The Wrong Turn: Twenty-Five Years On, US Strategy Has Not Come Back to Grand Strategy

📌 Editorial Lift Line

Twenty-five years after 9/11, the wrong turn is that the United States has replaced grand strategy with strategic backsliding, and neither of the two major parties in Washington has yet chosen to correct it.

The Argument

Hindustan Times argues that the greater and more insidious damage from 9/11 was not the attack itself but the changes in US strategy that followed. On 11 September 2001, at 8:46 in the morning, American Airlines Flight 11 flew into the north tower of the World Trade Center. Three plane crashes and roughly 3,000 deaths followed. The immediate American response, shutting down the city, suspending advertising on national television for two weeks, was proportionate to the shock. What was disproportionate was the abandonment of the hard-earned strategic lessons of Vietnam.

The Bush administration, the editorial argues, made three specific wrong turns. First, it went into Afghanistan and Iraq with inadequate foreknowledge, insufficient planning and none of the overwhelming force that the Powell Doctrine had prescribed. Second, it did not fund the wars, breaking with every previous wartime American administration and driving the federal deficit into structural deterioration. Third, it went it alone under the Bush Doctrine, abandoning the coalition-building that Bush Sr had used to evict Iraq from Kuwait in 1990-91. The Obama, Trump and Biden administrations followed rather than corrected these paths. The US federal debt has grown from $5.8 trillion in 2001 to over $40 trillion by August 2026.

How to Think About It

Approach the editorial through the concept of grand strategy: the alignment of a country’s political objectives with its economic capacity, military means and diplomatic instruments over the long term. Grand strategy asks three questions. What are we trying to achieve? What means do we have? Are the two aligned over time? The editorial’s argument is that after 9/11, the United States stopped asking these questions in a disciplined way. The consequences show up in the debt, in the withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, and in the unpredictability of Washington’s current international behaviour. For an aspirant, the value of the piece is that it converts twenty-five years of American foreign policy into a single analytical lens.

The Powell Doctrine and the Bush Doctrine

The Powell Doctrine, articulated by Colin Powell during the Gulf War of 1990-91, held that the United States should use military force only when specific conditions were met: a vital national security interest at stake, clear objectives, exhaustive analysis of risks and costs, exhaustion of non-military options, plausible exit strategy, and public and international support. Its logic was that military force is a blunt instrument whose use must be disciplined by political preparation.

The Bush Doctrine, articulated in the National Security Strategy of 2002, reversed the emphasis. It embraced preemptive war against emerging threats, favoured coalitions of the willing over broader multilateral endorsement, and prioritised democratic transformation of adversaries. It made the doctrinal case for the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Its architectural weakness was that it decoupled the use of force from the disciplines the Powell Doctrine had imposed.

The Three Wrong Turns, Examined

Wrong turn one: inadequate planning and inadequate force. US-led forces in Afghanistan could not eliminate the Taliban or establish a viable civilian government in Kabul. In Iraq, the initial invasion in 2003 succeeded rapidly at the tactical level but the post-invasion plan, the dissolution of the 400,000-strong Iraqi security forces and the deep de-Baathification, converted a defeated state into an active insurgency. The occupation of Iraq lasted nearly nine years and cost between $4 trillion and $6 trillion. The twenty-year War on Terror ended with the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 at a total cost of $8 trillion and 900,000 lives, per Brown University’s Costs of War Project. The editorial notes that Donald Trump campaigned against these forever wars in 2016 for good reason.

Wrong turn two: unfunded war. The editorial’s most novel contribution is on fiscal policy. Every previous wartime American president raised taxes to pay for the war. Ronald Reagan quietly raised taxes multiple times between 1982 and 1986 even while cutting income tax rates in headline terms. George H W Bush raised taxes on high incomes and on tobacco, alcohol and petrol in early 1990 after the Gulf War. George W Bush, in contrast, cut taxes in 2001 and again in 2003 through the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Bill. US military spending more than doubled from $330 billion in 2001 to over $700 billion in 2009, while the federal deficit swung from a $128 billion surplus in 2001 to a $1.4 trillion deficit by 2009. Fighting long wars without taxes is not a fiscal error alone; it is a strategic error, because national security depends on economic health as much as on military capability.

Wrong turn three: going it alone. The Bush Doctrine’s willingness to abandon major allies for the War on Terror produced a lopsided and limited coalition. The invasion of Afghanistan and the occupation of Iraq proceeded without France, Germany, Canada, New Zealand and other traditional partners. Bush Sr, by contrast, had assembled more than three dozen states in the coalition that evicted Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1990-91. The unilateral posture reduced the political legitimacy of the interventions, isolated the United States diplomatically, and eroded the alliance capital built since the Second World War.

The Aftermath

Twenty-five years on, no successor administration has corrected the wrong turns. Barack Obama continued the strategic drift by expanding drone operations while trying to reduce ground presence. Donald Trump, in his first term, pushed unilateralism further and challenged NATO’s institutional cohesion. Joe Biden’s administration completed the Afghanistan withdrawal in a way that appeared strategically bracing but tactically chaotic. Trump in his second term (2025 onward) has taken unilateral tariff posturing to previously unimagined levels. The federal debt has grown from $5.8 trillion in 2001 to over $40 trillion by August 2026. With the possible exceptions of the intervention in Libya (2011) and support for Ukraine (from 2022), Washington has acted unilaterally or bilaterally rather than through NATO or wider coalitions.

