The Core Argument
India’s state governments present ambitious budget estimates — but actual expenditure diverges significantly, especially on social sector spending. The editorial analyses structural weaknesses in state budget credibility: capital expenditure routinely under-executed, welfare promises made but not funded, and fiscal deficit reported differently across states. The piece calls for mandatory medium-term fiscal frameworks, independent fiscal councils for states, and strengthening of Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) oversight. It also flags that devolution from Centre to states (via Finance Commission) alone cannot fix state fiscal behaviour — political economy drives spending decisions more than budget documents.
The Problem — Budget vs. Reality
Capital Expenditure Under-execution
| Year (All States) | Budget Estimate (Capex) | Actual Execution |
|---|---|---|
| FY22 | ₹7.8 lakh crore | ~70% |
| FY23 | ₹9.5 lakh crore | ~72% |
| FY24 | ₹11.2 lakh crore | ~68% |
| FY25 | ₹12.8 lakh crore | Est. ~65–70% |
Why capex underperforms:
- Land acquisition delays
- Tender process bottlenecks
- Contractor payment delays (states owe contractors ~₹2-3 lakh crore)
- Last-quarter spending spikes (“March rush”)
Revenue Expenditure Over-run
In contrast, revenue spending (salaries, subsidies, interest) tends to overrun budgets:
- States compete to attract voters via loan waivers, free electricity, cash transfers
- These schemes create permanent fiscal liabilities
- Punjab, Telangana, Rajasthan, Karnataka — “freebies” debates now central to budget analysis
Fiscal Federalism — India’s Architecture
How States Get Money
| Source | Share |
|---|---|
| Own tax revenue | GST (state share), VAT on alcohol/petroleum, stamp duty |
| Devolution from Centre | 41% of divisible pool (15th Finance Commission) |
| Grants from Centre | Tied (scheme-specific) + untied grants |
| Borrowings | State Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management (FRBM) limits |
| Off-budget borrowings | Via state PSUs — a growing concern |
The Off-Budget Debt Problem
States borrow through:
- State Electricity Boards (DISCOMs)
- State Road Development Corporations
- State Housing Boards
These borrowings do not appear in the official fiscal deficit — creating hidden debt. India’s state off-budget liabilities estimated at ₹12–15 lakh crore (RBI estimate range).
Finance Commission and Devolution
15th Finance Commission (2021–26)
| Parameter | Decision |
|---|---|
| Vertical devolution | 41% of divisible pool to states (down from 42% in 14th FC — 1% to new UTs of J&K, Ladakh) |
| Horizontal distribution criteria | Population (15%), Area (15%), Income distance (45%), Demographic performance (12.5%), Forest/ecology (10%), Tax effort (2.5%) |
| Revenue deficit grants | ₹2.94 lakh crore to deficit states |
| Performance grants | Linked to education, health, Ease of Doing Business outcomes |
Tension: Southern states feel penalised by population-based formula (they controlled population growth, receive less devolution per capita).
Fixing State Fiscal Governance
Reforms Needed
| Reform | Rationale |
|---|---|
| Independent state fiscal councils | Like UK’s OBR — provide credible independent budget assessments |
| Medium-term fiscal framework (MTFF) | 3-year rolling budgets to prevent one-year gamesmanship |
| Off-budget disclosure mandates | States must consolidate all contingent liabilities |
| CAG empowerment | Performance audit of scheme spending (not just compliance) |
| Transparency in freebie funding | FRBM amendment to account for guarantee exposure |
UPSC Angle
| Paper | Angle |
|---|---|
| GS3 — Economy | Fiscal federalism, Finance Commission, state debt |
| GS2 — Governance | CAG; budget accountability; FRBM |
| GS2 — Polity | Centre-state relations; devolution; horizontal equity |
Mains Keywords: Fiscal federalism, 15th Finance Commission, FRBM, off-budget borrowings, freebies, revenue deficit, capex under-execution, CAG, state fiscal councils, vertical and horizontal devolution
Probable Question: “India’s fiscal federalism is asymmetric — states bear expenditure responsibilities without adequate revenue autonomy. Critically examine.” (GS2/GS3 Mains)