UPSC Prelims Practice
Current Affairs Quiz 19 May 2026
Test Your Knowledge
31 questions based on today’s current affairs & editorials
Choose number of questions
Question 1 of 31
The “Green” qualifier in India-Norway Green Strategic Partnership signals that the relationship is anchored around climate, clean energy, and ocean sustainability, specifically maritime decarbonisation, offshore wind, Arctic research, circular economy, and digital public infrastructure. This mirrors the India-Denmark Green Strategic Partnership (2020), the first such designation India used. Norway is not the world’s largest green hydrogen producer (option A is wrong); no 2035 net-zero joint target exists (option C is wrong); option D is fabricated.
Concept note
India has established differentiated partnership frameworks with European countries: India-Denmark Green Strategic Partnership (2020, focus: wind energy, water, food); India-Sweden Strategic Partnership (2026, focus: tech, innovation, NATO-linked defence); India-Norway Green Strategic Partnership (2026, focus: maritime, offshore wind, Arctic). The “Green” label is not merely rhetorical, it commits both sides to prioritising climate-linked cooperation over traditional security or trade frameworks.
Norway’s expertise in offshore wind (Equinor’s Hywind Scotland, world’s first floating offshore wind farm, 2017) and its 98% hydropower electricity mix make it a natural partner for India’s green transition. The India-EFTA TEPA (in force October 2025; USD 100B investment/15 years) provides the broader economic framework.
🎯 Concept Kit tap to expand
| 🔗 Cross-Paper Links | ** GS2 (India-Norway bilateral, India-Nordic Summit, India-EFTA TEPA); GS3 (offshore wind, green hydrogen, circular economy). ** |
| ✍️ Mains Keywords | ** Green Strategic Partnership, India-Norway, India-Denmark GSP, Equinor, offshore wind, Himadri station, EFTA TEPA. ** |
| ⚠️ Common Mistake | ** Confusing "Green Strategic Partnership" with a purely environmental treaty, it is a full bilateral partnership framework with environment as the primary framing, not a standalone climate agreement. ** |
| 📌 Exam Tip | ** India-Denmark GSP (2020) = first; India-Norway GSP (2026) = second. Both are "ocean nation" partnerships. Compare with India-Sweden SP (2026) which is a regular Strategic Partnership without the "Green" prefix. ** |
| 🎤 Interview | ** Does the proliferation of bilateral "Strategic Partnership" labels dilute their diplomatic significance, or do differentiated formats (Green, Regular, Comprehensive) add precision? |
Question 2 of 31
Himadri is India’s Arctic research station located at Ny-Ålesund, Svalbard, Norway, established on July 1, 2008. It is operated by NCPOR (National Centre for Polar and Ocean Research), headquartered in Goa, under the Ministry of Earth Sciences. Longyearbyen is Svalbard’s largest settlement (not Ny-Ålesund).
ISRO operates space satellites, not Arctic land stations. Tromsø hosts the Arctic Council Secretariat. Qaanaaq is in Greenland (Denmark).
Ny-Ålesund is the world’s northernmost international science park with 11 nations’ research stations.
Concept note
Ny-Ålesund (78°55’N, 11°56’E) in Svalbard, Norway, is the world’s most northerly permanent civilian settlement and hosts research stations from 11 nations including India, China, Germany, France, UK, Japan, and others. India’s Himadri station (named after the Himalayas) has been conducting year-round research since 2008 on climate change, glaciology, Arctic seismology, and atmospheric science.
India became an Arctic Council observer on May 15, 2013. India’s Arctic Policy was released in 2022, with six pillars.
NCPOR also operates India’s Antarctic stations (Maitri and Bharati).
🎯 Concept Kit tap to expand
| 🔗 Cross-Paper Links | ** GS2 (India-Norway relations, Arctic Council, India’s Arctic Policy); GS3 (climate science, polar research, glaciology). ** |
| ✍️ Mains Keywords | ** Himadri, Ny-Ålesund, Svalbard, NCPOR, Arctic Council, India’s Arctic Policy 2022. ** |
| ⚠️ Common Mistake | ** Confusing Himadri (Arctic) with Maitri/Bharati (Antarctic), both are NCPOR stations but on different poles. ** |
| 📌 Exam Tip | ** Himadri = Arctic = Ny-Ålesund, Svalbard, Norway = 2008. Maitri = Antarctic = 1989. Bharati = Antarctic = 2012. All under NCPOR, Ministry of Earth Sciences. ** |
| 🎤 Interview | ** Should India seek full membership (not just observer status) at the Arctic Council? What strategic interests would that serve? |
Question 3 of 31
The four EFTA (European Free Trade Association) members are Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein. Of the options given, only Iceland and Liechtenstein (option C) are both EFTA members. Austria was an EFTA member but joined the EU in 1995.
Denmark is an EU member (not EFTA). Sweden and Finland are EU members (Sweden since 1995, Finland since 1995), both left EFTA upon EU accession. The key EFTA characteristic: all four current members are NOT EU members, but Norway and Iceland participate in the EU single market via the EEA Agreement.
Concept note
EFTA was founded in 1960 as an alternative to the nascent European Economic Community (EEC). The original members included UK, Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland.
Over time, most joined the EU. Current EFTA (4 members): Switzerland (not EEA, has bilateral treaties with EU), Norway (EEA), Iceland (EEA), Liechtenstein (EEA).
The India-EFTA TEPA is historic: USD 100 billion investment commitment over 15 years, the first binding investment target in any Indian FTA. It took ~16 years to negotiate (2008–2024) and came into force October 2025.
Norway contributes maritime, oil expertise; Switzerland brings pharma (Novartis, Roche) and finance; Iceland offers geothermal; Liechtenstein brings financial services.
🎯 Concept Kit tap to expand
| 🔗 Cross-Paper Links | ** GS2 (India-EFTA TEPA, India-EU FTA, India-Norway relations); GS3 (FTA implications, investment flows, trade policy). ** |
| ✍️ Mains Keywords | ** EFTA, TEPA, USD 100 billion, 1 million jobs, Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein, EEA, India-EU FTA. ** |
| ⚠️ Common Mistake | ** Including Denmark, Sweden, or Austria as EFTA members, all three are EU members. The EFTA four are Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein. ** |
| 📌 Exam Tip | ** EFTA = Switzerland + Norway + Iceland + Liechtenstein (all non-EU). TEPA = October 2025 in force; USD 100B/15 years/1M jobs. These are the three key facts for Prelims. ** |
| 🎤 Interview | ** Given Switzerland’s financial secrecy and India’s black money concerns, how should India manage the tension between economic engagement and financial transparency in the India-Switzerland TEPA relationship? |
Question 4 of 31
Squadron Leader Saanya became the IAF’s first woman Cat-A (Category-A) flying instructor, qualifying at the Air Force Academy (AFA), Dundigal, near Hyderabad, Telangana. Cat-A is the highest flying instructor grade in IAF, it qualifies the holder to train other instructors. She completed the Flying Instructors’ Course (FIC) at AFA Dundigal.
Option A relates to Rafale (no such announcement for Saanya). Option C (squadron command) is a different milestone. Option D (Test Pilots’ School) is at Bangalore but is a different qualification altogether.
Concept note
IAF’s flying instructor classification: Cat-A (Master Instructor, highest; can train instructors), Cat-B (Senior Instructor), Cat-C (Instructor), Cat-D (Under Training). The FIC at AFA Dundigal uses HAL Kiran Mk-II (indigenous jet trainer) and Pilatus PC-7 Mk-II (Swiss turbo-prop trainer).
Women’s milestones in IAF: 1992 (first women officers, non-flying); 2016 (Avani Chaturvedi, Bhawana Kanth, Mohana Singh, first women fighter pilots); 2018 (Avani Chaturvedi, first solo MiG-21 flight); 2023 (Avani Chaturvedi, first woman in aerial wargame abroad, Veer Guardian 2023, Su-30 MKI); 2021–22 (IAF grants Permanent Commission to women, including flying branch, following Babita Puniya 2020 SC direction); 2026 (Sqn Ldr Saanya, first woman Cat-A instructor).
🎯 Concept Kit tap to expand
| 🔗 Cross-Paper Links | ** GS3 (IAF, defence modernisation, training); GS2 (gender integration, Permanent Commission, SC orders on women in armed forces). ** |
| ✍️ Mains Keywords | ** Cat-A instructor, Flying Instructors' Course, AFA Dundigal, women in IAF, Permanent Commission, Avani Chaturvedi. ** |
| ⚠️ Common Mistake | ** Confusing Cat-A flying instructor with other "firsts", this is specifically about the instructor qualification, not flying a specific aircraft type. ** |
| 📌 Exam Tip | ** Cat-A = apex of instructor pyramid = can train other instructors = FIC at AFA Dundigal. This is distinct from fighter pilot qualification (Combat Flying Training at Bidar/Jaisalmer) or test pilot (ASTE, Bangalore). ** |
| 🎤 Interview | ** How does gender integration in high-skill military roles serve both national security and constitutional values simultaneously? |
Question 5 of 31
which of the following statements is correct?
