The Lift Line
“Gratitude is a transient sentiment; national interest especially when linked to issues of national identity is enduring.” (Mohammed Ayoob, The Hindu, 23 October 2026)
Why This Editorial Matters for Your Exam
In the news: on 23 October 2026, The Hindu carried an op-ed by Mohammed Ayoob, “Tied by geography, divided by politics”, which traces today’s India-Bangladesh strains back to 1971 and argues that both capitals must now build on interest and geography rather than on gratitude.
Ayoob writes amid “speculation rife”, in his words, of a visit by Bangladesh’s Prime Minister Tarique Rahman (also Chairman of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, BNP) to New Delhi “in November or December”. For context, no visit has been announced: at his briefing on 15 September 2026, Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal said, “On the visit of Bangladesh prime minister, we have not heard anything on this” (as reported by TBS News). The calendar adds weight to the question: the Ganga Waters Treaty of 1996 reaches the end of its 30-year term on 12 December 2026. This site’s 18 June explainer on the Ganges Water Treaty at 30 has the treaty background.
Who is writing: Mohammed Ayoob is University Distinguished Professor Emeritus of International Relations, Michigan State University, and the author, with K. Subrahmanyam, of ‘The Liberation War’ (1972). What follows is his argument, not an official account.
GS Paper 2: India and its neighbourhood relations; bilateral agreements involving India; the effect of other countries’ politics on India’s interests. GS Paper 1: rivers and boundaries (the Ganga at Farakka, the Teesta, the land border).
The Crux in 60 Words
Ayoob argues that Bangladesh’s elites have held India in a mix of gratitude and resentment since 1971, that geography fed a fear of domination, and that attitudes to India became part of Dhaka’s identity politics. India’s bet on Sheikh Hasina deepened the problem. With the BNP back, India must stop expecting gratitude, and Dhaka must accept geography.
Mohammed Ayoob argues that Bangladesh’s elites have wavered between gratitude and resentment towards India since 1971, that attitudes to India became part of Bangladesh’s contest over its national identity, and that with the BNP back in power both sides must build on enduring interest and geography rather than on the memory of the liberation war.
- Geography feeds fear: Bangladesh shares a border of more than 4,000 km with India (4,096.7 km, per the Ministry of Home Affairs) and its principal rivers flow through or originate in India, so in Ayoob’s view the fear of Indian domination became part of Bangladeshi nationalism.
- Party politics hardened the split: the Awami League stayed identified with the secular, Bengali-nationalist legacy of 1971 and favoured close ties with India, while the BNP and its allies were much more suspicious; under Ziaur Rahman, Ayoob writes, nationalism was redefined in overtly Islamic terms.
- India identified its interests with Sheikh Hasina and the Awami League, so her overthrow in August 2024 and her flight to India became, in Ayoob’s words, a profound crisis for Indian policy, and the extradition question remains a major irritant.
- With the BNP’s return in February 2026, functional engagement has resumed, but in Ayoob’s assessment substantial mutual suspicion continues.
India’s closeness to the Awami League government rested on security interests, as Ayoob himself notes; New Delhi’s stated position on the extradition request is that it is considering it under established procedure, not refusing it; India’s envoy has said a visit by Prime Minister Tarique Rahman would get an honourable reception. River sharing also has stakeholders inside India, so magnanimity without reciprocity is hard to sell at home.
India should use its power with restraint, stop invoking 1971 as a claim on Dhaka’s loyalty and avoid demanding reciprocity for every concession, especially on river waters; Bangladesh should accept that strategic autonomy need not mean opposing India. The future of the Ganga Waters Treaty, whose 30-year term runs to 12 December 2026, is the nearest test.
Background and Context
Where the relationship stands in October 2026
- A new government in Dhaka. Tarique Rahman was sworn in as Prime Minister on 17 February 2026, days after his party “swept the first vote since the 2024 student-led uprising” (Al Jazeera). The BNP-led alliance won 212 of the 297 seats whose results were declared, against 77 for the Jamaat-led alliance.
- The Hasina question. Sheikh Hasina was ousted in August 2024 after student-led protests and fled to India. Al Jazeera reports that she “was handed a death sentence in absentia in November 2025” and that Dhaka is seeking her extradition. The two countries have an extradition treaty “with an exception for political cases”, and New Delhi has said it is considering the request “based on the established procedure” (Al Jazeera, 23 August 2026). This site’s 4 October roundup covered India’s High Commissioner on the extradition question.
The visit question. The dated statements so far:
- Reported on 19 August 2026: India’s High Commissioner to Bangladesh, Dinesh Trivedi, said a visit would get “an honourable reception” (The Wire).
- 21 August 2026: Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s press secretary, AAM Saleh, said “No decision has yet been made on the visit”, adding that Dhaka was waiting for India’s response on the extradition of Ms Hasina and “other fugitive criminals” (Reuters).
