India and ASEAN Need to Talk More: Defence Think Tank Forum

The Lift Line

“The real test of this maiden forum will be whether it produces sustained engagement, rather than another successful conference.” (Gurjit Singh, former Ambassador to ASEAN, The Indian Express)

Why This Editorial Matters for Your Exam

This signed column in The Indian Express, published on 19 October 2026, is by Gurjit Singh, former Ambassador to ASEAN and author of The Durian Flavour: India-ASEAN After a Decade of the Act East Policy. He took part in the forum he writes about, and refers to “My session on strategic stability and regional geopolitics”. That gives the column an inside view; what he reports from that session is his own observation.

The forum itself was covered in our earlier roundup on the forum. This page studies the argument: why a defence dialogue among experts matters, where ASEAN and India see the region differently, and what would make the forum last.

GS Paper 2: India and its neighbourhood; bilateral, regional and global groupings and agreements involving India and/or affecting India’s interests.

In the news: In The Indian Express on 19 October 2026, Gurjit Singh, former Ambassador to ASEAN, argues that the first ASEAN-India Defence Think Tank Forum, hosted by MP-IDSA in New Delhi with representatives of India and all 11 ASEAN member states, will be judged by what follows, not by the meeting itself.

The Crux in 60 Words

India-ASEAN security ties have grown between governments, but expert-level dialogue has lagged. The new defence think tank forum can fill that gap with candid, technical talk on maritime security, disaster relief, emerging technology and defence industry. To matter, it must meet regularly, do work between meetings and respect ASEAN’s caution about strategic competition. A conference is not a partnership.

Background and Context

The forum, in brief

The Defence Minister’s address (14 October 2026)

According to the PIB release on Rajnath Singh’s inaugural address:

• India seeks an Indo-Pacific where all countries, large and small, “make their own choices, protect their interests and pursue development in peace”.
• Self-reliance “does not mean working in isolation; it can create opportunities for trusted partners to design, build, maintain & improve equipment together”.
• He sought partnerships in “co-development, co-production, maintenance, repair and overhaul, training and long-term technical support”.
• He described the Indian Ocean and the waters of Southeast Asia as part of one connected maritime space, and noted that 2026 has been designated the ASEAN-India Year of Maritime Cooperation.
• He proposed a joint India-ASEAN research agenda on maritime security, cyber threats, emerging technologies, disaster response and defence-industry cooperation; regular exchanges among researchers, including young scholars; a small number of pilot projects, such as a tabletop exercise on maritime disaster response, a joint study on counter-drone solutions or a research project on secure maritime information sharing; and the promotion of Track 1.5 and Track 2 dialogues.

These were proposals in a speech. They are not agreed outcomes of the forum.

The Issue, Decoded

The Analysis

1. The gap the forum fills. Singh’s starting point is that the relationship’s “security dimension has advanced faster at the governmental level than among non-governmental interlocutors”. He argues, from his book, that the Delhi Dialogue, conceived as a Track 1.5 platform, “lost momentum as participation by ASEAN ministers diminished”, while the ASEAN-India Network of Think Tanks has continued. A forum built around “experts, researchers and defence professionals rather than seeking ministerial participation” can, he says, hold “a more candid and technically informed conversation”.

2. A political frame from the Defence Minister. Singh calls the inaugural address “a useful political framework”: trust, respect for sovereignty, international law and dialogue, and an Indian approach that complements ASEAN’s AOIP rather than competes with it. He singles out the line that self-reliance “does not mean working in isolation” as the opening for defence-industrial cooperation.

3. Where convergence is real. In Singh’s reading, HADR is “an established and relatively comfortable area for collaboration”, with room to improve preparedness, information-sharing and coordination before disasters strike. Maritime domain awareness, coast guard cooperation and interoperability deserve more attention, and cyber security and counter-drone technologies offer scope for joint research.

4. Where perceptions diverge. In his own session, Singh writes, “ASEAN interlocutors generally appeared less inclined to discuss some of the sharper strategic concerns that animate Indian thinking.” The South China Sea Code of Conduct “did not emerge spontaneously in the discussion, although it was raised later”, and “The Quad was also relatively peripheral.” He reads this not as indifference but as sensitivity about strategic competition and a wish to keep ASEAN’s autonomy, and concludes: “India must understand these concerns rather than assume its Indo-Pacific priorities will automatically resonate across Southeast Asia.”

5. Industry: partnership, not sales. “ASEAN partners are unlikely to be interested simply in purchasing Indian equipment,” Singh writes. They will look for reliable MRO, technology transfer, local industrial participation and sustained technical support, which joint development and production with Southeast Asian companies could provide. This matches the Defence Minister’s list of co-development, co-production and long-term technical support.

