The Lift Line
“Collective restrictions should require a demonstrable necessity, not merely administrative convenience.” (Yashovardhan Jha Azad, The Indian Express)
Why This Editorial Matters for Your Exam
This signed column in The Indian Express, published online on 11 October 2026, is by Yashovardhan Jha Azad, a retired IPS officer who has served as Central Information Commissioner, as Secretary (Security) in the Government of India and as Special Director of the Intelligence Bureau. He is also the author of Policing The Republic. The column responds to the police operation in Delhi on Saturday 10 October, when a youth-led protest demanding the resignation of the Chief Election Commissioner met mass detentions, transport curbs and an Internet shutdown.
What the Supreme Court ordered at its special Sunday sitting, and the law on prohibitory orders, detention and Internet suspension, is set out in our deep dive on the SC’s Sunday order on the Delhi protests. The right-to-protest argument under Article 19 is in our editorial Right to Protest: Mass Mobilisation Meets an Immovable State, and the Court’s 9 October hearing on the transit ban is in our 10 October roundup. For the DGP-selection rule, see DGP Appointment Rules: SC Tests Jharkhand on Prakash Singh. This piece takes a different angle: how the police plan for a protest, proportionality, and police reform.
GS Paper 2: Governance, transparency and accountability; issues of the federal structure (who controls Delhi’s police); fundamental rights. GS Paper 3: Security forces and agencies and their mandate; internal security. GS Paper 4: Professional judgment under political pressure.
In the news: a day after mass detentions in Delhi, the Supreme Court sat on a Sunday and directed that metro and rail services function normally unless restrictions are needed for public order under Article 19(2). In The Indian Express, a former Special Director of the Intelligence Bureau asks whether the police had other options.
New to this topic? Start here: the basics in plain words (revision card 1 of 7)
Background and Context
What the record shows about 10 October
The figures differ by source, and counsel told the Court that the State was not providing official numbers. Here is what can be attributed:
| Point | What was reported | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Detentions | Counsel told the Supreme Court that “7000 people were reported as detained” and that the State was not providing official numbers | LiveLaw report of the hearing |
| Detentions | “nearly 2,500” during the day, plus “around 1,000” picked up in preventive operations overnight | Delhi Police sources, as reported by The Hindu |
| Deployment | Over 20,000 security personnel, including the Central Armed Police Forces and the Delhi Police, in the New Delhi district | The Hindu |
| Metro | Entry and exit restricted at dozens of stations | The Hindu, LiveLaw |
| Legal basis claimed | Detentions followed violations of prohibitory orders under Section 163 of the BNSS in the New Delhi district | Delhi Police, as reported by The Hindu |
| Open question | Legal experts asked what authority was used to detain people in areas where those orders were not in force | The Hindu |
Three representatives of the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP), which called the protest along with Left groups and civil society groups, were taken into custody after police boarded their Air India flight on arrival in Delhi, The Hindu reported. Section 163 of the BNSS, which replaced Section 144 of the CrPC, lets an executive magistrate issue prohibitory orders where “immediate prevention or speedy remedy is desirable”.
Who controls Delhi’s police
Delhi is a special case, and the answer is in the statute, not in assumption.
| Provision | What it says |
|---|---|
| Delhi Police Act, 1978, Section 3 | “There shall be one police force for the whole of Delhi” |
| Section 4 | “The superintendence of the Delhi police throughout Delhi shall vest in, and be exercisable by the Administrator” |
| Section 2(a) | The “Administrator” is the Administrator of Delhi appointed under Article 239 |
| Section 6 | The Administrator appoints the Commissioner of Police |
| Article 239AA(1) | The Administrator of the National Capital Territory is designated the Lieutenant Governor |
| Article 239AA(3)(a) | The Delhi Assembly cannot make laws on Entries 1, 2 and 18 of the State List (Public Order, Police and Land, as the Supreme Court’s 2023 Constitution Bench judgment on Delhi’s services spelt out) |
So in law, the Delhi Police answer to the Lieutenant Governor, not to the elected Delhi government.
