BRICS in a Fragmented World Order: A Test of Relevance

Source: Original editorial ↗ The Hindu

The Lift Line

“it must face the reality that membership of BRICS hardly gives it any additional political or economic strength.” (M.K. Narayanan, The Hindu, 10 October 2026, on India)

Why This Editorial Matters for Your Exam

For context: India hosted the 18th (XVIII) BRICS Summit in New Delhi on 12-13 September 2026. Leaders adopted the New Delhi Declaration. Our news piece of 13 September 2026 reported both.

A month later, M.K. Narayanan, a former Director of the Intelligence Bureau, former National Security Adviser and former Governor of West Bengal, writes the lead article in The Hindu asking whether BRICS still matters. His answer: the summit was a success for India’s chairship, but the grouping’s structural problems remain, and the biggest of them is China.

This is a GS2 favourite: “Is grouping X still relevant to India?” The column hands you the case against; the Declaration’s text hands you the case for. A good answer uses both.

GS Paper 2: Bilateral, regional and global groupings and agreements involving India and/or affecting India’s interests; effect of policies and politics of developed and developing countries on India’s interests; important international institutions.

Background and Context

The summit in brief

Item	What the official record says
Summit	XVIII BRICS Summit, New Delhi, 12-13 September 2026
Theme	“Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability”
Outcome document	Background record: the New Delhi Declaration, dated 12 September 2026
Members	Eleven: the column calls BRICS the “11-member grouping”
Three pillars	Political and security; economic and financial; cultural and people-to-people cooperation
Previous chair	Brazil (2025)
Next summit	XIX Summit in China, which chairs BRICS in 2027

What the Declaration said, in its own words

Many summaries, including the column’s, describe the Declaration loosely. For Prelims, the exact verb matters.

Theme	The Declaration’s actual wording	Read it as
UN reform	Support for “a comprehensive reform of the UN, including its Security Council”; China and Russia “reiterate their support to the aspirations of Brazil and India to play a greater role in the UN, including its Security Council”	Support for a greater role, not an endorsement of permanent seats
Bretton Woods	“the urgent need to reform the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI)”	A demand, repeated
Trade	Restore “an accessible, effective, fully functioning, two-tier binding WTO dispute settlement mechanism”; “serious concerns” over unilateral tariff and non-tariff measures	A demand
Local currencies	“the discussions on promoting trade settlements and investments using BRICS local currencies, while respecting national priorities and acknowledging that there is no one-size-fits-all approach”	Discussions only, not a decision
Economic Partnership	“progress made towards the conclusion of the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership” during Brazil’s 2025 chairship; India steered “the progress of the Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 2030”	Still being concluded
Value chains	“the further development of the BRICS GVC Action Plan 2026-2030”	Work in progress
West Asia	“call for exercising maximum restraint, as well as avoiding actions that could further aggravate the situation”	Restraint; the column paraphrases this as “de-escalation”
Gaza	“full and unhindered humanitarian access in the Gaza Strip”	A call to all parties

The Analysis

Narayanan’s argument moves in five steps.

1. Credit where due. He calls the summit “an extravaganza of sorts” and its unanimous Declaration “a major achievement” for reconciling the views of the 11-member grouping. Commentators, he notes, saw it as in keeping with India’s policy of strategic autonomy, multi-alignment and multi-vector engagement.

2. But the age has changed. In his words, “this is the age of ‘variable geometry’ and not of ‘deep seated’ alliances.” Ad hoc cooperation and plurilateralism have replaced firm blocs. At best, he suggests, BRICS could become something like Europe’s “coalition of the willing”. He traces this shift to the period since the first BRIC summit, which he places in Yekaterinburg, Russia, in 2009.

3. Unmet demands. The original five, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, sought reform of the IMF, the World Bank and the UN. In his view these “remain unfulfilled to this day”, and BRICS “has failed to become a well-integrated economic bloc” able to stand up to the Bretton Woods institutions. Note that the 2026 Declaration itself repeats both demands, which supports his point that they are still open.

4. The China problem. China’s economic preponderance “has far eclipsed that of all other BRICS members”, creating “a serious imbalance”. He goes further: in his view, “China can no longer be regarded as a member of the Global South”.

5. India and China. Tensions persist. “No serious conflict” has taken place “since 2020 (Galwan)”, he writes, but relations “remain uneasy”. So BRICS’s ability “to act in unison in a world that is in disarray is strictly limited”, and the growing imbalance “perhaps contains the seeds of its irrelevance”.

Data and Institutions Vault

Prelims-grade facts:

Background: the 2026 summit:

• XVIII BRICS Summit: New Delhi, 12-13 September 2026, under India’s chairship.
• Theme: “Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability”.
• Context: the outcome document, the New Delhi Declaration, is dated 12 September 2026.
• Chairs: Brazil 2025, India 2026, China 2027 (XIX Summit).

The grouping:

• Eleven members; original five: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa.
• Three pillars: political and security; economic and financial; cultural and people-to-people.
• The Declaration also recognises Partner countries.