6. The weakness in India’s outreach. India often takes the initiative, Singh writes, but “sustained interaction requires more than hosting conferences in New Delhi.” ASEAN specialists are regularly invited to “fully funded programmes” by other dialogue partners, so India must compete through research collaboration, fellowships and reciprocal institutional exchanges. He backs a Malaysian suggestion to engage more closely with the Network of ASEAN Defence and Security Institutions (NADI), alongside proposals for tabletop exercises.

7. The wider architecture. Singh suggests ASEAN connect more coherently with the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and BIMSTEC, and that India’s IPOI advance in ways that complement the AOIP “without appearing to impose a competing regional framework.”

Our analysis: the column’s call for the IPOI to work with the AOIP, especially at sea, is not new; it restates what the 2022 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership already asks for, with “a focus on maritime cooperation”. What the forum adds is a channel for experts to do that work between summits. The relationship’s tracks also move at different speeds: on trade, the review of the ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA), which the 2022 statement asked to be expedited, is still under way, and the next meeting of its Joint Committee will be held in January 2027 in India.

Data and Institutions Vault

Prelims-grade facts:

The forum:

• The maiden ASEAN-India Defence Think Tank Forum was held at MP-IDSA, New Delhi, on 14-15 October 2026
• Participants: all 11 ASEAN Member States and India
• MP-IDSA: Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses; it calls the forum a “Track-1.5/2.0 platform”
• Origin: announced at the second ASEAN-India Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting, Kuala Lumpur, 31 October 2025, alongside the 12th ADMM-Plus

The framework:

• ASEAN-India Comprehensive Strategic Partnership: established by the joint statement at Phnom Penh, 12 November 2022
• The 2022 statement asks for AOIP-IPOI cooperation with a focus on maritime cooperation, connectivity and the SDGs
• 2026: designated the ASEAN-India Year of Maritime Cooperation

Trade track:

• AITIGA review: the 15th Joint Committee, held in Jakarta from 6 to 9 October 2026, directed all Sub-Committees to expedite pending chapters
• The next Joint Committee meeting will be held in January 2027 in India, in hybrid mode

Groupings the column names:

• NADI: Network of ASEAN Defence and Security Institutions
• IORA: Indian Ocean Rim Association; BIMSTEC

⚠️ Watch the trap: The forum was announced in Kuala Lumpur on 31 October 2025, not at a 2026 meeting, and it ran over two days, 14 and 15 October 2026. The Defence Minister’s research agenda, young-scholar exchanges and pilot projects were proposals in his address, not agreed outcomes, and meeting “preferably biennially” is Gurjit Singh’s recommendation, not a decision.

The Debate

Balanced verdict: the forum is the right instrument for a real gap, but an instrument is not an outcome. Its worth will show in what happens between meetings: a research agenda, exchanges and pilot projects. And India will get further by working on the shared ground (disaster relief, maritime awareness, industry) than by pressing ASEAN to echo its own strategic concerns.

How to Think About This

1. Separate the channel from the outcome. A first meeting creates a channel. Ask what it will produce: regular meetings, interim work, joint research. This is Singh’s own test.
2. Read silence as a signal. When partners avoid a topic (here the Code of Conduct and the Quad), the reason may be caution about rivalry rather than lack of interest. Singh reads it that way, and an answer that does the same shows judgment.
3. Sales versus partnership. In defence ties with smaller states, the buyer wants capability at home (maintenance, technology, local industry), not only equipment.
4. Proposed, recommended, agreed. Keep the three apart: the Defence Minister proposed, Singh recommends, and nothing on this page is a joint decision.

Diagram-in-Words

Takeaway Box

• Lift line: “The real test of this maiden forum will be whether it produces sustained engagement, rather than another successful conference.”
• The argument: a defence forum of experts fills a gap left as India-ASEAN ties grew mainly between governments; it must now meet regularly and do work between meetings.
• Prelims hooks: MP-IDSA; 14-15 October 2026; all 11 ASEAN Member States; Kuala Lumpur, 31 October 2025; 12th ADMM-Plus; CSP, 12 November 2022; AOIP and IPOI; 2026 as the ASEAN-India Year of Maritime Cooperation; NADI; IORA; BIMSTEC.
• Interview angle: how to engage partners who are wary of strategic competition, without asking them to take sides.
• Probable question: “Discuss the role of Track 1.5 and Track 2 dialogues in building the India-ASEAN strategic partnership.” (GS2)

Revision Flowchart

Sources: The Indian Express, column by Gurjit Singh, “India and ASEAN need to talk more”, 19 October 2026; PIB, Defence Minister’s address at the ASEAN-India Defence Think Tank Forum, 14 October 2026; MP-IDSA, ASEAN-India Defence Think Tank Forum event page; background: Joint Statement on ASEAN-India Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, Phnom Penh, 12 November 2022; context on the trade review: Ministry of Commerce and Industry statement on the 15th AITIGA Joint Committee, as reported by ANI and India Shipping News, 9 October 2026.

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