The Prakash Singh directions (2006)
In Prakash Singh v Union of India, decided by a Bench of Chief Justice Y.K. Sabharwal and Justices C.K. Thakker and P.K. Balasubramanyan, the Supreme Court issued seven directions “to the Central Government, State Governments and Union Territories for compliance till framing of the appropriate legislations”:
| Direction | What it requires |
|---|---|
| 1. State Security Commission | In every State, to ensure that the State Government “does not exercise unwarranted influence or pressure on the State police”; headed by the Chief Minister or Home Minister, with the DGP as ex-officio Secretary; its recommendations are binding on the State Government |
| 2. DGP selection and tenure | Chosen from the three senior-most officers empanelled by UPSC; a minimum tenure of two years |
| 3. Field officers’ tenure | Two years for the IG in charge of a zone, DIG of a range, SP of a district and SHO of a police station |
| 4. Separate investigation | Investigating police separated from law-and-order police, starting in towns of ten lakh or more |
| 5. Police Establishment Board | Decides transfers, postings and promotions of officers of and below the rank of Deputy Superintendent |
| 6. Police Complaints Authority | At the district level (up to DSP) and the State level (SP and above) |
| 7. National Security Commission | At the Union level, to prepare panels for chiefs of the Central Police Organisations, with a minimum tenure of two years |
For the commission’s make-up, the Court let States choose among models recommended by the National Human Rights Commission, the Ribeiro Committee and the Sorabjee Committee.
The Analysis
1. Numbers do not measure risk; the threat does. Azad lists the scale of the operation and asks: “what specific threat justified restrictions affecting an entire capital?” Several of his figures (at least 600 detentions in the “advanced crackdown”, more than 250 railway services cancelled) have no official source in the reports so far, and the accounts conflict: The Hindu reported over 200 trains arriving in Delhi cancelled, while the Solicitor General told the Supreme Court that trains ran to schedule. The detention totals in circulation also differ widely (see the table above). His point does not depend on any one number: “The relevant question is whether the danger could be managed, not whether every procedural formality had been satisfied.”
2. A professional test, not a political one. He points to London in November 2023, where, in his account, Metropolitan Police Commissioner Sir Mark Rowley resisted political pressure to prohibit a pro-Palestinian march on Armistice Day because the intelligence did not meet the threshold of the United Kingdom’s Public Order Act 1986. The lesson he draws: “political displeasure cannot substitute for a professional assessment.” Without disclosed reasons, he warns, sweeping restrictions “invite the suspicion that professional judgment has yielded to political wishes conveyed by a compliant bureaucracy.”
3. Negotiate, document, then target. The first duty of the police, in Azad’s view, is to “open channels of dialogue, assess risks and negotiate workable arrangements”: a designated site, limited hours, agreed attendance, volunteer marshals and clear conditions against violence. Such an offer puts responsibility on organisers too. Body cameras, videography and liaison officers would record misconduct “by protesters and police alike”, so that identifiable offenders face targeted action. This is proportionality in operational form: the narrowest measure that manages the risk.
4. Defiance is not violence. Jumping barricades, marching in human chains or lying down to resist arrest are, he writes, “the ritual dance of democracy”. “Stone-pelting, assault and destruction are different: They demand lawful action.” The police’s public face, he argues, should be “a facilitator protecting rights while enforcing reasonable limits and not the face of the ruling party.”
5. Heavy restrictions can backfire. Detaining the CJP’s leaders on their aircraft, Azad writes, gave them fame an orderly demonstration might never have won: “The state prevented a gathering but magnified its message.” The day, he adds, “again shifted attention from the original grievance to police conduct.”
6. The fix is institutional. Parties, he observes, “discover police accountability when they are in the Opposition”, and few press for the Supreme Court’s police-reform directions once in office. “A credible State Security Commission would help establish policy, evaluate performance and curb unwarranted interference.” Autonomy must come with recorded reasons, independent scrutiny of excessive force and transparent review of restrictions: “ministers set lawful policy while professionals decide how to implement it.” He also wants better training, because negotiation and de-escalation “cannot be improvised at a barricade”, closer scrutiny of the Home Ministry’s bureaucratic layer, and an experienced internal-security professional as Home Secretary. How such a commission would fit Delhi is not straightforward: the 2006 direction speaks of a commission “in every State”, while Delhi’s police are superintended by the Lieutenant Governor under the 1978 Act.
Data and Institutions Vault
Prelims-grade facts:
- Prakash Singh v Union of India (2006): seven directions to the Centre, States and Union Territories, pending legislation.
- State Security Commission: one in every State; chaired by the Chief Minister or Home Minister; DGP as ex-officio Secretary.
- State Security Commission recommendations: binding on the State Government.
- DGP: chosen by the State from the three senior-most officers empanelled by UPSC; minimum tenure of two years.
- Minimum two-year tenure: IG (zone), DIG (range), SP (district), SHO (police station).
- Police Establishment Board: transfers, postings and promotions of officers of and below the rank of Deputy Superintendent.