In Secretary, Ministry of Defence v. Babita Puniya (2020), the Supreme Court held that denying Permanent Commission to women Short Service Commission (SSC) officers in the Indian Army violated Articles 14 (equality) and 16 (equal opportunity). The SC rejected the Army’s argument about physiological differences and directed the Army to grant PC to eligible women officers across specified non-combat branches. This judgment paved the way for similar PC policies in IAF and Navy.
Option A is wrong, the 2020 judgment did not extend to combat arms (Infantry, Armoured Corps). Option C is directly contradicted by the judgment. Option D is wrong, the PC was directed for multiple branches, not just Medical Corps.
Concept note
Babita Puniya case (2020) was a landmark in gender equality in the armed forces. Prior to this, women were admitted only on Short Service Commission (SSC, 10+4 years), after which they had to leave the service.
The Army argued: (1) physiological differences; (2) soldiers would not accept women as commanding officers; (3) field postings impractical. The SC rejected all three arguments as stereotypical.
The Army was directed to grant PC in 10 branches including Signals, Engineers, Army Aviation, Army Service Corps. Combat arms (Infantry, Armoured Corps, Artillery) remain excluded.
After Babita Puniya, IAF and Navy adopted similar PC policies for their women officers.
🎯 Concept Kit tap to expand
| 🔗 Cross-Paper Links | ** GS2 (Supreme Court judgments, gender equality, fundamental rights); GS4 (constitutional values, dignity, non-discrimination). ** |
| ✍️ Mains Keywords | ** Babita Puniya 2020, Permanent Commission, SSC, Article 14, Article 16, women in armed forces, gender integration. ** |
| ⚠️ Common Mistake | ** Confusing the 2020 SC direction (PC for women in non-combat arms) with full combat integration (which has NOT yet been directed by SC). ** |
| 📌 Exam Tip | ** Babita Puniya (2020) = SC = Permanent Commission for women in Army (non-combat branches) = Articles 14 and 16. IAF granted PC to women (including flying branch) in 2021–22, following the Babita Puniya direction. ** |
| 🎤 Interview | ** If women now serve on PC in Army, IAF, and Navy, what is the remaining constitutional argument against their induction in combat arms? |
Question 6 of 31
The CIC’s ruling that BCCI is not a “public authority” rests on the “substantially financed” test under Section 2(h) of the RTI Act. BCCI’s primary revenues come from broadcast rights, IPL media deals, sponsorships, and ticket sales, not government grants. The Supreme Court in Thalappalam (2013) held “substantially financed” requires a major/dominant portion of funding from government.
Incidental benefits (like free use of government stadia) do not meet this threshold. Option A is wrong, BCCI is a society (Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975), not a company. Option C is fabricated.
Option D is wrong, no such sporting bodies exemption exists in RTI.
Concept note
Section 2(h) of RTI Act defines “public authority” as: bodies established by Constitution/law/government order, OR bodies owned, controlled, or substantially financed by government. BCCI passes none of these tests: not established by Constitution or law; not owned/controlled by government; not substantially financed.
The RTI jurisprudence on “substantially financed” (Thalappalam 2013) set a high bar: it must be a dominant/major share, not merely incidental government assistance. BCCI’s governance was instead reformed by the SC through the Lodha Committee (2016): one state one vote, age cap 70, tenure limits, Ombudsman, electoral officer, an accountability framework that doesn’t require RTI coverage.
🎯 Concept Kit tap to expand
| 🔗 Cross-Paper Links | ** GS2 (RTI Act, CIC, Section 2(h), public authority, transparency and accountability). ** |
| ✍️ Mains Keywords | ** BCCI, RTI Act 2005, Section 2(h), substantially financed, CIC, Thalappalam case, Lodha Committee. ** |
| ⚠️ Common Mistake | ** Assuming that because BCCI exercises a public function (national team selection, ICC representation), it is automatically a public authority under RTI, the test is about financing, not function. ** |
| 📌 Exam Tip | ** RTI public authority test = primarily about structure (established by law/government) + financing (substantially by government), NOT about the public nature of the function performed. ** |
| 🎤 Interview | ** Should India enact a separate Sports Governance Act to ensure transparency and accountability in bodies like BCCI, replacing the court-mediated Lodha approach? |
Question 7 of 31
Statement 1Correct
Section 4 of RTI Act mandates proactive disclosure; public authorities must publish 17 categories of information suo motu.
Statement 2Incorrect
The Chief Information Commissioner is appointed by the President on the recommendation of a COMMITTEE comprising the Prime Minister (chairperson), the Leader of Opposition in Lok Sabha, and a Cabinet Minister nominated by the PM. The appointment is not on the PM’s recommendation alone.
Statement 3Correct
Section 7: 30 days for ordinary information; 48 hours for information concerning life or liberty.
Therefore only statements 1 and 3 are correct.
Concept note
RTI Act 2005, key provisions: Section 2(h): public authority definition. Section 2(j): right to information definition.
Section 4: suo motu/proactive disclosure (17 categories including organisational structure, powers, duties, monthly remuneration, budget, annual reports, etc.). Section 6: application to PIO; fee ₹10; no reason required.
Section 7: response within 30 days (48 hours for life/liberty). Section 8: exemptions (security, sovereignty, Cabinet papers, personal privacy, etc.).
Section 19: appeal to First Appellate Authority (within 30 days) → CIC/SIC (within 90 days). Section 20: CIC/SIC can impose penalty ₹250/day up to ₹25,000 on PIO.
CIC appointment: President + PM-led committee (PM + Leader of Opposition + PM-nominated Cabinet minister).
🎯 Concept Kit tap to expand
| 🔗 Cross-Paper Links | ** GS2 (RTI Act 2005, transparency, governance, fundamental rights, CIC composition). ** |
| ✍️ Mains Keywords | ** RTI Act, Section 4, proactive disclosure, CIC appointment, time limits, Section 7, Section 8 exemptions. ** |
| ⚠️ Common Mistake | ** Stating CIC is appointed only by PM, the committee also includes the Leader of Opposition. This is a classic exam trick. ** |
| 📌 Exam Tip | ** RTI time limit = 30 days / 48 hours (life-liberty). CIC appointment = President + PM + LoP + PM-nominee minister. Penalty = ₹250/day, max ₹25,000. These three facts come up repeatedly. ** |
| 🎤 Interview | ** The RTI Act requires the Leader of Opposition on the CIC appointment committee. What if there is no recognised LoP (as happened 2014–2024 in Lok Sabha)? |
Question 8 of 31
India’s implicit legal basis for placing the IWT “in abeyance” is Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which allows a party to suspend or terminate a treaty in response to a “material breach” by the other party. India’s position is that Pakistan’s continued support for cross-border terrorism (including the Pahalgam attack of April 22, 2025, which killed 26 civilians) constitutes a material breach of the good-faith obligations underlying the IWT. Option A (Article 26, Pacta Sunt Servanda) actually cuts against India, it says treaties must be observed in good faith.
Option C (UN Charter) has no direct relevance. Option D (Simla Agreement) relates to bilateral dispute resolution but is not the legal basis for treaty suspension.
Concept note
The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) was signed September 19, 1960, between India and Pakistan with World Bank mediation. It has been called the world’s most successful water treaty, surviving three wars (1965, 1971, 1999 Kargil).
India’s April 2025 “abeyance” decision is unprecedented in IWT’s 65-year history. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), 1969, is the master treaty on treaty law: Article 26 (pacta sunt servanda, treaties must be performed in good faith), Article 27 (no domestic law justification for treaty violation), Article 60 (material breach → suspension/termination).
IWT has its own dispute resolution: PIC → Neutral Expert → Court of Arbitration. India participates in the Neutral Expert (Michel Lino, 2022) but boycotts the Court of Arbitration (since 2016, calling it “illegally constituted”).
🎯 Concept Kit tap to expand
| 🔗 Cross-Paper Links | ** GS2 (India-Pakistan relations, IWT, international law, VCLT); GS3 (water security, Indus basin, run-of-river hydropower). ** |
| ✍️ Mains Keywords | ** Indus Waters Treaty 1960, abeyance, Vienna Convention Article 60, material breach, Pahalgam, Court of Arbitration, Neutral Expert, Ratle project. ** |
| ⚠️ Common Mistake | ** Confusing "abeyance" with "termination", India has not terminated the IWT, only suspended engagement; also confusing Court of Arbitration (India boycotts) with Neutral Expert (India participates). ** |
| 📌 Exam Tip | ** IWT 1960 = World Bank mediation = September 19, 1960. Western Rivers → Pakistan; Eastern Rivers → India. Ratle (850 MW, Chenab) + Kishanganga (330 MW, Jhelum tributary) are the two disputed hydro projects. IWT dispute: PIC → NE → CA. ** |
| 🎤 Interview | ** Given that the IWT survived three wars, should India’s decision to hold it in abeyance be seen as a short-term coercive signal or a genuine long-term shift in India’s treaty posture? |
Question 9 of 31
The Ratle Hydroelectric Project is located on the Chenab River in Kishtwar district, Jammu & Kashmir, with an installed capacity of 850 MW. It is a run-of-river project being executed by NHPC (National Hydroelectric Power Corporation). Ratle is one of two projects at the centre of the India-Pakistan IWT dispute (the other being Kishanganga, 330 MW, on the Kishanganga River, a tributary of the Jhelum).