- 23 August 2026: Al Jazeera reported that plans for a visit had been derailed after Dhaka took offence at Ms Hasina addressing a press conference virtually in New Delhi on 5 August.
- 15 September 2026: the MEA said it had “not heard anything” on a visit; the MEA spokesperson, Randhir Jaiswal, said Mr Rahman had received two invitations, one for a bilateral visit and one for the BRICS summit (TBS News). Dhaka disputes the second: on 10 September, its State Minister for Foreign Affairs, Humaiun Kobir, had said “Our prime minister was not invited”, and that the invitation went to the BIMSTEC chair.
The settled and the unsettled
| Issue | Basis | Where it stands |
|---|---|---|
| Land boundary and enclaves | Land Boundary Agreement of 16 May 1974 and its Protocol of 6 September 2011 | Instruments of ratification exchanged during the Indian Prime Minister’s Dhaka visit of 6-7 June 2015; enclaves exchanged on 31 July 2015 |
| Ganga waters at Farakka | Ganga Waters Treaty, signed in New Delhi on 12 December 1996 | In force for 30 years from signature, to 12 December 2026; “renewable on the basis of mutual consent”; no renewal announced by 23 October 2026 |
| Teesta waters | Draft interim agreement, agreed by both governments in January 2011 | Not concluded as of the Joint Statement of 27 March 2021 |
| Border fencing | India’s fencing of the 4,096.7 km border | 3,232.218 km fenced and 864.482 km yet to be fenced (February 2025) |
| Extradition | Bilateral extradition treaty, with an exception for political cases | Dhaka seeks Ms Hasina’s return; India has said it is considering the request |
On the Ganga treaty, the MEA spokesperson has said that “the technical level meetings on [the] Ganga Water Treaty have continued to happen”, as quoted in a brief by the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS) of 12 October 2026; the brief adds, citing Bangladeshi media reports, that Dhaka has formed a technical committee on the treaty. On the Teesta, the 2021 Joint Statement recorded that Prime Minister Narendra Modi “reiterated India’s sincere commitment and continued efforts to conclude this agreement, in consultation with the relevant stakeholders.”
The Analysis
Ayoob builds his case in five steps.
1. The 1971 paradox. From the start, he writes, “the attitude of Bangladesh’s elites toward India has wavered between gratitude and resentment”: gratitude for India’s “crucial role” in the liberation war, and resentment that India “had to play the role of liberator”. The Mukti Bahini fought, but in his account “the decisive military blow against Pakistan was delivered by India”, and what began as “immense gratitude” became over time “a source of grave discomfort”. Nations, he notes, cherish stories in which they are “the principal authors of their own liberation”.
2. Geography becomes identity. Dhaka feared that India’s policy would be mediated through “a Hindu-majority West Bengal next door” with strong cultural and linguistic ties to Bangladesh, and the open borders after 1971 revived memories of the dominance of the Hindu bhadralok in pre-Partition Bengal. Add the map: a border of “more than 4,000 kilometres” (the official length is 4,096.7 km, so the point holds) and principal rivers that “flowed through or originated in India” (the two share 54 common rivers). The result, in his reading: “the fear of Indian domination became an important component of Bangladeshi nationalism.”
3. India becomes a party issue. The goodwill between Sheikh Mujib and Indira Gandhi did not outlast Mujib. His successors distanced Bangladesh from India, and under Ziaur Rahman nationalism was “redefined in overtly Islamic terms”, in place of the linguistic nationalism of the liberation movement. Dhaka sought closer ties with Pakistan, China and the United States to balance India. What New Delhi saw as “gratuitous anti-Indianism” was, from Dhaka’s side, “an assertion of strategic autonomy by a much weaker state”. Over time the Awami League stayed close to India and the BNP and its allies grew “much more suspicious”, so “attitudes towards India became part of the contest over Bangladesh’s national identity.”
4. The Hasina bet. India, Ayoob argues, “increasingly identified its interests not merely with Bangladesh but with Sheikh Hasina and the Awami League”, and was seen as placing its security interests above Bangladesh’s democratic evolution. Her overthrow in August 2024 was therefore “a profound crisis for Indian policy”, and her flight to India reinforced suspicion of New Delhi. He calls it “India’s continuing refusal to extradite her”. That word is his: India’s stated position, as reported, is that it is considering the request under established procedure, under a treaty that excepts political cases.
5. A new chapter, and two lessons. With the BNP back in power since February 2026, “functional engagement has resumed”, but “substantial mutual suspicion continues”. His lessons:
- For New Delhi: gratitude for 1971 cannot be “the permanent foundation of Bangladeshi foreign policy”, and repeatedly invoking India’s role “can be counterproductive”. India should use its power “with restraint and sensitivity” and “abjure demanding reciprocity” for its magnanimity, “especially on the sharing of river waters”.
