The Lift Line
“Until India’s privacy debate catches up to that reality, every right it wins will only ever be half a win.”
Why This Editorial Matters for Your Exam
Pankhuri Agarwal, a lecturer at King’s Business School, King’s College London, connects three stories that most answers treat separately: police facial recognition, online doxxing and electoral-roll verification. The piece gives a structure for questions on privacy, surveillance, data protection and technology and ethics.
GS Paper 2: Fundamental rights; government policies. GS Paper 3: Challenges to internal security through communication networks; cyber security. GS Paper 4: Ethics in public administration; privacy and dignity.
Background and Context
The three stories the author connects, as she describes them.
| Story | What the column says |
|---|---|
| Facial recognition | In July 2026, Rajya Sabha member A.A. Rahim petitioned the Supreme Court against the Delhi Police’s use of facial recognition, AI-enabled smart glasses, drones and a mobile command vehicle at protests at Jantar Mantar; the data was allegedly hosted by two private firms |
| Doxxing | Women who joined the protests were later targeted online with their personal details and rape and death threats. Separately, in August 2026, the Supreme Court disposed of a PIL on doxxing and deepfakes, asking Union Ministries to take remedial measures |
| Electoral rolls | The Special Intensive Revision (SIR) checks identity to decide who stays on the roll; Bihar’s roll went from about 7.89 crore electors to a final 7.42 crore |
The law.
| Instrument | Relevance |
|---|---|
| K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) | Nine judges: privacy is a fundamental right under Article 21; limits must pass legality, legitimate aim, proportionality |
| Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, Section 17 | The Union may exempt any state instrumentality in the interests of sovereignty, security, public order and related grounds |
| Pegasus (Manohar Lal Sharma v. Union of India) | Court-appointed technical committee (supervised by Justice R.V. Raveendran) found malware on some phones in 2022 but could not confirm it was Pegasus, and recorded the Union’s non-cooperation |
| Lucknow hoardings (March 2020) | The Allahabad High Court ordered removal of hoardings naming anti-CAA protesters, calling them an “unwarranted interference in privacy” |
A long history. In 1858, William Herschel, a magistrate in Bengal, began taking handprints on contracts; fingerprint classification was later developed in Bengal by Azizul Haque and Hem Chandra Bose under Edward Henry (the Henry system, 1897).
The Analysis
1. Three kinds of watching. The state watches in public (cameras); crowds watch and punish online (doxxing); bureaucracy watches through identity checks (rolls). Each decides who is counted, believed or safe.
2. The burden is uneven. Minorities, migrants, Dalits, Adivasis, women and the poor bear most of the cost.
3. The law protects one link. Puttaswamy is framed around state action; the DPDP Act lets the state exempt itself; private vendors and anonymous accounts sit outside a single framework. A person’s data “passes through other hands beyond it”.
4. Scale and speed are new. The impulse to make people identifiable is old; what has changed is that “a photo can be uploaded, identified, amplified and linked to an address within hours”.
5. A new starting point. Treat surveillance not as a discrete act by one actor against one person, but as diffuse action by states, companies and foreign vendors at once.
Data and Institutions Vault
Prelims-grade facts:
Privacy law:
- Puttaswamy (2017): nine-judge Bench; privacy part of Article 21; overruled M.P. Sharma (1954) and Kharak Singh (1962) to that extent.
- DPDP Act, 2023: Section 17 exemptions; Data Protection Board of India adjudicates.
- IT Act, 2000, Section 69: interception, monitoring and decryption by the government.
Pegasus:
- Technical committee supervised by Justice R.V. Raveendran; report 2022.
History of identification:
- 1858: Herschel’s handprints; 1897: Henry system of fingerprint classification adopted in Bengal.
⚠️ Watch the trap: Puttaswamy (2017) is the privacy judgment; the Aadhaar judgment of 2018 is also titled K.S. Puttaswamy (a five-judge Bench) and upheld Aadhaar with limits.
The Debate
For the author’s view. Data now flows from state cameras to private servers to public networks. A framework that polices only one link leaves the person exposed at every other.
The complications. Facial recognition and data analytics help police identify offenders and find missing children; clean electoral rolls are a constitutional duty; security exemptions exist in most data laws. The Supreme Court has also held that the Election Commission may examine citizenship for the limited purpose of the rolls.