Option A describes Kishanganga (wrong river, right to associate with 330 MW). Beas River (option C) is an Eastern River, fully allocated to India, not disputed. The Indus River 1,000 MW option is fabricated.
Concept note
IWT Western River Hydropower Projects: (1) Ratle, Chenab River, Kishtwar, J&K, 850 MW, under construction by NHPC; disputed by Pakistan at both Neutral Expert and Court of Arbitration (maximum pondage, gate spillways). (2) Kishanganga, Kishanganga River (Neelum in Pakistan), tributary of Jhelum, J&K, 330 MW, commissioned 2018; Pakistan challenged at Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) 2010; PCA Final Award (December 20, 2013) allowed India to build but mandated minimum flow of 9 cumecs downstream. “Maximum pondage” = temporary water storage limit in run-of-river project forebay.
Pakistan argues excessive pondage gives India ability to time water releases, disrupting Pakistan’s agricultural calendar downstream.
🎯 Concept Kit tap to expand
| 🔗 Cross-Paper Links | ** GS2 (IWT, India-Pakistan, international arbitration); GS3 (hydropower, water disputes, Indus basin). ** |
| ✍️ Mains Keywords | ** Ratle project, Chenab River, 850 MW, NHPC, Kishanganga, maximum pondage, Court of Arbitration. ** |
| ⚠️ Common Mistake | ** Confusing Ratle (Chenab, 850 MW) with Kishanganga (Jhelum tributary, 330 MW), both are disputed IWT projects but on different rivers with different capacities. ** |
| 📌 Exam Tip | ** Ratle = Chenab = 850 MW = under construction. Kishanganga = Jhelum tributary = 330 MW = commissioned 2018. Both are run-of-river, Western Rivers, disputed by Pakistan. ** |
| 🎤 Interview | ** Can India leverage the Ratle project’s completion as a bargaining chip in normalising India-Pakistan relations, or does the legal dispute make it irreversibly contentious? |
Question 10 of 31
Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021) opened a narrow window for bail under UAPA: the SC held that constitutional courts (SC and HC) retain the power to grant bail even when Section 43D(5) bars it, if prolonged pre-trial incarceration amounts to a violation of Article 21 (right to life and personal liberty, including right to speedy trial). In Najeeb, the accused had been in prison for 5+ years without trial completion, the SC granted bail. Option A (Watali 2019) actually set the restrictive standard, courts must accept prosecution at face value, making bail harder.
Option C (Sudha Bharadwaj) was about a specific accused, not a general gender-based exception. Option D is wrong, Thwaha Fasal did not invalidate Section 43D(5).
Concept note
UAPA bail jurisprudence timeline: (1) NIA v. Watali (2019), court must not scrutinise evidence depth at bail stage; if chargesheet “plausible” = prima facie true = bail denied. This is the restrictive standard. (2) Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021), Article 21 exception: prolonged detention without trial = bail possible.
This is the liberal exception. (3) Thwaha Fasal (2021), courts must form their own view on prima facie truth; cannot rubber-stamp prosecution. (4) Sudha Bharadwaj (2022), bail on health + prolonged detention grounds (Bhima Koregaon case). Section 43D(5) remains constitutionally valid but its application is moderated by these judgments.
The divergence between SC benches applying Watali vs Najeeb is the 2026 constitutional concern.
🎯 Concept Kit tap to expand
| 🔗 Cross-Paper Links | ** GS2 (UAPA, Article 21, bail jurisprudence, NIA, SC judgments, anti-terror law). ** |
| ✍️ Mains Keywords | ** UAPA Section 43D(5), K.A. Najeeb 2021, Watali 2019, Article 21, prima facie truth, constitutional courts, bail, Bhima Koregaon. ** |
| ⚠️ Common Mistake | ** Confusing Watali (restrictive, pro-prosecution) with Najeeb (liberal exception, Article 21 bail). Watali made bail harder; Najeeb made it possible in prolonged cases. ** |
| 📌 Exam Tip | ** Najeeb 2021 = Article 21 window for UAPA bail. Watali 2019 = prima facie truth = prosecution accepted at face value. These two judgments represent the two poles of UAPA bail jurisprudence. ** |
| 🎤 Interview | ** Should Parliament amend UAPA Section 43D(5) to incorporate the Najeeb exception explicitly, or would that dilute the security intent of the provision? |
Question 11 of 31
The UAPA (Amendment) Act, 2019 introduced the power to designate INDIVIDUALS as terrorists, previously only organisations could be designated as “terrorist organisations” under the Schedules to UAPA. Under the 2019 amendment, the central government can list an individual in Schedule IV of UAPA without trial or court order. This was challenged as violating due process, no judicial review mechanism is provided.
Option A (cyberterrorism) was not the 2019 amendment’s focus. Option C (automatic NIA transfer) is incorrect, NIA transfer requires NIA’s own cognizance or state government reference. Option D is incorrect, UAPA detention provisions were not amended this way in 2019.
Concept note
UAPA 2019 Amendment, key changes: (1) Individual terrorist designation, Section 35: Central government can add individuals to Schedule IV as “terrorists” without court order; designated person can appeal to Review Committee within 45 days, but burden of proof is on individual. (2) NIA can investigate UAPA offences committed by Indians abroad. (3) Seizure and attachment provisions strengthened. First individual designations: Masood Azhar (Jaish-e-Mohammed chief), Hafiz Saeed (LeT chief), Zarar Shah, Dawood Ibrahim, all designated as individual terrorists in 2019.
Prior to 2019, only organisations (LeT, JeM, HuM, SIMI, CPI-Maoist, etc.) were listed in Schedules I-III of UAPA.
🎯 Concept Kit tap to expand
| 🔗 Cross-Paper Links | ** GS2 (UAPA, anti-terror law, NIA, fundamental rights, due process). ** |
| ✍️ Mains Keywords | ** UAPA 2019 Amendment, individual terrorist designation, Schedule IV, NIA, Masood Azhar, Hafiz Saeed, Dawood Ibrahim. ** |
| ⚠️ Common Mistake | ** Not knowing the key change of 2019 amendment, it is specifically about INDIVIDUAL designation (not organisation, not cyberterrorism). ** |
| 📌 Exam Tip | ** UAPA originally enacted 1967; major amendments: 2004, 2008, 2012, 2019. 2019 = individual terrorist designation. First designees: Masood Azhar, Hafiz Saeed, Dawood Ibrahim, Zarar Shah. ** |
| 🎤 Interview | ** Is designating individuals as terrorists without a court order compatible with Article 21 of the Constitution and the principles of natural justice? |
Question 12 of 31
IMD’s official rainfall classification: (1) Deficient, less than 90% of LPA; (2) Below Normal, 90–95% of LPA; (3) Normal, 96–104% of LPA; (4) Above Normal, 105–110% of LPA; (5) Excess, more than 110% of LPA. India’s 2026 monsoon forecast of 92% of LPA falls in the Below Normal (90–95%) category. The LPA for the country as a whole is ~868.6 mm for June–September (1971–2020 baseline).
Previous below-normal years linked to El Niño: 2002 (81% LPA), 2009 (78% LPA), 2014 (88% LPA). A Below Normal monsoon is concerning but not as severe as Deficient (<90%).
Concept note
IMD’s LPA is recalculated periodically: the current baseline is 1971–2020 (868.6 mm). El Niño (warm SST anomaly in central-eastern Pacific) historically suppresses Indian monsoon.
In 2026, El Niño probability for June–August is high (NOAA ~62%; PAGASA ~79%), a major reason for the 92% LPA forecast. The monsoon onset over Kerala is the first indication of monsoon arrival (normal date: June 1).
In 2026, IMD forecast: May 26 (5 days early). Early onset ≠ good monsoon; total seasonal rainfall (June–September all-India) is the better indicator of agricultural impact.