- For Dhaka: it “cannot wish away geography”. No tie with Beijing, Islamabad or Washington can replace a workable relationship with the country that, in his words, “surrounds Bangladesh on three sides”, and strategic autonomy “need not be defined through knee-jerk opposition to India”.
The goal, he concludes, is to keep the most important legacy of 1971: “the recognition that their security and stability are inextricably intertwined.”
Data and Institutions Vault
Prelims-grade facts:
Border and land boundary:
- Border length: 4,096.7 km; 3,232.218 km fenced, 864.482 km yet to be fenced (MHA, Lok Sabha reply, 4 February 2025).
- Land Boundary Agreement: signed on 16 May 1974; its Protocol signed on 6 September 2011.
- Ratification: instruments exchanged during the Indian Prime Minister’s Dhaka visit of 6-7 June 2015.
- The Bill: Constitution (One Hundredth Amendment) Bill, 2015, passed by Parliament in May 2015.
- Enclaves: exchanged on 31 July 2015; 111 Indian enclaves in Bangladesh for 51 Bangladeshi enclaves in India.
- Citizenship choice: 920 persons from the Indian enclaves opted to retain Indian citizenship; none from the Bangladeshi enclaves in India opted to move.
Rivers:
- Common rivers: 54; the Joint Rivers Commission was set up in June 1972.
- Ganga Waters Treaty: signed in New Delhi on 12 December 1996; shares the flow at Farakka from 1 January to 31 May, by 10-day periods.
- Term: 30 years from signature, to 12 December 2026; “renewable on the basis of mutual consent”.
- Low-flow clause: if the flow at Farakka falls below 50,000 cusecs in any 10-day period, the two governments enter into immediate consultations.
- Teesta: draft interim sharing agreement agreed in January 2011; not concluded as of the Joint Statement of 27 March 2021.
Politics in Dhaka:
- Prime Minister: Tarique Rahman (BNP), sworn in on 17 February 2026.
- Election result: BNP-led alliance 212 and Jamaat-led alliance 77, of 297 seats declared (Al Jazeera).
- Sheikh Hasina: ousted in August 2024 and fled to India; sentenced to death in absentia in November 2025.
- Extradition treaty: in force between the two countries, with an exception for political cases.
⚠️ Watch the trap: the Ganga Waters Treaty is renewable by mutual consent; it does not renew itself, and it had neither expired nor been renewed by 23 October 2026. The Land Boundary Agreement dates from 1974 but was implemented only in 2015. The Teesta deal is a draft interim agreement (January 2011), not a signed treaty. The border is 4,096.7 km, of which 864.482 km was still unfenced in February 2025.
The Debate
Ayoob’s case. Gratitude fades; interest and identity last. India tied itself to one party in Bangladesh and paid for it when that party fell. Because India is the far larger neighbour and releases the Ganga’s lean-season flow to Bangladesh at Farakka, its restraint, not Dhaka’s gratitude, decides whether suspicion eases. And repeated talk of 1971 reopens the very wound that troubles the relationship.
The other side. New Delhi’s closeness to the Awami League government rested on security interests, as Ayoob himself notes, and with 864.482 km of the border still unfenced in February 2025, any Indian government will weigh security heavily. “Refusal” overstates India’s position on Ms Hasina: India has said it is considering the request under established procedure, and the treaty itself excepts political cases. India has also kept the door open: its High Commissioner said a visit would get “an honourable reception”. And reciprocity on water is not mere bargaining: river sharing has stakeholders inside India. The 2021 Joint Statement spoke of concluding the Teesta deal “in consultation with the relevant stakeholders”, and the ISAS brief notes that the Janata Dal (United) has opposed renewal of the Ganga treaty.
The balanced verdict. Ayoob’s historical diagnosis is persuasive: a relationship that depends on who rules in Dhaka is fragile, and India gains by dealing with Bangladesh rather than with one party. But his remedy has to work through concrete files: the Ganga treaty before 12 December 2026, the Teesta, the border, and a legal answer on extradition. Those, more than any visit, will show whether “functional engagement” becomes trust.
How to Think About This
Use the “memory, map, mandate” lens for any neighbourhood question:
- Memory: what history does each side tell? (1971: gratitude and resentment.)
- Map: what does geography force on both? (A 4,096.7 km border, 54 common rivers, the Ganga at Farakka.)
- Mandate: who governs, and how does the ruling party see India? (The Awami League close to India; the BNP more suspicious.)
- Mechanisms: which institutions carry the relationship whoever governs? (The Joint Rivers Commission, the Ganga Waters Treaty, the Land Boundary Agreement, the extradition treaty.)