The balanced verdict. Keep the tools but build the safeguards: a law on state surveillance with independent authorisation and audits; duties on vendors; narrow, reasoned DPDP exemptions; and quick remedies for doxxing and deepfakes.
How to Think About This
Follow the data, not the actor. For any privacy question, trace where the information goes: who collects it, who stores it, who can see it, who can spread it. Then ask which law governs each step. The gaps usually appear at the hand-offs.
Diagram-in-Words
The right to privacy recognised in K.S. Puttaswamy (2017) was framed against the state, but threats to privacy now arise from a chain of state agencies, private vendors and online networks. Discuss the gaps in India's legal framework and suggest reforms. (250 words)
In K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017), a nine-judge Bench held privacy to be a fundamental right under Article 21, subject to the tests of legality, legitimate aim and proportionality. The threats to privacy, however, have moved from single acts of the state to chains that link public agencies, private contractors and online networks.
Three gaps stand out. First, state surveillance: India has no comprehensive law authorising and supervising facial recognition, drones or large-scale data collection by the police; interception is governed by the Telecommunications Act, 2023, the IT Act, 2000 and rules under them, with executive rather than judicial oversight.
Second, exemptions: Section 17 of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 allows the Union to exempt any state instrumentality in the interest of sovereignty, security, public order and related grounds, so the data law may not apply where the risk is greatest. Third, private actors: vendors that host police data, and platforms where individuals are doxxed or targeted with deepfakes, are regulated in fragments, through contracts, the IT Rules, 2021 and criminal law, without a clear allocation of responsibility.
The proportionality test of Puttaswamy, and the necessity reasoning in the Pegasus proceedings, give courts a yardstick, but ex-post litigation is slow. Reforms should include a surveillance law with prior independent authorisation, purpose limitation, retention limits and audits; binding security and confidentiality duties on vendors; narrow, reasoned and reviewable exemptions; and quick takedown and remedy mechanisms for doxxing.
Privacy protection must follow data across hands. A framework that covers the state, its contractors and online platforms together would give citizens rights that match the way surveillance now works.
Interview Angle
"A protester is identified by a police camera, then doxxed and threatened online. Who in India is legally responsible at each step, and what would you change?"
Takeaway Box
- Thesis: surveillance is a chain, not a single act.
- Links: police cameras, private vendors, online doxxing, identity checks for rolls.
- Law: Puttaswamy (2017) is state-focused; DPDP Section 17 allows state exemptions.
- Precedent: Lucknow hoardings (2020) struck as “unwarranted interference in privacy”.
- Reform: surveillance law, vendor duties, narrow exemptions, fast remedies.
Sources: The Hindu, Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (MeitY), Supreme Court of India
Pankhuri Agarwal argues that police facial recognition, online doxxing of protesters and identity checks for electoral rolls, read together, form a diffuse chain of surveillance across the state, private firms and online networks, and that India’s privacy framework, built around state action, does not assign responsibility along that chain.
- A petition alleges that the Delhi Police used facial recognition, AI-enabled smart glasses, drones and a mobile command vehicle at protests, with the data hosted by two private firms.
- Women protesters were later doxxed online, with rape and death threats; public identification as punishment has precedents, such as the 2020 Lucknow hoardings that the Allahabad High Court ordered removed.
- Identity checks in the Special Intensive Revision of rolls decide who can vote; Bihar’s roll went from about 7.89 crore electors to a final 7.42 crore.
- Puttaswamy (2017) framed its test around state action, and the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 lets the Union exempt any state instrumentality on grounds including security and public order.
- The Pegasus inquiry found malware on some phones but could not confirm the spyware, and noted the Union’s non-cooperation.
Facial recognition and data-driven verification help police identify offenders and keep electoral rolls clean; exemptions for security agencies exist in most data laws; and the Supreme Court has upheld the limited examination of citizenship for roll revision.
Treat surveillance as a chain: a law on state surveillance with judicial or independent authorisation, purpose limitation and audit; binding duties on private vendors that handle state data; narrow and reviewable DPDP exemptions; and fast remedies against doxxing and deepfakes.
Cite this page: Surveillance Is Not the Only Privacy Issue: Cameras, Doxxing and Electoral Rolls as One Chain — Ujiyari.com | Free UPSC & State PCS Editorial Analysis