🎯 Concept Kit tap to expand
| 🔗 Cross-Paper Links | ** GS3 (monsoon, LPA, El Niño, agriculture); GS1 (Indian monsoon mechanism, onset, withdrawal). ** |
| ✍️ Mains Keywords | ** LPA, Below Normal, 90-95%, El Niño, monsoon onset Kerala, IMD seasonal forecast, agricultural implications. ** |
| ⚠️ Common Mistake | ** Confusing "Deficient" (<90%) with "Below Normal" (90–95%), they are different categories with different agricultural implications. ** |
| 📌 Exam Tip | ** IMD rainfall categories: Deficient <90% | Below Normal 90–95% | Normal 96–104% | Above Normal 105–110% | Excess >110%. 2026 = 92% = Below Normal. These percentages are exact, memorise them. ** |
| 🎤 Interview | ** Given that a below-normal monsoon disproportionately affects kharif crop sowing (particularly paddy and oilseeds), what policy interventions should the government pre-position? |
Question 13 of 31
IMD’s four-colour alert system: Green = No warning (Watch); Yellow = Be Aware (moderate risk; prepare); Orange = Be Prepared (significant risk; action likely needed); Red = Take Action (severe/extreme risk; immediate action required). In the May 19 heatwave context: Delhi-NCR received Yellow (heatwave; temp 43–45°C, 3–5°C above normal); Wardha and Yavatmal received Orange (severe heatwave; 6.5°C above normal). An Orange alert on May 19 means authorities must be ready to act and public health measures should be deployed.
Red = most severe; typically issued for cyclones and extreme flooding events at landfall.
Concept note
IMD’s four-colour coded alert system applies to all weather hazards, heatwave, cyclone, heavy rainfall, fog, thunderstorm, cold wave. The same colours mean the same things across hazard types.
Yellow = awareness; Orange = preparedness; Red = immediate action. This system was introduced to standardise public communication.
For heatwaves: Yellow = heatwave (≥40°C, ≥4.5°C above normal for plains); Orange = severe heatwave (≥40°C, ≥6.5°C above normal); Red = extreme heatwave (≥45°C). Heat Action Plans (HAPs) specify which agencies take which actions at each alert level.
🎯 Concept Kit tap to expand
| 🔗 Cross-Paper Links | ** GS3 (IMD, disaster management, heatwave, NDMA); GS1 (extreme weather, climate change impacts). ** |
| ✍️ Mains Keywords | ** IMD colour alerts, Yellow/Orange/Red, heatwave classification, Heat Action Plan, NDMA, Vidarbha. ** |
| ⚠️ Common Mistake | ** Getting the colours in the wrong order or wrong meaning, Green/Yellow/Orange/Red is a standard traffic-light style scale from lowest to highest risk. ** |
| 📌 Exam Tip | ** Green = Watch. Yellow = Be Aware. Orange = Be Prepared. Red = Take Action. These four phrases are the official IMD formulations, use exact wording. ** |
| 🎤 Interview | ** Should India mandate Heat Action Plans for all urban local bodies above a threshold population, or should HAPs remain advisory at the state level? |
Question 14 of 31
The India-Nordic Summit is an informal multilateral dialogue format, not a treaty-based organisation. It convenes India with all five Nordic states (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Iceland) simultaneously, typically held alongside the bilateral visit of the Indian PM to a Nordic capital. The 1st Summit was in Stockholm (2018); 2nd in Copenhagen (2022); 3rd in Oslo (2026).
There is no permanent Secretariat (option A is wrong). The format includes all five Nordics, including Finland (option C is wrong, all five are included). Option D gets the location right (Oslo) but wrong edition (3rd Summit Oslo 2026; 1st was Stockholm 2018).
Concept note
India-Nordic Summit history: 1st (Stockholm, May 2018), hosted by Sweden’s PM Stefan Löfven alongside Modi’s bilateral visit; focus: innovation, climate; India committed to Paris Agreement; 2nd (Copenhagen, May 2022), hosted alongside Modi’s bilateral; focus: post-COVID green recovery, offshore wind (Denmark-India green hydrogen), Ukraine war context; 3rd (Oslo, May 2026), Arctic governance, DPG, circular economy. Sweden joined NATO on March 7, 2024; Finland on April 4, 2023, both after the 2nd Summit in 2022.
So in 2026, all five Nordic states are NATO members. India, not being a NATO member and adhering to strategic autonomy, navigates this carefully at the Summit.
🎯 Concept Kit tap to expand
| 🔗 Cross-Paper Links | ** GS2 (India-Nordic relations, India-EFTA TEPA, Arctic Council, digital public goods); GS3 (Nordic innovation, green hydrogen, offshore wind). ** |
| ✍️ Mains Keywords | ** India-Nordic Summit, Stockholm 2018, Copenhagen 2022, Oslo 2026, informal multilateral, Nordic five, Finland NATO April 2023, Sweden NATO March 2024. ** |
| ⚠️ Common Mistake | ** Stating India-Nordic Summit is treaty-based or has a permanent Secretariat, it is entirely informal. Also confusing the Summit host cities (Stockholm → Copenhagen → Oslo, not the other way). ** |
| 📌 Exam Tip | ** 1st = Stockholm 2018. 2nd = Copenhagen 2022. 3rd = Oslo 2026. Remember: S-C-O (alphabetical order of cities). Finland/Sweden NATO: Finland April 4, 2023; Sweden March 7, 2024. ** |
| 🎤 Interview | ** Should India formalise the India-Nordic Summit into a permanent diplomatic institution like the India-ASEAN Summit, or does its informal flexibility serve India’s interests better? |
Question 15 of 31
India became a permanent observer to the Arctic Council on May 15, 2013, not 2009 or 2007. India’s Arctic research station is called Himadri (meaning the Himalayas in Sanskrit), located at Ny-Ålesund, Svalbard, Norway, established in 2008. Maitri is India’s first permanent Antarctic research station (1989).
Bharati is India’s second Antarctic station (2012). Dakshin Gangotri was India’s first Antarctic station (1983), now used as a supply base. All polar stations are operated by NCPOR under Ministry of Earth Sciences, but Himadri is in the Arctic while Maitri and Bharati are in Antarctica.
Concept note
India’s polar research footprint: Arctic, Himadri (Ny-Ålesund, Svalbard, est. 2008). Antarctic, (1) Dakshin Gangotri (1983; now supply depot); (2) Maitri (1989; Schirmacher Oasis, Queen Maud Land, operational); (3) Bharati (2012; Prydz Bay, Larsemann Hills, operational).
All under NCPOR (National Centre for Polar and Ocean Research), Goa, Ministry of Earth Sciences. India’s Arctic Policy (2022): six pillars, science and research; climate and environmental protection; economic and human development; transportation and connectivity; governance and international cooperation; national capacity building.
Arctic Council: 8 member states + 38 observers (including India, China, Japan, South Korea, UK, EU, etc.).
🎯 Concept Kit tap to expand
| 🔗 Cross-Paper Links | ** GS2 (India-Norway, Arctic Council, India’s Arctic Policy); GS3 (climate, polar research, NCPOR). ** |
| ✍️ Mains Keywords | ** Arctic Council, India observer 2013, Himadri, Ny-Ålesund, NCPOR, India’s Arctic Policy 2022, Maitri, Bharati, Dakshin Gangotri. ** |
| ⚠️ Common Mistake | ** Confusing Arctic (Himadri) with Antarctic (Maitri, Bharati) stations. Also confusing observer year (2013) with station establishment year (2008). ** |
| 📌 Exam Tip | ** Himadri = Arctic = Norway = 2008 (station) / 2013 (observer). Maitri = Antarctic = 1989. Bharati = Antarctic = 2012. All = NCPOR = Ministry of Earth Sciences. ** |
| 🎤 Interview | ** With the Arctic melting at 4× the global average rate, should India seek full Arctic Council membership rather than remaining an observer? |
Question 16 of 31
The Urban Heat Island (UHI) effect is the well-documented phenomenon where urban areas are significantly warmer, typically 2–5°C, than surrounding rural areas. The primary causes are: replacement of natural surfaces (soil, vegetation) with heat-absorbing materials (concrete, asphalt, brick); reduced vegetation (less evapotranspiration cooling); waste heat from air conditioning, vehicles, and industrial processes; canyon effect of tall buildings reducing wind circulation; and reduced sky view factor. In Delhi’s case, UHI can add 2–5°C to already extreme heatwave temperatures.
Option A (coastal cities) is incorrect. Option C (IMD event category) is fabricated. Option D is a fabricated definition.
Concept note
UHI is a global phenomenon affecting all major cities. Studies show Delhi’s UHI intensity can reach 3–7°C at night (when rural areas cool faster but urban areas retain heat).
Mitigation strategies: cool roofs (high-albedo surfaces), green roofs, urban parks and tree cover (target: 33% green cover for Indian cities), permeable pavements, cool pavement technologies, reflective road surfaces. India’s National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC, 2008) includes the National Mission for a Green India, partially addressing urban green cover.
Delhi’s green cover is ~20% (below the 33% norm). Heatwave mortality is significantly higher in urban areas due to UHI, vulnerable populations: homeless, outdoor construction workers, elderly.
