🗞️ Why in News On April 14, 2026, the Supreme Court invoked its extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to directly dissolve a marriage, bypassing the usual procedural requirements under the Hindu Marriage Act and the Family Courts Act. The ruling — notable for highlighting how Article 142 can remedy procedural abuse in matrimonial litigation — renews debate about the constitutional contours of this unique power.
What is Article 142?
Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India states:
“The Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it, and any decree so passed or order so made shall be enforceable throughout the territory of India…”
Article 142(2) empowers the Court to investigate or punish contempt of itself, summon witnesses, or discover documents.
Why Article 142 is Unique
Most constitutional courts worldwide are limited to interpreting and applying existing law. Article 142 uniquely empowers the Supreme Court of India to do “complete justice” — which may mean going beyond statutory law, filling legislative gaps, or issuing orders that would technically be outside its adjudicatory jurisdiction.
The drafters consciously chose this — the Constituent Assembly debates (May 27, 1949) show that Dr B.R. Ambedkar defended this provision as necessary for a young democracy with incomplete legal frameworks.
Article 142 in Matrimonial Cases — Doctrinal Evolution
The Six-Month Waiting Period Problem
Under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (Section 13B) — which governs divorce by mutual consent — parties must:
- First file a joint petition
- Wait 6 months (cooling-off period) before filing a second motion confirming the decision
- File the second motion within 18 months
This cooling-off period can be distressing where the marriage has irrevocably broken down and both parties consent.
Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan (2023)
In Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan (2023) 14 SCC 401, a 5-judge Constitution Bench held:
- Yes, Article 142 can be used to grant divorce on the ground of “irretrievable breakdown of marriage” — even though this is not a ground under the Hindu Marriage Act
- The Court can waive the 6-month cooling-off period under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act
- The Court laid down guidelines for when Article 142 should be exercised in matrimonial matters
The April 14, 2026 Ruling — In Context
The Court’s April 14 judgment applies the Shilpa Sailesh framework to a case where the marriage had been broken for over a decade, with multiple rounds of litigation spanning family courts, high courts, and the SC. Using Article 142, the Court:
- Dissolved the marriage directly — avoiding sending the matter back to family court
- Settled property division
- Fixed alimony terms
- Quashed criminal proceedings arising from the matrimonial dispute
The “Irretrievable Breakdown” Doctrine
“Irretrievable breakdown” is not a statutory ground for divorce in any Indian personal law. The Law Commission of India has recommended its inclusion four times:
- 71st Report (1978)
- 217th Report (2009)
- 221st Report (2009)
- Periodic reiterations in other reports
The recommendation has not been enacted by Parliament. In the absence of legislative action, the Supreme Court has used Article 142 to fill the gap — but has stressed (in Shilpa Sailesh) that:
- This is an exceptional remedy, not a routine ground
- High Courts and lower courts cannot dissolve marriages on irretrievable breakdown — only the Supreme Court can, using Article 142
- Factors considered: length of separation, nature of allegations, attempts at reconciliation, children’s welfare
Other Landmark Article 142 Uses
Article 142 has been used across widely varying situations:
| Case | Year | Use |
|---|---|---|
| Union Carbide v. UoI | 1991 | Bhopal gas tragedy settlement — ordered $470 million compensation |
| Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan | 1997 | Sexual harassment guidelines in absence of legislation — precursor to Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace Act 2013 |
| M.C. Mehta v. UoI (Delhi pollution) | Various | Shut down polluting industries in Delhi NCR |
| Naz Foundation (reference) | 2018 | Navtej Singh Johar — reading down Section 377 IPC |
| Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record v. UoI | 2015 | Set up collegium for judicial appointments pending NJAC matter |
| Babri Masjid / Ayodhya | 2019 | Use of Article 142 to grant alternate land to Sunni Waqf Board |
| Shilpa Sailesh | 2023 | Divorce by irretrievable breakdown under Article 142 |
| Central Vista | 2021 | Environmental clearance conditions |
The Debate — Judicial Overreach or Complete Justice?