- Police Complaints Authority: district level (up to DSP) and State level (SP and above).
- National Security Commission: at the Union level, for selecting chiefs of the Central Police Organisations.
- Delhi Police Act, 1978: one force for all of Delhi (Section 3); superintendence vests in the Administrator (Section 4).
- Commissioner of Police, Delhi: appointed by the Administrator (Section 6, Delhi Police Act, 1978).
- Article 239AA(3)(a): keeps Entries 1, 2 and 18 of the State List (public order, police, land) outside the Delhi Assembly’s law-making power.
- Section 163, BNSS: the prohibitory-order power that replaced Section 144 of the CrPC; exercised by an executive magistrate.
⚠️ Watch the trap: superintendence of the Delhi Police vests in the Administrator (the Lieutenant Governor) under Section 4 of the Delhi Police Act, not in the elected Delhi government. The State Security Commission’s recommendations are binding, not advisory. The DGP panel is prepared by UPSC, but the State Government makes the choice from it.
The Debate
| Azad’s case | The other side |
|---|---|
| Restrictions must rest on an independently assessed threat, with reasons disclosed | The police plan for the worst case; turnout and intent are hard to judge at short notice |
| A negotiated site, hours and marshals could have managed the protest | Prohibitory orders under Section 163 of the BNSS were in force in the New Delhi district, and the Delhi Police said the detentions followed their violation |
| Targeted action against identifiable offenders, not collective curbs | Targeting needs intelligence and time; a crowd that turns violent can overwhelm a thin deployment |
| A State Security Commission and operational autonomy would curb political interference | Autonomy must not become immunity; the column itself says elected authority sets lawful policy, and Delhi’s police answer to the Lieutenant Governor by statute |
| Heavy curbs magnify the protesters’ message | Restraint that fails is also costly; the answer lies in better planning, not in giving up the power to restrict |
How to Think About This
Read the column as a lesson in proportionality, the idea that a restriction on a right should go no further than the risk requires. In policing, that becomes a ladder: dialogue and negotiated conditions first, documentation and targeted action next, and collective restrictions only when a recorded assessment shows the lesser steps will not work. The Supreme Court applied the same test to prohibitory orders and Internet suspensions in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020): such orders must meet the test of proportionality and state the material facts behind them (see our deep dive on the Sunday order).
Then separate two questions an answer often mixes up. The first is operational: was this the least restrictive way to manage the risk? The second is institutional: who made the call, on what assessment, and who reviews it? Prakash Singh answers the second with commissions, fixed tenures and complaints bodies; Delhi adds its own layer, because its police answer to the Lieutenant Governor by statute. For GS4, the column’s core is the officer’s duty to give professional advice candidly, even when it is unwelcome.
Diagram-in-Words
Planning for a protest
The sequence the column implies: manage the danger before restricting a whole city.
Takeaway Box
- The argument: the Delhi Police had options short of sweeping restrictions: negotiation, documentation and targeted action.
- The test: collective restrictions need “a demonstrable necessity, not merely administrative convenience”.
- The line: peaceful defiance is democratic ritual; stone-pelting, assault and destruction demand lawful action.
- The reform: the Prakash Singh directions (2006), led by a State Security Commission with binding recommendations, plus training in de-escalation.
- The Delhi twist: superintendence of the Delhi Police vests in the Lieutenant Governor under Section 4 of the Delhi Police Act, 1978.
Revision Cards
UjiyariWho controls Delhi's police: card 3 →UjiyariWhere autonomy ends: card 4 →UjiyariTest yourself on card 5 →Show answer
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UjiyariOn card 6: traps, recall and memory hooks →R1Which BNSS section replaced Section 144 of the CrPC?
R2Who appoints Delhi's Commissioner of Police?
R3In which year were the Prakash Singh directions issued?
R4From what town size must investigation be separated?
UjiyariWrite the Mains answer on card 7 →UjiyariNow take today’s quiz →Sources: The Indian Express, Yashovardhan Jha Azad, “How to plan for a protest: The Delhi police had other options”; Prakash Singh v Union of India (2006), Indian Kanoon; Delhi Police Act, 1978, Indian Kanoon; Article 239AA, Constitution of India; Government of NCT of Delhi v Union of India (2023), Indian Kanoon; LiveLaw, report of the Supreme Court’s Sunday hearing; The Hindu, “SC mandates free movement, no illegal detentions, subject to public order”; The Hindu, print edition, 11 October 2026
Source: Protest Policing in Delhi: Proportionality and Police Reform — Ujiyari.com | Free UPSC & State PCS Editorial Analysis