- Asymmetry: does the larger neighbour’s conduct reassure or alarm? (Ayoob’s call for restraint without demands for reciprocity.)
Then separate the record from the reading: the treaty dates, the border length and the enclave exchange are official facts; the psychology of 1971 and the motives of each side are Ayoob’s interpretation.
Diagram-in-Words
India-Bangladesh: tied by geography, divided by politics
Covers Ayoob’s argument: mistrust rooted in 1971, geography and party politics, and the lessons he draws for both capitals.
The figure maps Ayoob’s argument from its roots in 1971 to the lessons he draws for both capitals.
India's relations with Bangladesh have swung between close partnership and deep suspicion since 1971. Examine the historical, geographical and domestic-political roots of this pattern, and suggest how India can build a durable relationship with whichever party governs in Dhaka. (250 words)
India and Bangladesh share a land border of 4,096.7 km (Ministry of Home Affairs, February 2025) and 54 common rivers, and India’s role in 1971 gave the relationship a founding bond. Yet ties have swung between partnership and suspicion depending on who governs in Dhaka.
The return of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), whose leader Tarique Rahman was sworn in as Prime Minister on 17 February 2026, makes the roots of that pattern a live question.
Historical roots. The memory of 1971 cuts both ways: gratitude for India’s help in the liberation war, and discomfort that the decisive blow was not Bangladesh’s own.
Geographical asymmetry. India is the far larger neighbour and releases the Ganga’s lean-season flow to Bangladesh at Farakka, so water sharing (the Ganga Waters Treaty of 12 December 1996; the Teesta interim agreement, drafted in January 2011 but not concluded as of the Joint Statement of 27 March 2021) turns a fear of domination into a policy dispute.
Domestic politics. The Awami League has generally favoured close ties with India and the BNP has been more wary, so attitudes to India became part of Bangladesh’s identity politics.
Recent strain. India’s close ties with the Sheikh Hasina government, her ouster in August 2024, her flight to India and Dhaka’s extradition request, which India has said it is considering under established procedure, have turned one person into a bilateral irritant.
What has worked. The 1974 Land Boundary Agreement and its 2011 Protocol were implemented in 2015, when 111 Indian and 51 Bangladeshi enclaves were exchanged on 31 July, showing that hard issues can be settled.
A durable relationship needs India to use its weight with restraint, keep engagement open with whichever party governs in Dhaka, and treat water sharing as a shared interest rather than a favour; for Bangladesh, strategic autonomy need not mean opposing India. The future of the Ganga Waters Treaty, whose 30-year term ends on 12 December 2026 and which is renewable by mutual consent, is the immediate test.
Interview Angle
"Bangladesh is now governed by the BNP, a party long wary of New Delhi. If you were advising the Ministry of External Affairs, how would you rebuild trust without giving up India's security concerns?"
Takeaway Box
- Lift line: “Gratitude is a transient sentiment; national interest especially when linked to issues of national identity is enduring.”
- Core idea: since 1971 Bangladesh’s elites have viewed India with gratitude and resentment; geography and party politics turned this into identity politics, and India’s bet on Sheikh Hasina deepened it. India must stop expecting gratitude, and Dhaka must accept geography.
- Prelims hooks: border 4,096.7 km; LBA 1974, Protocol 2011, enclaves exchanged on 31 July 2015 (111 for 51); 54 common rivers; Joint Rivers Commission, June 1972; Ganga Waters Treaty, 12 December 1996, Farakka, 1 January to 31 May, 30 years, renewable by mutual consent; Teesta draft, January 2011.
- Ethics and Interview angle: how a larger power shows restraint: respecting a neighbour’s sovereignty and democratic choices while protecting its own security, and handling an extradition request through law rather than politics.
- Probable question: “Examine the significance of the Ganga Waters Treaty, 1996 for India-Bangladesh relations as its 30-year term nears its end.” (GS2, 150 words)
Sources:
- “Tied by geography, divided by politics”, Mohammed Ayoob, op-ed, The Hindu, 23 October 2026
- PIB, Ministry of Home Affairs: Lok Sabha written reply on the India-Bangladesh border, 4 February 2025
- Treaty between India and Bangladesh on sharing of the Ganga waters at Farakka, 12 December 1996 (text, Ministry of Jal Shakti)
- Ministry of External Affairs: Annual Report 2015-16; Land Boundary Agreement booklet; India-Bangladesh relations brief
- PIB: India-Bangladesh Joint Statement, 27 March 2021
- Al Jazeera, 13 and 17 February 2026 and 23 August 2026; Reuters (via Financial Express), 21 August 2026; The Wire, 19 August 2026; TBS News, 15 September 2026
- Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), Brief 1428, 12 October 2026
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