Key Declaration lines:

• UN: China and Russia back Brazil and India’s aspirations to a greater role, including in the Security Council.
• WTO: restore a two-tier binding dispute settlement mechanism.
• Payments: local-currency settlement only under discussion; “no one-size-fits-all approach”.
• Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership 2030: progress towards conclusion.
• BRICS GVC Action Plan 2026-2030: further development.

⚠️ Watch the trap: The Declaration did not adopt a BRICS local-currency system; it noted “discussions” and respected national priorities. Nor did China and Russia endorse permanent seats for India and Brazil; they backed their “aspirations” to “a greater role”. And BRICS has eleven members, not five or ten.

The Debate

Narayanan’s case. Summits produce consensus on paper because the text asks little of anyone. The real test is action, and there BRICS falls short: no integrated bloc, no reformed IMF or UN, a dominant China and an uneasy India-China relationship. For India, membership “hardly gives it any additional political or economic strength”.

The other side.

• Consensus is itself a result. Getting eleven members with very different interests to agree on one text is what a chair is judged by, and India did it.
• Concrete hooks exist. China and Russia’s support for India’s role at the UN is on record. Cross-border payment work and the Economic Partnership Strategy give India specific tracks to pursue.
• Strategic autonomy needs many tables. BRICS is one of several groupings India uses. Its value lies in voice and options, not alliance.
• Imbalance cuts both ways. The Declaration names consensus as part of the BRICS spirit. A working rule of consensus gives every member, India included, a say over the common text.

The balanced verdict. Narayanan is right that BRICS is not an alliance and will not become one. But “not an alliance” is not the same as “irrelevant”. India should treat BRICS as an issue-based platform: push payments interoperability, WTO dispute settlement and reform of global institutions, and guard against any single member’s agenda through the consensus rule.

How to Think About This

Use the “alliance versus platform” test for any grouping question:

1. What binds members? Shared values and obligations (an alliance) or shared interests on particular issues (a platform)?
2. Who sets the agenda? If one member dominates, ask whether consensus rules protect the rest.
3. What is India’s gain? Voice, market access, finance, or leverage with other powers?

Most groupings India belongs to are platforms. Judge them by what they deliver issue by issue, not by whether they act as one bloc.

Diagram-in-Words

From summit success to structural doubt (redraw as a flow in an answer):

1. Achievement: consensus New Delhi Declaration under India’s chairship.
2. Context: a world of “variable geometry”, ad hoc coalitions and plurilateralism.
3. Constraint 1: original reform demands (IMF, World Bank, UN) still unmet.
4. Constraint 2: China’s preponderance creates imbalance; India-China ties uneasy.
5. Outcome: limited ability to act in unison.
6. India’s response: treat BRICS as an issue-based platform within multi-alignment.

Takeaway Box

• Lift line: “membership of BRICS hardly gives it any additional political or economic strength.” (on India)
• Core idea: BRICS achieved consensus in New Delhi, but consensus on paper is not cohesion in action; China’s weight is the central strain.
• Prelims hooks: XVIII Summit, New Delhi, 12-13 September 2026; theme; three pillars; eleven members; China chairs in 2027; “two-tier” WTO dispute settlement; local currencies only “discussions”.
• Ethics and Interview angle: balancing national interest with collective commitments; candour about the limits of a grouping India champions.
• Probable question: “BRICS is better understood as a platform than as a bloc. Discuss with reference to India’s interests.” (GS2, 250 words)

Sources: The Hindu, M.K. Narayanan, “BRICS in a fragmented world order: a test of relevance”, 10 October 2026; background: New Delhi Declaration, XVIII BRICS Summit, 12 September 2026

Source: BRICS in a Fragmented World Order: A Test of Relevance — Ujiyari.com | Free UPSC & State PCS Editorial Analysis

Key Arguments at a Glance

The consensus New Delhi Declaration of the 18th BRICS Summit was a diplomatic success for India’s chairship, but it does not change the grouping’s structural limits: an imbalance created by China’s rise, unmet reform demands and a world of ad hoc coalitions rather than firm alliances.

✓ Supporting

• Consensus was real: the Declaration covered global governance reform, trade, finance, energy, climate, technology, health and agriculture, and the author reads it as in keeping with India’s strategic autonomy and multi-alignment.
• This is the age of ‘variable geometry’, not deep alliances; BRICS may at best become a loose coalition of the willing.
• The original members’ core demands, reform of the IMF, the World Bank and the UN, remain unfulfilled, and BRICS has not become an integrated economic bloc.
• China’s economic and political weight now far exceeds that of other members, creating an imbalance; the author argues China can no longer be regarded as part of the Global South.
• India-China relations remain uneasy despite diplomatic calm, which limits how far BRICS can act in unison.

⚠ Counter

The Declaration itself shows the grouping can still set a shared agenda: support from China and Russia for India’s and Brazil’s aspirations at the UN, a common call for reform of the Bretton Woods Institutions and the WTO, and continued work on cross-border payments. For India, a platform that includes major non-Western economies serves strategic autonomy even if it delivers slowly.

→ Way Forward

Use BRICS for issue-based gains (payments interoperability, WTO dispute settlement, development finance, AI cooperation) rather than as an alliance; keep consensus and sovereign equality as the working rule so no single member sets the agenda; and pair BRICS with India’s other partnerships under multi-alignment.