🎯 Concept Kit tap to expand
| 🔗 Cross-Paper Links | ** GS3 (disaster management, urban heat island, climate change adaptation, heatwave); GS1 (climatology, urban geography). ** |
| ✍️ Mains Keywords | ** Urban Heat Island, UHI, 2–5°C warmer, concrete/asphalt, reduced vegetation, Delhi, cool roofs, green cover, NAPCC. ** |
| ⚠️ Common Mistake | ** Describing UHI as related only to coastal cities or as an IMD-official classification, it is a scientific phenomenon applicable to all urban areas. ** |
| 📌 Exam Tip | ** UHI = urban 2–5°C warmer than rural = concrete/asphalt + waste heat + less vegetation. Mitigation = cool roofs + urban green cover + permeable surfaces. Delhi = ~20% green cover (should be 33%). ** |
| 🎤 Interview | ** As India rapidly urbanises (target 600 million urban population by 2047), how should the Smart Cities Mission incorporate UHI mitigation as a mandatory element? |
Question 17 of 31
Statement 1Correct
The PIC (Permanent Indus Commission) comprises the Commissioners of Indus Waters from both India and Pakistan and must meet at least once per year under the IWT.
Statement 2Correct
The Neutral Expert adjudicates “questions of fact” (technical interpretations of treaty provisions); its decisions are binding on both parties.
Statement 3Incorrect
India participates in the Neutral Expert (NE) process but has BOYCOTTED the Court of Arbitration (CA) since 2016, calling it “illegally constituted.” India argues Pakistan cannot simultaneously pursue NE and CA for the same disputes.
Therefore only statements 1 and 2 are correct.
Concept note
IWT Dispute Resolution: Step 1, PIC (bilateral; Commissioners meet annually; routine questions and site visits). Step 2, Neutral Expert (technical questions; World Bank-facilitated appointment; binding on “questions of fact”; current NE: Michel Lino since 2022; final award expected 2026).
Step 3, Court of Arbitration (legal/political questions; 7 members: 2 nominated by each party + 3 by neutral appointing institutions; India boycotts since 2016). India’s position: Pakistan cannot pursue NE and CA simultaneously for same issues, this is impermissible double-tracking.
India’s boycott = the CA has proceeded ex parte (without India’s participation); its awards are unilateral and India considers them null and void.
🎯 Concept Kit tap to expand
| 🔗 Cross-Paper Links | ** GS2 (IWT, India-Pakistan, water diplomacy, international arbitration, World Bank). ** |
| ✍️ Mains Keywords | ** PIC, Neutral Expert, Court of Arbitration, IWT dispute resolution, India boycott CA, Michel Lino, World Bank, double-tracking. ** |
| ⚠️ Common Mistake | ** Stating India boycotts both NE and CA, India participates in NE but boycotts CA. This distinction is critical. ** |
| 📌 Exam Tip | ** IWT dispute: PIC (routine) → NE (technical, binding) → CA (legal/political). India boycotts CA; participates in NE. NE current: Michel Lino (2022). This three-step hierarchy is a standard Prelims question format. ** |
| 🎤 Interview | ** If the Neutral Expert’s final award (expected 2026) finds in Pakistan’s favour, will India be legally obligated to comply, and what are the enforcement mechanisms? |
Question 18 of 31
The Flying Instructors’ Course (FIC) at AFA Dundigal uses HAL Kiran Mk-II (HJT-16) and Pilatus PC-7 Mk-II as the primary training aircraft. The Kiran Mk-II is an indigenously designed jet trainer manufactured by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, India’s first indigenously produced jet aircraft. The Pilatus PC-7 Mk-II is a Swiss-designed turbo-prop trainer.
Tejas Mk-1A and Su-30 MKI (option A) are frontline combat aircraft not used in instructor courses. Jaguar and MiG-21 Bison are combat aircraft. BAE Hawk Mk-132 is the advanced jet trainer used at Stage III training (Bidar/AFA), not the FIC specifically.
Concept note
IAF’s flying training pipeline: Stage I, Elementary Flying Training at Bidar (Pilatus PC-7 Mk-II turbo-prop); Stage II, Basic Flying Training (Kiran Mk-II jet trainer, AFA Dundigal); Stage III, Advanced Flying Training (BAE Hawk Mk-132, AFA Dundigal and AFS Bidar); Stage IV, Type conversion to combat aircraft (MiG-21 UTI, Su-30 MKI, Rafale, Tejas at respective squadrons). The Kiran Mk-II (HJT-16) was designed by Aircraft Design Bureau, HAL Bangalore, it first flew in 1964 (Kiran Mk-I), with Mk-II variant introduced later.
Pilatus PC-7 Mk-II: India selected it in 2012; 75 aircraft ordered; Swiss origin but manufactured under ToT in India.
🎯 Concept Kit tap to expand
| 🔗 Cross-Paper Links | ** GS3 (IAF training, HAL, indigenous aircraft, defence manufacturing, Atmanirbhar Bharat in defence). ** |
| ✍️ Mains Keywords | ** Kiran Mk-II, HJT-16, HAL, Pilatus PC-7 Mk-II, AFA Dundigal, FIC, IAF training pipeline. ** |
| ⚠️ Common Mistake | ** Confusing Kiran Mk-II (basic jet trainer, FIC) with BAE Hawk Mk-132 (advanced jet trainer, Stage III), both are used at Dundigal/Bidar but at different training stages. ** |
| 📌 Exam Tip | ** FIC = Kiran Mk-II + Pilatus PC-7. Hawk Mk-132 = Stage III advanced trainer. Tejas = combat aircraft (not trainer version used at FIC). HAL Kiran = India’s first indigenous jet aircraft. ** |
| 🎤 Interview | ** HAL’s Kiran has been in service for over 60 years. Should India accelerate procurement of HAL’s new HJT-36 Sitara jet trainer to replace the aging Kiran fleet? |
Question 19 of 31
The Mattei Plan for Africa is Italy’s Africa engagement strategy launched by PM Giorgia Meloni in 2024, named after Enrico Mattei, the founder of ENI (Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi), Italy’s state energy company, who was known for his forward-looking engagement with African energy sectors in the 1950s–60s. The plan focuses on energy, food security, education, healthcare, and connectivity. It is a bilateral Italian initiative, not a multilateral debt relief programme.
Italy positions it as an alternative to China’s BRI approach, offering “partnerships” rather than “transactions.” India and Italy share interest in Africa, Italy via Mattei Plan; India via India-Africa Forum Summit and its own bilateral Africa engagements.
Concept note
Enrico Mattei (1906–1962) was the founder and first CEO of ENI (founded 1953). He was known for negotiating joint ventures with oil-producing states (Iran, Egypt, Morocco) that gave the host country 75% of profits instead of the standard 50/50 Western deal, revolutionary for the time.
He died in a plane crash in 1962, widely suspected to be sabotage by US/UK oil companies. The Mattei Plan (2024) invokes his memory to signal Italy’s Africa partnership intent.
Giorgia Meloni (PM since October 2022) made Africa engagement a signature of her foreign policy, partly to address Italian immigration pressure from Africa. India-Italy-Africa triangle is emerging as a potential collaboration space.
🎯 Concept Kit tap to expand
| 🔗 Cross-Paper Links | ** GS2 (India-Italy JSAP, India-EU FTA, Africa in India’s foreign policy, G7 outreach). ** |
| ✍️ Mains Keywords | ** Mattei Plan for Africa, Giorgia Meloni, ENI, India-Italy JSAP 2025–2029, G7, Africa engagement, India-Africa Forum Summit. ** |
| ⚠️ Common Mistake | ** Confusing "Mattei Plan" with a nuclear or debt initiative, it is a holistic Africa engagement strategy (energy, food, health, connectivity). ** |
| 📌 Exam Tip | ** Mattei Plan = Italy’s Africa strategy = 2024 = Giorgia Meloni = named after ENI founder Enrico Mattei. India-Italy JSAP 2025–2029: bilateral trade target ~€20 billion (~USD 20B) by 2029 (from ~USD 16.77B in 2025). ** |
| 🎤 Interview | ** Can India and Italy collaborate under a joint India-Italy-Africa framework to offer African nations an alternative to Chinese infrastructure financing? |
Question 20 of 31
The Lodha Committee (Justice R.M. Lodha, retired CJI) made several governance recommendations for BCCI but did NOT recommend bringing BCCI under the RTI Act. The committee’s approach was to create an internal accountability framework (Ombudsman, Electoral Officer, ethics norms) rather than external statutory accountability through RTI. Options A, B, and D are all genuine Lodha recommendations: (A) one state, one vote; (B) age cap 70 and tenure cap 3 terms/9 years; (D) cooling-off period.
The SC accepted most of these recommendations and enforced them through a Supreme Court-supervised implementation committee.
Concept note
Lodha Committee (2016) major recommendations: (1) One state, one vote (eliminated dual votes for multiple associations per state); (2) Age cap: 70 years; Tenure cap: maximum 3 terms of 3 years each = 9 years total in any combination of BCCI + state association offices; (3) Cooling-off: mandatory gap after completing tenure before returning to cricket administration; (4) Electoral Officer: independent person to conduct elections; (5) Ombudsman and Ethics Officer: independent external appointment; (6) IPL Governing Council: separated from main BCCI governance; (7) Audit: CAG-style independent audit. The committee did NOT recommend RTI coverage, it advocated for a self-governing accountability model within BCCI.