The editorial coins a phrase for the resulting posture: strategic backsliding. It describes a state that no longer sees itself as accountable to other states, to international law, or to humankind. The description is deliberately harsh.

What This Means for India

The implication for India is not spelled out in the editorial, but it follows plainly. A United States whose foreign policy is not disciplined by grand strategy is a partner whose behaviour is harder to predict, whose commitments are harder to rely on, and whose commercial relationships are more subject to sudden politicisation. India’s response has been to diversify: closer ties with the European Union through the FTA under negotiation, deeper engagement with the Global South through BRICS, and expanded defence procurement diversification through France, Russia and domestic production. That posture is not anti-American; it is a rational hedge against a partner whose grand strategy has not yet been rebuilt.

The Way Forward

If the editorial’s diagnosis is correct, three specific American corrections would be necessary: rebuild bipartisan consensus on grand strategy, restore multilateral engagement including through revitalising NATO’s political dimension, and restore fiscal capacity for national security spending through structural tax reform. None of these is on the current Washington agenda. For India and other partners, the practical implication is that the wait for correction is likely to be long, and the hedging posture must be maintained.

🗂️ Data and Institutions Vault

Prelims-grade facts:

The 9/11 attacks:

• Date: 11 September 2001.
• First strike: American Airlines Flight 11 into World Trade Center north tower, 8:46 am local time (EDT) on 11 September 2001.
• Deaths: approximately 3,000.
• Perpetrator: al-Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden.

The two doctrines:

• Powell Doctrine: vital interest, clear objectives, risk analysis, non-military options exhausted, exit strategy, public and international support; force in overwhelming strength if used.
• Bush Doctrine: articulated in the 2002 National Security Strategy; preemptive war, coalitions of the willing, democratic transformation of adversaries.

The wars and their costs:

• Afghanistan invasion: October 2001.
• Iraq invasion: March 2003.
• Iraq occupation cost: $4-6 trillion (per the editorial).
• Total War on Terror cost: $8 trillion and 900,000 lives (per Brown University’s Costs of War Project).
• US withdrawal from Afghanistan: August 2021.

The fiscal record:

• Federal deficit 2001: $128 billion surplus.
• Federal deficit 2009: $1.4 trillion deficit.
• US military spending 2001: $330 billion.
• US military spending 2009: over $700 billion.
• US federal debt 2001: $5.8 trillion.
• US federal debt August 2026: over $40 trillion.

Precedent operations:

• Grenada, 1983.
• Panama, 1988.
• Haiti, 1994-95.
• Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 1990-91.
• Iranian hostage rescue mission, 1980.
• US Marines in Lebanon, 1983.

The Bush Sr Kuwait coalition, 1990-91:

• More than three dozen states contributed troops, materiel, money or logistical support.

Mains Answer Framework

Introduction. The 25th anniversary of the 11 September 2001 attacks is an occasion to assess the strategic consequences that followed. Hindustan Times argues that the Bush administration made three specific wrong turns that no successor has corrected: inadequate planning and force in Afghanistan and Iraq, unfunded wars that structurally weakened American fiscal capacity, and unilateralism that eroded alliance capital.

Body. The first wrong turn abandoned the Powell Doctrine, which had required clear objectives, exhaustion of non-military options and overwhelming force. Afghanistan and Iraq were pursued with inadequate ground forces and inadequate post-conflict planning; the dissolution of Iraq’s 400,000-strong security forces converted a defeated state into an insurgency. The Iraq occupation cost $4-6 trillion and the 20-year War on Terror cost $8 trillion and 900,000 lives. The second wrong turn was fiscal. Reagan and Bush Sr both raised taxes to fund military commitments; George W Bush cut taxes in 2001 and 2003 while military spending more than doubled from $330 billion to $700 billion, and the deficit swung from a $128 billion surplus to $1.4 trillion. The third wrong turn was diplomatic. The Bush Doctrine’s coalitions of the willing produced a lopsided intervention in Iraq without France, Germany or Canada, in contrast with the more-than-three-dozen-state coalition Bush Sr had assembled for Kuwait in 1990-91. Twenty-five years on, the successor administrations have not corrected these paths; the federal debt has grown to over $40 trillion. The result is what the editorial calls strategic backsliding: a country that no longer sees itself as accountable to other states, to international law or to humankind. For India, this environment reinforces the case for diversification through the India-EU FTA, BRICS, and defence procurement across France, Russia and domestic production.

Conclusion. Grand strategy is not restored by memory of a single crisis; it is restored by discipline over decades. Twenty-five years is a long time to still be waiting.

PYQ Linkage

• UPSC CSE Mains GS2, 2020: “‘Indian diaspora has an important role to play in South East Asian countries’ economy and society.’ Appraise the role of Indian diaspora in South-East Asia in this context.” (partner-diversification context)
• UPSC CSE Mains GS2, 2019: “‘The long-sustained image of India as a leader of the oppressed and marginalised nations has disappeared on account of its new-found role in the emerging global order.’ Elaborate.”
• UPSC CSE Prelims, 2020: A question on international institutions and their headquarters.

The Aspirant’s One-Line Takeaway

A superpower that fights long wars without paying for them, and without its allies, does not remain a superpower for long, and twenty-five years after 9/11 the United States is still discovering the price of that lesson.

Sources: Hindustan Times, Brown University Costs of War Project

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