More Than Trade: India Must Deepen the South Korea Partnership Into a Genuine Strategic Alliance

India and South Korea established their Special Strategic Partnership in 2015 — the highest diplomatic designation the two countries share. Bilateral trade stands at ~USD 22-25 billion annually, and South Korean companies (Samsung, Hyundai, Kia, LG, POSCO) are significant investors in India’s manufacturing sector.
Yet the partnership has been characterised by diplomatic goodwill without operational depth — a gap that President Lee Jae Myung’s April 2026 visit must begin to close.

Areas of strategic convergence: India and South Korea share concerns about Indo-Pacific maritime security, supply chain diversification away from China, and technology sovereignty. South Korea’s Semiconductor Mission and India’s Semiconductor Mission are natural complements — Seoul has the technology, India has the market scale and strategic need.
South Korea’s K-defence ecosystem (K9 Thunder already inducted by India) is a proven supply chain for India’s defence modernisation. Both countries face the challenge of managing the US alliance while maintaining economic flexibility. Structural barriers: India’s persistent trade deficit with South Korea under the 2010 CEPA reflects competitiveness gaps in manufacturing — Korean electronics, displays, and automobiles dominate because they are genuinely better-designed and manufactured at scale.
This structural reality limits trade balance without industrial deepening. India’s defence procurement bureaucracy has historically slowed even promising partnerships — the FA-50 evaluation has been running for years without conclusion.
South Korea’s progressive government may deprioritise Indo-Pacific security frameworks in favour of inter-Korean engagement. The semiconductor opportunity: India’s Semiconductor Mission (₹76,000 crore) needs Samsung and SK Hynix as partners willing to invest in India, not merely sell to it. The Taiwan concentration risk — highlighted by US-China tensions over the Taiwan Strait — creates political incentive for both countries to diversify production. The CEPA gap: The 2010 CEPA needs a services chapter upgrade to allow Indian IT, pharmaceuticals, and digital services meaningful Korean market access — currently lacking despite the framework’s existence. Act East and New Southern Policy convergence: India’s Act East Policy and South Korea’s New Southern Policy (prioritising India and ASEAN) are complementary frameworks that need institutionalised mechanisms — not just bilateral summits — to realise their potential.

India-South Korea relations have the diplomatic architecture for a genuine strategic partnership but lack operational depth. The Lee Jae Myung visit must yield concrete outcomes: a binding semiconductor investment framework, a CEPA services chapter, a defence joint-production pilot, and a maritime cooperation agreement.
Without these, the Special Strategic Partnership risks remaining a designation without content — a missed opportunity in an Indo-Pacific moment that rewards those who build real partnerships.