The Ghosts of 1945: How Memory of the Second World War Is Being Used in Today's Contest Over Asia

Source: Original editorial ↗ The Indian Express

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The Lift Line

“References to history are rarely innocent. The past is interpreted and reinterpreted to serve the politics of the present.”

Why This Editorial Matters for Your Exam

C. Raja Mohan, contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express, reads the recent Trump-Xi summit in Washington through the lens of memory politics. It links GS1 world history (the Second World War, the post-war order) with GS2 IR (US-China-Japan dynamics, UN reform, India’s place).

GS Paper 2: Effect of policies and politics of developed countries on India’s interests; important international institutions. GS Paper 1: World history: the World Wars and their effects; post-colonial redrawing of boundaries.

Background and Context

The two post-war orders the author names.

Order	What it was
Yalta System	From the Yalta Conference (February 1945) of Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin: spheres of influence in Europe, the basis of the Soviet claim to a leading role
San Francisco System	The US alliance network in Asia built on the Treaty of San Francisco (peace with Japan, signed 8 September 1951) and the US-Japan Security Treaty (1951), plus alliances with South Korea, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand

The China question. America’s wartime ally was the Republic of China (ROC) under Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi), which retreated to Taiwan in 1949 when Mao Zedong founded the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The ROC held China’s UN seat, including the permanent seat on the Security Council, until UNGA Resolution 2758 (1971) transferred it to the PRC.

The “enemy state” clauses. Articles 53, 77 and 107 of the UN Charter refer to states that were enemies of the signatories in the Second World War (Japan, Germany, Italy and others). In 1995, the General Assembly (resolution 50/52) called them obsolete and decided to begin the process of deleting them, which requires a Charter amendment.

India in the war. Jaishankar told a Russia-India-China meeting in June 2020 that 2.3 million Indians served under arms and 14 million in war production. The British Indian Army fought in North Africa, Italy, East Africa and, decisively, in Burma (Imphal and Kohima, 1944).

The Analysis

1. Memory as a tool. Trump invokes wartime partnerships with Russia and China, which critics see as cover for leader-level outreach that unsettles US allies. Putin uses it to claim a Yalta-style role in Europe; Xi, to challenge the San Francisco System in Asia.

2. The Taiwan distinction. The US-China alliance of the war is a fact that needs qualification: the ally was the ROC. Taipei accuses Beijing of “narrative diplomacy” to erase Taiwan’s historical identity.

3. Japan on the defensive. A narrative of the US and China as victors and Japan as aggressor gives Beijing ammunition against Tokyo’s defence build-up. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi spoke to Trump after the summit; the allies reaffirmed their coordination.

4. From victim to victor. Under Mao, the war was awkward, since Nationalist armies fought much of it. From the 1980s it became a story of Japanese aggression and the “century of humiliation”; under Xi, China presents itself as a victor and UN founder. Historian Rana Mitter has traced how this supports a claim to the apex of the global hierarchy.

5. India’s absence. India contributed hugely but got little recognition in the post-war order, a “historical injustice” in Jaishankar’s words. The roots are domestic: the Congress opposed Britain’s decision to involve India and launched Quit India (1942); the Communists switched to support the war after Germany invaded the Soviet Union (1941); Subhas Chandra Bose sought German and Japanese help and led the Indian National Army. These divisions made it hard to fold the soldiers’ sacrifice into a national story.

6. A discourse without history. The Indian elite pays little attention to the war’s politics, its role in Partition and India’s post-war marginalisation, one reason, the author suggests, why Indian foreign policy talk leans on abstract concepts.

Data and Institutions Vault

Prelims-grade facts:

Post-war order:

• Yalta Conference: February 1945 (Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin).
• UN Charter signed at San Francisco, 26 June 1945; in force 24 October 1945.
• Treaty of San Francisco (peace with Japan): signed 8 September 1951.
• UNGA Resolution 2758 (1971): China’s UN seat to the PRC.
• UN Charter “enemy state” clauses: Articles 53, 77, 107; GA resolution 50/52 (1995) called them obsolete.

India and the war:

• Quit India: 8 August 1942; INA under Bose; battles of Imphal and Kohima, 1944.
• India was a founding member of the UN, signing the Charter in 1945 before independence.

⚠️ Watch the trap: India signed the UN Charter in 1945 as British India and is a founding member, even though it became independent in 1947.

The Debate

For the author’s view. Great powers are using 1945 to shape 2026; India, absent from that story, weakens its own claim to a larger role in global governance.

The complications. Summit rhetoric seldom changes alliances: the US-Japan alliance was reaffirmed at once. India’s standing today rests on its economy, military and diplomacy, not on wartime memory.

The balanced verdict. Both matter. Capabilities earn a seat at the table; history supplies the legitimacy. India should teach and commemorate its war, and use it in diplomacy, while building the capabilities that make the claim credible.

How to Think About This

Ask who benefits from a historical claim. When a state invokes the past, ask what present goal it serves: a territorial claim, an alliance shift, a seat at the table. This makes “history” questions in GS2 analytical rather than descriptive.

Diagram-in-Words

Takeaway Box

• Peg: Trump-Xi summit’s affirmation of the US-China wartime alliance.
• Frame: Yalta System (Europe) versus San Francisco System (Asia).
• Target: Japan’s defence build-up; Taiwan’s historical identity.
• Shift: China from victim to victor.
• India: 2.3 million under arms, 14 million in war production; an uncorrected “historical injustice”.

Sources: The Indian Express, Charter of the United Nations, Ministry of External Affairs

Source: The Ghosts of 1945: How Memory of the Second World War Is Being Used in Today's Contest Over Asia — Ujiyari.com | Free UPSC & State PCS Editorial Analysis

Key Arguments at a Glance

C. Raja Mohan argues that the Trump-Xi affirmation that the US and China were victorious wartime allies is a use of history for present politics: it helps Beijing claim the mantle of a 1945 victor, puts Japan on the defensive and blurs Taiwan’s place, while India, whose soldiers fought across the war, remains absent from the debate.

✓ Supporting

• Trump has invoked wartime cooperation with both Russia and China; for Putin it supports a Yalta-style order in Europe, for Xi an attack on the US-led San Francisco alliance system in Asia.
• America’s wartime ally was the Republic of China under Chiang Kai-shek, which survives in Taiwan; the People’s Republic was founded only in 1949, which is why Taipei accuses Beijing of “narrative diplomacy”.
• Recalling the US and China as victors and Japan as aggressor gives Beijing ammunition against Japan’s defence build-up, and China opposes removal of the UN Charter’s obsolete “enemy state” clauses.
• Under Xi, China has moved from a narrative of victimhood to one of victory, which supports a claim to authority in the global order.
• India had 2.3 million people under arms and 14 million in war production, but its divided national movement left it unable to claim that contribution, a “historical injustice” Jaishankar raised in 2020.

⚠ Counter

Invocations of history at summits are often symbolic and do not change alliances; the US-Japan alliance was reaffirmed immediately, and India’s foreign policy is shaped more by present capabilities than by wartime memory.

→ Way Forward

India should study and teach the Second World War’s impact on the subcontinent, claim its soldiers’ contribution in its diplomacy, and ground its foreign policy discourse in history and geopolitics rather than abstract concepts.