SC in BCCI v. Cricket Association of Bihar (2015) said BCCI performs “public functions” but stopped short of mandating RTI.
🎯 Concept Kit tap to expand
| 🔗 Cross-Paper Links | ** GS2 (BCCI governance, Lodha Committee, RTI Act, accountability of quasi-public bodies, SC-mandated reform). ** |
| ✍️ Mains Keywords | ** Lodha Committee 2016, one state one vote, age cap, tenure limit, cooling-off, Ombudsman, BCCI reform, Supreme Court. ** |
| ⚠️ Common Mistake | ** Assuming Lodha Committee recommended RTI for BCCI, it specifically did NOT; it created an alternative internal accountability framework. ** |
| 📌 Exam Tip | ** Lodha reforms: one state one vote + age cap 70 + max 3 terms (9 years) + cooling-off + Ombudsman + Electoral Officer. Lodha did NOT recommend RTI. The SC supervised implementation through a committee. ** |
| 🎤 Interview | ** Has the Lodha Committee model of court-mandated sports governance reform been successful enough to be replicated for other national sports federations? |
Question 21 of 31
El Niño is a periodic warm sea surface temperature (SST) anomaly in the central-eastern equatorial Pacific Ocean. It weakens the Walker Circulation, the east-west atmospheric circulation pattern over the equatorial Pacific, which in turn suppresses the convection that drives the Indian Ocean’s warming and the SW monsoon. The result is below-normal or deficient rainfall in India during El Niño years.
Option A describes La Niña (cold SST, strengthens monsoon). Option C confuses El Niño with Arabian Sea wind reversal (unrelated mechanism). Option D is not El Niño (it describes something different).
Concept note
ENSO (El Niño–Southern Oscillation) system: El Niño = warm SST anomaly, central-eastern equatorial Pacific, every 3–5 years = weakened Walker Circulation = reduced Indian Ocean moisture = below-normal Indian monsoon. La Niña = cold SST anomaly, same region = enhanced Walker Circulation = above-normal Indian monsoon.
ENSO-Neutral = neither. Major El Niño years and India monsoon: 1987 (below normal), 2002 (deficient; 81% LPA), 2009 (deficient; 78% LPA), 2014 (below normal; 88% LPA), 2023 (below normal).
The high El Niño probability for June–August 2026 (NOAA ~62%; PAGASA ~79%) is why IMD forecasts 92% LPA (Below Normal). Other factors suppressing/enhancing monsoon: Indian Ocean Dipole (IOD), Mascarene High strength, Eurasian snow cover.
🎯 Concept Kit tap to expand
| 🔗 Cross-Paper Links | ** GS3 (El Niño, ENSO, Indian monsoon, agricultural implications); GS1 (climatology, Pacific Ocean SST, Walker Circulation). ** |
| ✍️ Mains Keywords | ** El Niño, La Niña, ENSO, Walker Circulation, below-normal monsoon, LPA, Indian Ocean Dipole. ** |
| ⚠️ Common Mistake | ** Confusing El Niño (warm SST = bad monsoon) with La Niña (cold SST = good monsoon). The warm/cold and good/bad linkages are frequently tested. ** |
| 📌 Exam Tip | ** El Niño = warm SST = weak Walker Circulation = below-normal Indian monsoon. La Niña = cold SST = strong Walker Circulation = above-normal Indian monsoon. 2026: El Niño probability high (NOAA ~62%) → 92% LPA forecast = Below Normal. ** |
| 🎤 Interview | ** Given that El Niño years reliably suppress Indian monsoon, should India adopt a standing El Niño Preparedness Policy that automatically triggers agricultural support programmes when ENSO enters El Niño phase? |
Question 22 of 31
All five Nordic states being NATO members creates a specific diplomatic consideration for India: any defence technology cooperation with them (especially dual-use tech like 6G, AI, maritime surveillance) now involves navigating NATO’s technology control and export frameworks. India, adhering to “strategic autonomy,” avoids joining military alliances and is careful not to accept cooperation that could entangle it in NATO obligations. Option A is wrong, NATO members can fully engage non-members bilaterally (e.g., Finland and Sweden had deep India ties before NATO).
Option C is wrong, Green Strategic Partnership does not create NATO partnership. Option D is completely incorrect, Article 3 (internal capacity building) has no such prohibition.
Concept note
India’s strategic autonomy doctrine means India does not join military alliances. Nordic NATO membership creates a nuanced context: (1) Defence technology cooperation (Saab Gripen, Carl Gustaf, Finnish cybersecurity) must navigate ITAR and NATO Technology Control Regime (TCR); (2) India cannot join any Nordic-led collective security arrangement; (3) India-Norway, India-Sweden MoUs on defence are bilateral and continue, but NATO framework adds a layer of complexity; (4) India-Finland cybersecurity cooperation (Nokia 6G) is dual-use and requires careful delineation.
India has similar navigation with the US (QUAD, COMCASA, BECA, LEMOA), bilateral agreements without formal alliance.
🎯 Concept Kit tap to expand
| 🔗 Cross-Paper Links | ** GS2 (India’s strategic autonomy, India-Nordic relations, NATO, India-Sweden/Norway/Finland defence ties). ** |
| ✍️ Mains Keywords | ** NATO, strategic autonomy, Finland NATO 2023, Sweden NATO 2024, Technology Control Framework, India-Nordic, dual-use technology. ** |
| ⚠️ Common Mistake | ** Assuming NATO membership prevents bilateral engagement, it does not; but it adds a layer of technology transfer complexity. ** |
| 📌 Exam Tip | ** Finland NATO = April 4, 2023. Sweden NATO = March 7, 2024. India strategic autonomy = non-alliance policy. This combination = India engages Nordic bilaterally but navigates NATO tech controls carefully. ** |
| 🎤 Interview | ** As more of India’s key bilateral partners (Sweden, Finland, Norway, Japan–ASEAN-aligned) join formal alliances, can India’s strategic autonomy doctrine remain practically sustainable? |
Question 23 of 31
Pair 1Incorrect
Maitri is India’s Antarctic station (not Arctic); located at Schirmacher Oasis, Queen Maud Land, Antarctica.
Pair 2Correct
Himadri is India’s Arctic station at Ny-Ålesund, Svalbard, Norway.
Pair 3Correct
Bharati is India’s second Antarctic station at Larsemann Hills, Prydz Bay, East Antarctica (commissioned 2012).
Pair 4Correct
Dakshin Gangotri (India’s first Antarctic station, 1983) is located in Queen Maud Land, Antarctica, now used as a supply depot. Three pairs are correctly matched (2, 3, 4).
Pair 1Incorrect
Because Maitri is Antarctic, not Arctic.
Concept note
India’s polar research stations: Arctic: Himadri (Ny-Ålesund, Svalbard, Norway), 2008. Antarctic: (1) Dakshin Gangotri (Queen Maud Land), 1983, now supply base; (2) Maitri (Schirmacher Oasis, Queen Maud Land), 1989, operational; (3) Bharati (Larsemann Hills, Prydz Bay, East Antarctica), 2012, operational.
All under NCPOR (National Centre for Polar and Ocean Research), Goa, Ministry of Earth Sciences. India is a consultative member of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS).
India’s Indian Antarctic Bill, 2022 was passed to regulate Indian activities in Antarctica.
🎯 Concept Kit tap to expand
| 🔗 Cross-Paper Links | ** GS2 (India-Norway, Arctic Council); GS3 (polar research, NCPOR, climate science). ** |
| ✍️ Mains Keywords | ** Himadri, Maitri, Bharati, Dakshin Gangotri, NCPOR, Arctic, Antarctic, Svalbard, Queen Maud Land, Larsemann Hills. ** |
| ⚠️ Common Mistake | ** Placing Maitri in the Arctic, Maitri is Antarctic. Only Himadri is Arctic. ** |
| 📌 Exam Tip | ** Arctic = Himadri only. Antarctic = Dakshin Gangotri (1983, supply base) + Maitri (1989, active) + Bharati (2012, active). All under NCPOR. ** |
| 🎤 Interview | ** India’s Indian Antarctic Bill (2022) regulates Indian activities in Antarctica. Should India enact a similar Arctic Research and Protection Act given the increasing strategic importance of the Arctic? |
Question 24 of 31
NIA v. Watali (2019) is the foundational restrictive precedent on UAPA bail. The SC held: at the bail stage under Section 43D(5) of UAPA, courts must broadly accept the prosecution’s version as reflected in the chargesheet and case diary, without deep scrutiny or weighing evidence. If the chargesheet presents a “plausible” case, it satisfies the prima facie truth standard, and bail must be denied.
This means courts cannot probe whether the evidence will ultimately succeed at trial, even weak or contested evidence can block bail. Option A describes the opposite approach. Option C fabricates a 6-month rule.