Arguments For Broad Article 142 Use
- Legislative inertia: Parliament often fails to enact reforms despite Law Commission recommendations (e.g., irretrievable breakdown, criminal law reforms)
- Constitutional design: Ambedkar and the Constituent Assembly intended the power broadly — the phrase “complete justice” was deliberate
- Case-specific remedy: Article 142 is exercised in specific disputes, not as general law-making
- Higher court discipline: Only the Supreme Court has this power — preventing chaos in lower courts
Arguments Against
- Separation of powers: The Supreme Court should not make law where Parliament has deliberately chosen not to legislate
- Democratic deficit: Judicial legislation bypasses debate, scrutiny, and popular accountability
- Uncertainty: “Complete justice” is subjective; different benches may reach different outcomes
- Rule of law: Predictability of law is undermined if the apex court can set aside statutory requirements in the name of equity
Constitutional Constraints on Article 142
The Supreme Court itself has developed limits:
- Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner (1963): Article 142 orders must not violate fundamental rights
- A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak (1988): Cannot be used to contravene the express provisions of any statute
- Supreme Court Bar Association v. UoI (1998): Article 142 is supplementary to existing laws — not a substitute for them; cannot override “substantive law applicable to the case”
So even as Article 142 empowers the Court, it cannot override substantive statutory provisions or fundamental rights.
Comparative — Similar Powers in Other Jurisdictions?
| Country | Closest Analogue | Scope |
|---|---|---|
| USA (Supreme Court) | “All Writs Act, 1789” | Issue writs necessary in aid of jurisdiction — narrower than Article 142 |
| UK (Supreme Court) | Inherent jurisdiction | Primarily procedural — cannot override statute |
| Canada | Section 24(1) Charter | Remedies for Charter violations — rights-specific |
| South Africa | Section 172 Constitution | Declaring invalidity and remedies — narrower |
| Australia | Section 75 Constitution | Original jurisdiction — not a “complete justice” provision |
| India | Article 142 | Broadest in the world — general power for complete justice |
India’s Article 142 is uniquely broad. The Indian Supreme Court’s activism is in substantial part enabled by this provision.
The Family Law Landscape — Why Article 142 Ends Up Filling Gaps
Multiple Personal Laws, Uneven Reform
| Community | Key statute | Irretrievable breakdown as ground? |
|---|---|---|
| Hindu (inc. Sikh, Jain, Buddhist) | Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 | No (judicial gap-filling via Article 142) |
| Muslim | Muslim Personal Law Application Act 1937; Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act 1939; Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act 2019 (triple talaq) | Not explicitly; talaq and khula available |
| Christian | Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (amended 2001) | No (but grounds expanded in 2001 amendment) |
| Parsi | Parsi Marriage & Divorce Act, 1936 | No |
| Special / Secular | Special Marriage Act, 1954 | No |
The Uniform Civil Code (UCC) debate — Article 44 of the Directive Principles — has periodic salience, but the political difficulty of harmonising personal laws is a key reason Parliament has been slow to reform matrimonial law.
UPSC Relevance
| Paper | Angle |
|---|---|
| GS2 — Polity | Article 142 — scope, limits, leading cases; separation of powers; judicial activism |
| GS2 — Governance | Law Commission recommendations (71st, 217th, 221st); legislative inertia; UCC debate |
| GS2 — Social Justice | Personal laws; divorce law reform; protection of women in matrimonial disputes |
| GS4 — Ethics | Role of morality in judicial decision-making; judicial restraint vs activism |
| Prelims | Article 142 — complete justice; Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan (2023, 5-judge bench); Hindu Marriage Act 1955 (Section 13B cooling-off: 6 months); A.R. Antulay (1988); SCBA v. UoI (1998) |
| Interview | “Is Article 142 the Constitution’s strength or a mark of Parliament’s failure? Should irretrievable breakdown be codified as a statutory ground?” |
📌 Facts Corner
Article 142: Clause 1: Supreme Court may do “complete justice” in any cause · Clause 2: Contempt, summoning witnesses, document discovery · No equivalent provision in state High Courts.
Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan (2023): 5-judge Constitution Bench (Justices S.K. Kaul, Sanjiv Khanna, A.S. Oka, Vikram Nath, J.K. Maheshwari) · Article 142 can be used to grant divorce on irretrievable breakdown · Can waive 6-month cooling-off period under Section 13B Hindu Marriage Act 1955 · Only SC can do this — not lower courts.
Constraints on Article 142: Cannot override fundamental rights (Prem Chand Garg 1963) · Cannot contradict express statute (A.R. Antulay 1988) · Supplementary, not substitutive (SCBA v. UoI 1998) · Must not override substantive statutory law.
Law Commission Reports on Irretrievable Breakdown: 71st (1978), 217th (2009), 221st (2009) · All recommend statutory inclusion · Parliament has not enacted.
Landmark Article 142 uses: Union Carbide (1991, $470M) · Vishaka guidelines (1997) · Ayodhya (2019, alternate land) · Navtej Johar (2018, Section 377) · GS2: Polity.
Source: Article 142 and the Supreme Court's Extraordinary Power: A Matrimonial Dissolution Raises Old Questions — Ujiyari.com | Free UPSC & State PCS Current Affairs
