access and benefit-sharing for genetic resources.
• Biological Diversity Act, 2002 (amended 2023): governs access to biological resources in India.

India:

• Global Initiative on Digital Health: launched during India’s G-20 presidency, 2023.
• Union Health Secretary (October 2026): Punya Salila Srivastava, who represented India at the UN meeting.
• H20 summit: under the UK’s G-20 presidency, end of 2027 (as stated by the author).

⚠️ Watch the trap: The Pandemic Agreement and the International Health Regulations are different instruments. The IHR are regulations under Article 21 of the WHO Constitution and bind all members unless they reject them; the Pandemic Agreement is a treaty under Article 19 that binds only countries that ratify it. And the Agreement is adopted but not in force: it cannot even open for signature until the PABS annex is agreed.

The Debate

For the author’s view. COVID-19 showed that a world without rules for sharing pathogens and products leaves poorer countries at the back of the queue. A treaty with a benefit-sharing system, adopted with no country voting against, is a real advance. India is well placed to broker the final deal: it is a manufacturer and a developing country, it has worked on digital health at the G-20, and it has a direct stake, since its vaccine output depends on patents and APIs it does not control.

The other side. An agreement that rests on national sovereignty at every turn may lack teeth. The One Health and technology transfer provisions are weak precisely because neither side would accept binding commitments, and the United States, home to many of the firms that hold vaccine patents, has left the WHO and rejected the Declaration. A target of 20 per cent of production depends on manufacturers choosing to take part. And as the author concedes, India’s idea of a “global public good”, such as digital infrastructure, overlaps with its own national priorities.

The balanced verdict. A treaty without the strongest commitments is still better than no treaty, and the PABS annex is where its value will be decided. India’s influence will depend less on speeches than on what it brings: technical help to Southern countries, credible equity in its own rules on biological material, and a manufacturing base that others can count on in a crisis.

How to Think About This

Sovereignty versus solidarity is the master frame. Most global governance questions, from climate finance to pandemic treaties, turn on how much sovereignty countries will pool and who pays. In a Mains answer, name the trade-off and show how both the North and the South invoke sovereignty for different ends.

Access and benefit-sharing is a recurring idea. It links the Nagoya Protocol (biodiversity), the PIP Framework (influenza) and PABS (pandemic pathogens): those who provide a resource should share in what is made from it. Use this thread to connect GS2 and GS3 answers.

Domestic strength underwrites foreign policy. The author’s point that “global leadership always rests on domestic strengths” applies widely: India’s API dependence, patent position and biological-material rules all shape what it can credibly demand abroad.

Diagram-in-Words

Takeaway Box

• Thesis: the Pandemic Agreement already forms a new global regime; India should lead the Global South in finishing it, and practise equity at home.
• Status: adopted 20 May 2025 (committee vote 124-0-11); waiting for the PABS annex (due by WHA May 2027); then signature and 60 ratifications.
• Fault lines: binding One Health targets without funding (Africa said no); binding technology transfer (the North said no); real-time sharing by manufacturers.
• India in New York: equitable access and global public goods, within national sovereignty; the US rejected the Declaration.
• India’s routes: South-South technical partnerships; H20 (UK G-20, 2027), Global Initiative on Digital Health, Partners for Multilateralism; domestic rules on biological material.
• India’s interest: vaccine hub, but the patents are held abroad; API import dependence; needs device and PPE technology.

Revision Flowchart

Sources: The Hindu, op-ed by Priyadarshini Singh, 8 October 2026; background: WHO, Amended International Health Regulations enter into force, 19 September 2025; Ujiyari, 26 September 2026.

Source: India's Stakes in the Global Pandemic Agreement: PABS Annex — Ujiyari.com | Free UPSC & State PCS Editorial Analysis