Option D is a fabricated limitation.
Concept note
Watali (2019) vs Najeeb (2021) is the central tension in UAPA bail law. Watali: restrictive, prosecution case accepted at face value; prima facie truth = plausible chargesheet = bail denied.
Najeeb: liberal exception, prolonged incarceration + no trial progress = Article 21 violated = constitutional court can grant bail notwithstanding Section 43D(5). Post-Watali, NIA has routinely cited it to oppose bail in all UAPA cases.
Critics argue Watali effectively makes pre-trial detention permanent since UAPA trials can take 10+ years to complete. Bhima Koregaon accused (2018 arrest) were still in trial as of 2024 — 6+ years.
This is the context for the 2026 SC divergence controversy.
🎯 Concept Kit tap to expand
| 🔗 Cross-Paper Links | ** GS2 (UAPA, Section 43D(5), Watali, Najeeb, bail, NIA, Article 21). ** |
| ✍️ Mains Keywords | ** NIA v. Watali 2019, prima facie truth, chargesheet, bail denied, UAPA Section 43D(5), plausible chargesheet. ** |
| ⚠️ Common Mistake | ** Confusing Watali (pro-prosecution, bail denied) with Najeeb (pro-liberty, bail possible), they represent opposite poles. ** |
| 📌 Exam Tip | ** Watali (2019) = prosecution case accepted at face value + plausible chargesheet = prima facie true = bail denied. This is the status quo restrictive rule. Najeeb (2021) is the narrow exception when Article 21 is violated by prolonged detention. ** |
| 🎤 Interview | ** Should the SC constitute a larger Constitution Bench to definitively resolve the Watali-Najeeb tension and establish a clear UAPA bail standard? |
Question 25 of 31
The GPFG is called the “Oil Fund” because it is funded from the surplus revenues of Norway’s oil and gas sector. The Norwegian government transfers oil and gas export revenues into the fund via the Government Petroleum Fund mechanism, these revenues are then invested globally (not in oil assets specifically). The fund is managed by Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM), the investment management division of Norway’s central bank (Norges Bank).
Option A is wrong, it is not managed by the Ministry of Petroleum. Option C is wrong, GPFG is diversified (equities, bonds, real estate); not solely oil futures. Option D is wrong, Nordic Investment Bank is a separate multilateral development bank.
Concept note
GPFG key facts: Established 1990 (as “Government Petroleum Fund”); renamed in 2006 to Government Pension Fund Global. Size: ~USD 2.2 trillion (2025), world’s largest SWF.
Managed by: NBIM (division of Norges Bank, Norway’s central bank). Investment policy: globally diversified, ~73% equities, ~25% fixed income, ~2% real estate/infrastructure.
Ethical exclusions: Council on Ethics recommends; Board of Norges Bank decides. Excluded sectors: tobacco, certain weapons (cluster munitions, nuclear), companies with severe ESG violations.
India exposure: significant (estimated USD 15–28 billion in Indian equities/bonds). The fund owns ~1.5% of all global listed shares, making it the world’s largest single minority shareholder.
🎯 Concept Kit tap to expand
| 🔗 Cross-Paper Links | ** GS2 (India-Norway relations, sovereign wealth funds); GS3 (Dutch Disease, SWF governance, patient capital, ESG). ** |
| ✍️ Mains Keywords | ** GPFG, Oil Fund, NBIM, Norges Bank, USD 2.2 trillion, sovereign wealth fund, Dutch Disease, ethical exclusion. ** |
| ⚠️ Common Mistake | ** Confusing NBIM (manages the fund, division of Norges Bank) with Norges Bank (central bank, of which NBIM is a part), both are correct but NBIM is the specific manager. ** |
| 📌 Exam Tip | ** GPFG = Oil Fund = revenue from Norwegian oil sector = world’s largest SWF (~USD 2.2 trillion, 2025) = managed by NBIM (Norges Bank division) = ~1.5% global listed shares = ethical exclusions. Five facts in one sentence. ** |
| 🎤 Interview | ** Should India establish a sovereign wealth fund from its foreign exchange reserves (~USD 650 billion) on Norway’s GPFG model to generate long-term returns for future generations? |
Question 26 of 31
Which of the following statements about the National Investigation Agency (NIA) is INCORRECT?
Statement C is INCORRECT, NIA is headed by a Director General who is an IPS (Indian Police Service) officer, not a retired High Court judge. The DG is appointed by the central government from among senior IPS officers. The Law Ministry does not make this appointment (MHA does).
Options A, B, and D are all correct: NIA was established December 31, 2008 under NIA Act 2008 post-26/11; the 2019 NIA Amendment extended jurisdiction to offences by Indians abroad; NIA has Special Courts for trial under Section 11 of the NIA Act.
Concept note
NIA (National Investigation Agency): Established: December 31, 2008; NIA Act 2008. Trigger: 26/11 Mumbai attacks (November 26, 2008) exposed gaps in counter-terror investigation framework.
HQ: New Delhi. Head: Director General (IPS officer, not judge).
Jurisdiction: Scheduled offences, UAPA, Prevention of Money Laundering Act, Explosives Act, Arms Act, Atomic Energy Act, Anti-Hijacking Act, Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against Safety of Maritime Navigation Act. 2019 amendment: NIA can investigate UAPA offences committed by Indians anywhere in the world. Special NIA Courts: designated under Section 11; try cases faster than regular courts; in situ in states.
India also has: NDPS Act courts, POCSO courts, CBI courts, all special courts for specific legislations.
🎯 Concept Kit tap to expand
| 🔗 Cross-Paper Links | ** GS2 (NIA, UAPA, counter-terrorism institutions, security agencies, 26/11). ** |
| ✍️ Mains Keywords | ** NIA, NIA Act 2008, 26/11, DG (IPS officer), Special Courts, Section 11, 2019 Amendment, jurisdiction abroad. ** |
| ⚠️ Common Mistake | ** Stating NIA DG is a judge, it is an IPS officer. Also confusing NIA (federal investigation) with CBI (broader central investigation, non-terror focus). ** |
| 📌 Exam Tip | ** NIA established: December 31, 2008. Under NIA Act 2008. 26/11 was November 26, 2008, NIA followed within a month. DG = IPS officer (MHA appointment). 2019 amendment = NIA can investigate Indians abroad. ** |
| 🎤 Interview | ** As cross-border terrorism evolves, should NIA be given the power to coordinate with Interpol and foreign agencies directly without routing requests through MEA? |
Question 27 of 31
The Ahmedabad Heat Action Plan (est. 2013) was developed and is implemented through a partnership between the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (AMC) and the Indian Institute of Public Health (IIPH), Gandhinagar (Gujarat). IIPH Gandhinagar is a public health research and training institution. The plan includes: early warning system linked to IMD; coordination with hospitals; cooling centres; public awareness campaigns; protection of outdoor workers.
It is widely cited as India’s most successful city-level HAP and has been replicated in other Gujarat cities and national guidelines. Option A (AIIMS Ahmedabad), no such institution at that time. Option C (NDMA), national body, not city-level partner.
Option D (IMD), weather forecast provider but not operational HAP partner.
Concept note
Ahmedabad HAP (2013): Triggered by the 2010 Ahmedabad heatwave which killed ~1,344 people. Partnership: AMC + IIPH Gandhinagar + Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC, US NGO).
Key features: (1) Pre-heatwave alerts from IMD (Yellow/Orange/Red); (2) Colour-coded response protocols for each department; (3) Cooling centres in public buildings; (4) Night shelters kept open; (5) Water provision at public taps; (6) Hospital preparedness protocols; (7) Training for outdoor construction workers. Ahmedabad model was adopted by 100+ Indian cities under NDMA’s national HAP guidelines.
The plan has been shown to reduce heatwave mortality by 30–40% compared to pre-plan baseline.
🎯 Concept Kit tap to expand
| 🔗 Cross-Paper Links | ** GS3 (disaster management, heatwave, Heat Action Plans, NDMA, public health); GS2 (urban governance, municipal bodies). ** |
| ✍️ Mains Keywords | ** Ahmedabad HAP, IIPH Gandhinagar, AMC, cooling centres, Heat Action Plan, heatwave mortality, NDMA. ** |
| ⚠️ Common Mistake | ** Saying NDMA or AIIMS developed the Ahmedabad HAP, IIPH Gandhinagar is the partner institution. NDMA provided national guidelines but AMC+IIPH are the Ahmedabad-specific partners. ** |
| 📌 Exam Tip | ** Ahmedabad HAP = 2013 = AMC + IIPH Gandhinagar = model city HAP = triggered by 2010 Ahmedabad heatwave = reduces mortality 30–40%. ** |
| 🎤 Interview | ** Should India mandate Heat Action Plans for all cities above 1 million population under the Disaster Management Act, 2005, or should this remain advisory? |
Question 28 of 31
The Royal Order of the Polar Star (Kungliga Nordstjärneorden) was founded on February 23, 1748 by King Frederick I of Sweden. It is Sweden’s oldest and most prestigious state order, originally awarded for services to Sweden in sciences, literature, and arts, later expanded to diplomatic and state service. Modi received the Commander Grand Cross (highest class), conferred by Crown Princess Victoria during his May 17–18, 2026 visit to Gothenburg.
