🗞️ Why in News India’s defence exports reached a record ₹38,424 crore in FY 2025–26 — a 62.66% surge over FY 2024–25 (₹23,622 crore). Business Standard argues that while the headline is impressive, structural bottlenecks — particularly India’s near-total dependence on imported aero-engines for all frontline combat aircraft — cap how far “indigenisation” truly extends. Sustained momentum requires shifting from assembly and integration to genuine deep technology development.

The Export Milestone in Context

Year Defence Exports Growth
FY 2018-19 ₹10,745 crore
FY 2022-23 ₹15,920 crore
FY 2024-25 ₹23,622 crore
FY 2025-26 ₹38,424 crore (~$4.6 billion) +62.66%

Breakdown (FY26):

  • Defence PSUs (DPSUs): ₹21,071 crore (up 151% YoY)
  • Private sector: ₹17,353 crore

Top export destinations: USA, France, Armenia, Maldives, Sri Lanka, Mauritius, Philippines, UAE Key export items: Brahmos cruise missiles (Philippines contract — landmark export), artillery ammunition, radar systems, helicopters, offshore patrol vessels, small arms

The growth is real. India has moved from a near-zero defence export position in 2014 to the world’s top-25 defence exporters in a decade — a genuine policy success.

Where the Indigenisation Story Gets Complicated

The Aero-Engine Dependency

Every frontline Indian combat aircraft flies on a foreign engine:

Aircraft Engine Origin
Tejas Mk-1 / Mk-1A GE F404-GE-IN20 (90 kN wet thrust) USA (GE Aerospace)
Tejas Mk-2 (planned) GE F414 (98 kN) USA (GE Aerospace)
AMCA (planned, 2035+) GE F414 + Safran co-development USA / France
Su-30 MKI (262 aircraft) AL-31FP Russia (Sukhoi/Saturn)
Mirage 2000 (49 aircraft) SNECMA M53 France
MiG-29 / MiG-29K RD-33 Russia

Why this matters: Aero-engines are the most technologically complex and strategically controlled defence components. Engine supply can be withheld as geopolitical leverage. India learned this with Russian AL-31FP supply disruptions during periods of diplomatic friction.

The Kaveri Engine Failure — A Case Study

India’s Kaveri engine programme — DRDO’s effort since the 1980s to develop an indigenous engine for Tejas — failed to meet the required thrust specifications:

  • Target: 85+ kN wet thrust
  • Achieved: ~73 kN wet thrust (insufficient for Tejas combat weight requirements)
  • Timeline overrun: 30+ years, still not flight-cleared
  • Current status: Being repurposed for an unmanned aircraft variant; not suitable for manned fighter

The Kaveri failure is not for lack of investment in isolation — it reflects a broader structural deficit in India’s high-temperature metallurgy and precision manufacturing ecosystem, which cannot be resolved by DRDO alone.

R&D Investment — The Structural Constraint

India’s total national R&D expenditure stands at approximately 0.64% of GDP (Economic Survey 2024-25). For comparison:

Country R&D as % of GDP
USA 3.5%
China 2.4%
Israel 5.4%
South Korea 4.9%
India 0.64%

Important clarification: The 0.64% figure represents India’s entire national R&D across all sectors. Defence R&D specifically — through DRDO’s budget of ₹26,816 crore in FY26 — represents approximately 0.07–0.08% of GDP. DRDO receives only about 3.94% of India’s total defence budget.

The Missing Ecosystem

Deep technology indigenisation requires an industrial-technological ecosystem India is still building:

Capability Gap Current Status
High-temperature turbine blade metallurgy Underdeveloped; imported alloys
Precision casting and forging Growing through private sector but limited
Defence-grade semiconductors Near-zero domestic production
Propulsion test infrastructure GTRE (Kaveri) has limited capacity
Private sector R&D incentive Limited defence R&D tax incentives

The Policy Architecture

The government has created enabling structures — but their effectiveness depends on ecosystem development:

Policy Significance
Defence Production & Export Promotion Policy (DPEPP) 2020 Target: ₹1.75 lakh crore turnover by 2025; $5 billion exports
Positive Indigenisation Lists 509+ items reserved for domestic procurement; prevents imports
iDEX (Innovations for Defence Excellence) Funds defence tech startups; Rs 100 crore corpus
Two Defence Corridors UP (Lucknow-Aligarh-Kanpur) and Tamil Nadu — anchor industrial clusters
FDI liberalisation 74% automatic FDI in defence; 100% under government route

The Editorial’s Core Argument

Business Standard does not dismiss the export numbers — it contextualises them. The argument: India is excelling at the integration layer (assembling, combining, and exporting platforms and subsystems) while remaining dependent on foreign suppliers for the hardest technological components (engines, seekers, advanced electronics).

This is not sustainable as a long-term defence strategy. Sustained momentum requires:

  1. Dedicated national aero-engine development programme with ring-fenced multi-decade funding
  2. Private sector-led defence R&D with DRDO in a coordination (not monopoly) role
  3. Defence industrial corridors with genuine technology transfer conditions on all FDI
  4. STEM talent pipeline for advanced materials and propulsion science

UPSC Relevance

Paper Angle
GS3 — Economy Defence manufacturing; indigenisation; PLI for defence; export policy
GS3 — Security Technology dependence; aero-engine imports; DRDO
GS2 — Governance DPEPP 2020; iDEX; defence corridor policy
Mains Keywords DRDO, Kaveri engine, GE F414, indigenisation, DPEPP 2020, iDEX, Positive Indigenisation List, defence corridor, R&D investment

📌 Facts Corner

India Defence Exports FY26: ₹38,424 crore | Growth: 62.66% over FY25 (₹23,622 crore) | DPSUs: ₹21,071 cr | Private sector: ₹17,353 cr | Aero-engine dependence: Tejas Mk-1A → GE F404 (USA) | Su-30 MKI → AL-31FP (Russia) | Mirage 2000 → SNECMA M53 (France) | MiG-29 → RD-33 (Russia) | Kaveri engine: ~73 kN achieved vs 85+ kN required — not flight-cleared for Tejas | India total R&D/GDP: 0.64% (all sectors; DRDO defence R&D ~0.07%) | DRDO budget FY26: ₹26,816 crore (~3.94% of defence budget) | GS3: Economy, Security & Defence