🗞️ Why in News The Hindu editorial of March 11, 2026 examines the weakening of parliamentary convention protecting the Speaker’s neutrality, arguing that political pressure has increasingly influenced rulings on anti-defection cases and Money Bill certification — and that codified safeguards are now necessary.
The Editorial’s Argument
The Hindu makes a structural argument about institutional design:
1. Conventions alone are insufficient. The Speaker’s neutrality in Westminster systems rests on conventions — not statutes. India has witnessed three removal motions (all failed) in 75 years, suggesting the office retains formal protection. But the perception of partisanship in key rulings has grown, particularly on anti-defection and Money Bill decisions.
2. The anti-defection power has become a political tool. Under the Tenth Schedule (added 1985), Speakers decide defection petitions. Speakers have repeatedly delayed decisions to protect defecting MLAs/MPs who support the government — the Supreme Court has repeatedly criticised this practice (Keisham Meghachandra case, 2020).
3. Money Bill certification is opaque and judicially unreviewable. The Speaker’s certification of a bill as a “Money Bill” under Article 110 allows it to bypass the Rajya Sabha. In Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank (2019), the SC referred the question of judicial review of Money Bill certification to a larger bench — which has not yet ruled. The editorial argues codifying clear criteria is essential.
Constitutional Position of the Speaker
Article 93 and the Election Process
The Speaker is elected by the Lok Sabha from among its members. Unlike in the UK (where the Speaker resigns from the party upon election), India’s Speaker remains a party member — a fundamental structural tension.
| Feature | India | UK |
|---|---|---|
| Elected by | Lok Sabha members | House of Commons members |
| Party affiliation post-election | Retained | Resigned (convention) |
| Retirement | Returns to party politics | Typically not re-elected in party contest |
| Neutrality mechanism | Convention only | Strong convention + constituency protection |
Removal of Speaker (Article 94)
The Speaker can be removed by a resolution of the Lok Sabha passed by a majority of all then members — requires 14-day advance notice, during which the Speaker cannot preside. Only 3 removal motions have been attempted since independence — all failed.
Anti-Defection Rulings — The Core Problem
The Tenth Schedule (added by 52nd Constitutional Amendment, 1985) disqualifies MPs/MLAs who:
- Voluntarily give up party membership
- Vote/abstain against the party’s direction (without being excused)
The Speaker decides disqualification petitions — creating a conflict of interest when the defectors support the ruling party. The SC in Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992) upheld the Tenth Schedule but held Speaker’s order judicially reviewable. In Keisham Meghachandra v. Speaker (2020), SC directed timely decisions.
The editorial’s specific recommendation: Transfer anti-defection adjudication to an independent tribunal (similar to the Election Disputes Tribunal proposed by various commissions).
Money Bill Certification — Article 110 Controversy
Article 110 defines Money Bills (taxation, appropriation, etc.). The Aadhaar Act (2016) was certified as a Money Bill — challenged in K.S. Puttaswamy v. UoI (2018). The SC (4:1) upheld the certification but Justice Chandrachud in dissent argued it was a misuse. The certification question was referred to a larger bench in Rojer Mathew (2019).
UPSC Relevance
Prelims: Art. 93 (Speaker election), Art. 94 (removal — majority of all members), Art. 110 (Money Bill), Tenth Schedule (anti-defection), 52nd Amendment 1985; Kihoto Hollohan (1992); Keisham Meghachandra (2020); Rojer Mathew (2019). Mains GS-2: Parliamentary procedures; Speaker’s constitutional role; anti-defection law weaknesses; Money Bill controversy; reforms to strengthen parliamentary institutions.
📌 Facts Corner — Knowledgepedia
Speaker — Constitutional Data:
- Art. 93: Speaker and Deputy Speaker elected by Lok Sabha
- Art. 94: Removal — resolution by majority of all then members (not just present); 14-day advance notice required
- Art. 95: Speaker cannot preside during own removal motion; Deputy Speaker presides
- Removal motions in history: 3 attempts since 1952 — all failed
Anti-Defection Law:
- Tenth Schedule: Added by 52nd Constitutional Amendment, 1985
- Grounds: Voluntary resignation from party OR voting against party’s direction
- Exception: Merger of 2/3 party members (original 1/3 exception removed by 91st Amendment, 2003)
- Decision authority: Speaker/Chairman — the structural conflict of interest
- SC on timeline: Keisham Meghachandra (2020) — Speaker must decide within 3 months
- Kihoto Hollohan (1992): Upheld Tenth Schedule; Speaker’s order judicially reviewable
Money Bill:
- Art. 110: Defines Money Bill (taxation, borrowing, appropriation, etc.)
- Procedure: Rajya Sabha cannot reject/amend — can only recommend; Lok Sabha can ignore recommendations
- Controversy: Aadhaar Act (2016) certified as Money Bill; Puttaswamy 2018 upheld (4:1)
- Larger bench reference: Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank (2019) — pending
UK Comparison:
- UK Speaker: Resigns party membership upon election; fights election as “The Speaker” (no party opposition in constituency) — strong neutrality convention
- India: No such convention; Speaker returns to party politics after term
Source: The Hindu, Vajiram & Ravi