Option A (Gustav III, 1772) is incorrect. Option C (1815, Charles XIII) relates to the Congress of Vienna period but is the wrong king/year for this order. Option D (1905, Oscar II) relates to the period of Norwegian independence but is not this order’s founding.
Concept note
The Royal Order of the Polar Star was established to honour those who served Sweden, particularly in arts, sciences, literature, and later in civic/diplomatic roles. Classes: Knight of 1st Class, Commander, Commander Grand Cross (highest).
The Polar Star (North Star/Polaris) symbolises constancy and guidance, apt for an order honouring service. Modi’s 31st global honour, India’s PM accumulates honours from countries as part of ceremonial diplomacy.
Other notable foreign state orders received by Modi: Saudi Arabia’s Order of King Abdulaziz (2016), Russia’s Order of St. Andrew (2019), France’s Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour (2023), etc.
🎯 Concept Kit tap to expand
| 🔗 Cross-Paper Links | ** GS2 (India-Sweden Strategic Partnership, ceremonial diplomacy, state honours, India-Nordic Summit). ** |
| ✍️ Mains Keywords | ** Royal Order of Polar Star, 1748, King Frederick I, Commander Grand Cross, Crown Princess Victoria, Modi 31st honour. ** |
| ⚠️ Common Mistake | ** Getting the founding year wrong, 1748 (Frederick I) not 1772 (Gustav III) or 1905. ** |
| 📌 Exam Tip | ** Royal Order of Polar Star = Sweden = 1748 = King Frederick I = oldest Swedish state order. Modi = Commander Grand Cross = 31st global honour = May 2026. ** |
| 🎤 Interview | ** As India accumulates dozens of foreign state honours for its PM, should India reconsider its own policy of awarding foreign decorations, and whether these translate into concrete diplomatic outcomes? |
Question 29 of 31
The 91st Constitutional Amendment Act, 2003 inserted Article 164(1A): “The total number of Ministers, including the Chief Minister, in the Council of Ministers of a State shall not exceed fifteen per cent of the total number of members of the Legislative Assembly of that State: Provided that the number of Ministers, including the Chief Minister, in a State shall not be less than twelve.” The same amendment also inserted Article 75(1A) for the Union government (Council of Ministers at Centre ≤ 15% of Lok Sabha strength). Option C and D are fabricated provisions. In Kerala: 15% of 140 = 21 → CM Satheesan’s cabinet of 21 (CM + 20) is at the exact ceiling.
Concept note
91st Amendment (2003): Two key changes: (1) Article 75(1A): Union Council of Ministers ≤ 15% of Lok Sabha strength = max ~81 (15% of 543). (2) Article 164(1A): State Council of Ministers (including CM) ≤ 15% of Legislative Assembly strength (minimum 12). (3) Also amended Tenth Schedule: defection from party while holding ministry = disqualification from both ministry AND membership. Background: States like Jharkhand, Bihar had 80–90-member cabinets for political accommodation, making governance dysfunctional.
The 91st Amendment was a direct response. For Kerala: 15% × 140 = 21 → VD Satheesan’s cabinet (21 = CM + 20) is at ceiling.
No expansion possible without resignation or reshuffle.
🎯 Concept Kit tap to expand
| 🔗 Cross-Paper Links | ** GS2 (Council of Ministers, 91st Amendment, Kerala election, Article 164, coalition politics). ** |
| ✍️ Mains Keywords | ** Article 164(1A), 91st Constitutional Amendment 2003, 15% ceiling, Council of Ministers, minimum 12, Kerala cabinet. ** |
| ⚠️ Common Mistake | ** Confusing Article 75(1A) (Union, 15% of Lok Sabha) with Article 164(1A) (State, 15% of Assembly), both inserted by 91st Amendment but apply to different levels. ** |
| 📌 Exam Tip | ** 91st Amendment = Article 164(1A) = state ministers ≤ 15% of Assembly (min 12) = also Article 75(1A) for Union. Kerala: 15% × 140 = 21 → Satheesan cabinet at ceiling. ** |
| 🎤 Interview | ** The 91st Amendment was meant to prevent bloated cabinets, but states still reach the ceiling (as Kerala did). Should the ceiling be reduced to 10% to further discipline coalition horse-trading? |
Question 30 of 31
The Kishanganga Hydroelectric Project (330 MW) is located on the Kishanganga River, a tributary of the Jhelum, known as Neelum River in Pakistan, in Jammu & Kashmir. Pakistan challenged it at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in 2010, arguing India was diverting water away from Pakistan’s Neelum-Jhelum project downstream. The PCA (2013) partial award allowed India to build the project but imposed a minimum downstream flow requirement of 3.4 cumecs.
India commissioned the project in 2018 and has complied with the minimum flow requirement. Option A describes Ratle (Chenab, 850 MW) but with a wrong description of outcome. Options C and D are fabricated.
Concept note
Kishanganga PCA (2010–2013): Pakistan’s claim: India’s diversion of Kishanganga waters to generate power would reduce flows into Neelum (Kishanganga’s name in Pakistan) and harm Pakistan’s own Neelum-Jhelum project. PCA Final Award (December 20, 2013): India can build and operate Kishanganga; must maintain minimum flow of 9 cumecs at all times.
India argued for 4.25 cumecs; Pakistan demanded 80 cumecs; PCA set 9 cumecs as the floor. Kishanganga commissioned 2018 (330 MW).
PCA (Permanent Court of Arbitration, The Hague) = different from the Court of Arbitration under IWT, PCA is a separate arbitral institution also used in the Kishanganga and Ratle disputes.
🎯 Concept Kit tap to expand
| 🔗 Cross-Paper Links | ** GS2 (IWT, India-Pakistan, Kishanganga, PCA, Neutral Expert, Court of Arbitration); GS3 (hydropower, river systems, J&K). ** |
| ✍️ Mains Keywords | ** Kishanganga, 330 MW, Jhelum tributary, Neelum River, PCA 2013, 3.4 cumecs minimum flow, commissioned 2018. ** |
| ⚠️ Common Mistake | ** Confusing Kishanganga (Jhelum tributary, 330 MW) with Ratle (Chenab, 850 MW). Kishanganga is commissioned (2018); Ratle is still under construction. ** |
| 📌 Exam Tip | ** Kishanganga = Jhelum tributary = 330 MW = commissioned 2018 = PCA Final Award December 20, 2013 (allowed, minimum flow 9 cumecs). Ratle = Chenab = 850 MW = under construction = current Court of Arbitration dispute. ** |
| 🎤 Interview | ** The Kishanganga PCA decision set a precedent that India must maintain minimum downstream flows. Does this create an opening for Pakistan to seek similar orders on other Western River projects? |
Question 31 of 31
In Indian law: a “society” is a membership-based non-profit (or public-utility) organisation registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (or state equivalents like Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975). Societies are typically used for educational, charitable, literary, scientific, or sports purposes. A “company” is a registered entity under the Companies Act, 2013, primarily for business/commercial activities; Section 8 companies are non-profit companies.
BCCI is a society, registered under Tamil Nadu law. This is why it is not under Companies Act’s disclosure norms or MCA oversight. Option A reverses the profit/non-profit distinction.
Options C and D are fabricated.
Concept note
Societies Registration Act 1860: Central legislation; allows societies for literary, scientific, charitable, artistic, or educational purposes. State societies acts exist (e.g., Tamil Nadu, AP, Maharashtra).
Key features of societies: governed by a memorandum and rules (equivalent of AOA for companies); managed by a committee/governing board; must file annual returns with Registrar of Societies; dissolution requires special resolution. BCCI registered under Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975, this subjects it to minimal disclosure requirements compared to a company under Companies Act (MCA oversight, ROC filings, auditor appointment, etc.).
This low disclosure requirement + non-RTI status = minimal public accountability, the core criticism.
🎯 Concept Kit tap to expand
| 🔗 Cross-Paper Links | ** GS2 (BCCI, RTI, corporate governance, Societies Registration Act, accountability of quasi-public bodies). ** |
| ✍️ Mains Keywords | ** Society, Societies Registration Act 1860, company, Companies Act 2013, BCCI, Tamil Nadu Societies Act. ** |
| ⚠️ Common Mistake | ** Assuming BCCI is a company, it is a society. This distinction matters for RTI applicability, tax treatment, and governance norms. ** |
| 📌 Exam Tip | ** BCCI = society (Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975) = not a company (Companies Act) = minimal public disclosure requirements = not under MCA/ROC oversight. ** |
| 🎤 Interview | ** Should India enact a National Sports Governance Act that applies to all national sports federations, regardless of their registration form (society, company, trust), to ensure uniform accountability standards? |
Performance
Question-wise Result