The Lift Line
The safest place to stand in a great-power storm is not behind one giant, but shoulder to shoulder with your fellow middle powers, and that is the logic of a G minus two.
Why This Editorial Matters for Your Exam
A “G minus the two great powers”, India, Japan, Australia, Indonesia, South Korea and the ASEAN states building cooperation without being trapped between the US and China, is a precise expression of India’s doctrine of strategic autonomy. For the exam it packages minilateralism, ASEAN centrality, supply-chain resilience and multi-alignment into one usable frame.
GS Paper 2: bilateral, regional and global groupings and agreements involving India; effect of great-power policies on India’s interests; the Indo-Pacific.
For Prelims, carry the vehicles: SAGAR and its elevation to MAHASAGAR, the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative, the Quad, I2U2, the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative, IPEF and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. For Mains, argue why middle-power coalitions expand India’s room to manoeuvre without forcing a bloc choice, consistent with India’s official multi-alignment stand.
Background and Context
The Indo-Pacific risks hardening into a bipolar US-China contest in which smaller and middle powers become arenas rather than actors. The “G minus 2” idea responds directly: middle powers should build independent frameworks, minus the two great powers, so they can shape the region on their own terms.
India’s own doctrine already runs this way. SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) was launched in Mauritius in March 2015; a decade later, in March 2025, again in Mauritius, it was elevated to MAHASAGAR (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions). The Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI), proposed at the East Asia Summit in Bangkok in November 2019 with seven pillars, gives the vision an operational architecture. India’s framing throughout is strategic autonomy and multi-alignment, not membership of any bloc.
The Core Argument / Issue
Minilaterals expand strategic space
Small, purpose-built groupings let middle powers act without waiting for consensus among giants. India already sits in several: the Quad (India, US, Japan, Australia), whose foreign ministers held their eleventh meeting in New Delhi on May 26, 2026; I2U2 (India, Israel, UAE, US, first summit July 2022); and the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative with Japan and Australia (2021). Each is issue-based, and together they weave a lattice of cooperation that no single power controls.
ASEAN centrality is the anchor
A durable G minus 2 needs a stable core, and ASEAN centrality provides it. The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP, 2019) offers an inclusive, non-bloc template; the Philippines chairs ASEAN in 2026. Middle powers should reinforce ASEAN’s convening role rather than build structures that bypass it.
| Layer | Vehicle | What it secures |
|---|---|---|
| India’s doctrine | SAGAR to MAHASAGAR; IPOI (7 pillars) | Maritime security and growth framing |
| Minilaterals | Quad; I2U2; SCRI | Issue-based coalitions of the willing |
| Economic resilience | IPEF (India in pillars II-IV) | Supply chains, clean economy, anti-corruption |
| Regional core | ASEAN centrality; AOIP | Inclusive, non-bloc convening space |
Supply chains and maritime security are the content
The substance of middle-power cooperation is concrete: supply-chain resilience to reduce single-country dependence, and maritime security to keep sea lanes open. On the rules, the South China Sea Arbitration award of July 12, 2016 (Philippines v. China, under UNCLOS) is the reference point for a law-based order that middle powers have a shared stake in upholding.
How to Think About This (Analytical Frame)
Use the hedging-versus-bandwagoning frame. Bandwagoning means aligning fully with one great power for protection, and paying in autonomy; hedging means keeping options open across powers. A G minus 2 is structured hedging: middle powers pool weight so that hedging becomes a strategy, not just an evasion. For India specifically, it operationalises strategic autonomy: engage the US through the Quad, keep channels to China, and simultaneously build a middle-power lattice that reduces dependence on either. The test of the strategy is whether it enlarges choices; if a coalition forces a binary choice, it is a bloc, not a G minus 2.
The Diagram in Words
Bipolar US-China pull -> risk of middle powers as arenas -> response: G minus 2 lattice (India, Japan, Australia, Indonesia, South Korea, ASEAN) -> minilaterals (Quad, I2U2, SCRI) + ASEAN centrality (AOIP) + IPEF supply chains + maritime security under UNCLOS -> India anchors it via SAGAR to MAHASAGAR and IPOI -> expanded strategic space, multi-alignment preserved
Way Forward
- Thicken the minilateral lattice. Deepen the Quad, SCRI and issue-based coalitions so cooperation does not depend on great-power consent.
- Reinforce ASEAN centrality. Support the AOIP and ASEAN-led mechanisms as the inclusive core rather than bypassing them.
- Operationalise MAHASAGAR and IPOI. Convert the doctrine into concrete maritime security, capacity-building and blue-economy projects across the region.
- Prioritise supply-chain resilience. Use IPEF pillars and SCRI to cut single-country dependence in critical goods.
PYQ Linkage and Practice
UPSC has asked about the Quad, ASEAN’s role in the Indo-Pacific, India’s strategic autonomy, and the significance of the Indo-Pacific to India. This editorial ties those to the middle-power coalition idea.
Practice question: “For a middle power, minilateralism is the practical face of strategic autonomy.” Examine how India can use a coalition of Indo-Pacific middle powers to navigate US-China rivalry without joining a bloc. (250 words, 15 marks)
Sources: The Indian Express
Source: A G Minus 2 Strategy for the Indo-Pacific — Ujiyari.com | Free UPSC & State PCS Editorial Analysis
