Current Affairs Quiz 29 March 2026

The WTO Appellate Body was created in 1995 alongside the WTO itself and handled approximately 500+ appellate proceedings before its paralysis. Its 7-member bench was designed to prevent any single country from dominating dispute outcomes.

The Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA), used by ~54 WTO members since 2020, is a workaround under Article 25 of the DSU (Dispute Settlement Understanding). Critically, India, the US, and Russia are NOT MPIA participants, leaving them unable to appeal panel rulings against them.

India participates in the Appellate Body process but chose not to join MPIA. The DSB (Dispute Settlement Body) itself still functions as the General Council in a different capacity, only the appellate tier is paralysed.

The practical consequence: any country losing a WTO panel ruling can file an appeal into the void, delaying compliance indefinitely, a legal loophole that undermines the entire enforcement architecture of global trade law.

Under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), domestic support calculations use 1986-88 reference prices, a methodology that artificially inflates India’s subsidy estimates by ignoring 35+ years of inflation and currency changes. Under this formula, India’s Minimum Support Price (MSP)-based procurement appears far more trade-distorting than it actually is.

India’s key PSH programmes include the Public Distribution System (PDS) and the National Food Security Act (NFSA, 2013), which together cover ~67% of India’s population (~80 crore beneficiaries). The peace clause was extended at each subsequent MC (MC10 Nairobi, MC11 Buenos Aires, MC12 Geneva, MC13 Abu Dhabi, MC14 Yaounde), but always as a temporary fix, never a permanent solution.

India’s stated position is that any permanent solution must be unconditional (not requiring annual notification) and retrospective (covering existing programmes, not just future ones). The de minimis subsidy cap distinction matters: 10% for developing countries vs 5% for developed countries of the total value of agricultural production.

The WTO e-commerce moratorium was first introduced in 1998 at the second Ministerial Conference in Geneva, when cross-border electronic commerce was in its infancy. India’s Equalisation Levy (2016, expanded 2020) taxes digital services domestically, but this is a separate instrument from WTO-governed customs duties on electronic transmissions.

At MC14, 66 WTO members (~70% of global trade) adopted an interim e-commerce framework, the moratorium was extended again but not made permanent, which India counts as a partial win. The moratorium specifically covers customs duties on electronic transmissions (downloading software, streaming services, cross-border data flows), NOT domestic digital taxation, NOT VAT/GST on digital services, and NOT the Equalisation Levy.

India’s concern is that a permanent moratorium would lock in tariff-free treatment for cross-border digital services dominated by American and European technology firms, preventing developing countries from building digital trade policy space as their digital economies scale. UNCTAD estimates developing countries lose ~$10 billion annually in potential customs revenue due to this moratorium.

The BSA timeline shows the trajectory of India-Japan financial diplomacy: $3 billion (2008, signed during Governor Y.V. Reddy’s tenure at RBI) → $15 billion (2012) → $50 billion (2013) → $75 billion (2018). The BSA is a two-way arrangement, Japan can also access Indian rupees against US dollars if needed.

Critically, India has never actually drawn on the BSA in any of its iterations; it functions primarily as a confidence signal to markets, credit rating agencies (Moody’s, S&P, Fitch), and foreign investors, a financial backstop that deters speculative attacks on the rupee without requiring actual disbursement. The third amendment and restatement (February 2026) extended the arrangement for another period, signalling continuity in the India-Japan strategic partnership.

Currency swap arrangements like the BSA are part of India’s broader Global Financial Safety Net (GFSN) architecture alongside IMF resources, bilateral swaps, and the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement.

The Chiang Mai Initiative was originally established in 2000 as bilateral swaps among ASEAN+3 countries following the devastating Asian Financial Crisis (1997-98), which exposed the absence of regional liquidity support mechanisms. It was multilateralised (CMIM) in 2010, creating a single pooled arrangement of $240 billion.

India accesses US dollar liquidity via the FIMA Repo Facility (Federal Reserve standing facility for foreign central banks, introduced permanently in 2021), this is NOT a swap but a collateralised borrowing facility where the RBI pledges US Treasury securities as collateral. India’s financial safety net hierarchy: SAARC ($2B, India as provider) → BRICS CRA ($18B India’s committed share of $100B total) → India-Japan BSA ($75B bilateral) → FIMA Repo Facility (uncapped, against collateral).

India’s total forex reserves (~$640 billion as of 2026) dwarf these committed lines, making the BSA and CRA more about market confidence than actual liquidity need.

India’s integrated air defence architecture is organised in concentric range layers: S-400 Triumf (long-range, ~400 km interception, Russia, 5 squadrons contracted in 2018 at $5.43B) → Barak-8/MRSAM (medium-range, 70-100 km, India-Israel joint, manufactured by BDL) → Akash MkI/Mk2 (medium-range, 25-40 km, indigenous DRDO, BEL production) → Tunguska 2K22 (SHORAD: 8 km missile / 4 km gun, Russia, Army air defence for armoured columns) → Igla-S MANPADS (man-portable, ~6 km, Russia). The Tunguska combines 30mm autocannons with 9M311 missiles on a tracked chassis, providing a dual-mode (gun + missile) capability for protecting armoured formations against helicopters and low-flying aircraft.

The Rs 445 crore contract for Tunguska ammunition/spares signed in 2026 falls under DAP 2020’s Buy (Global) category.

DAP 2020 replaced DPP 2016 (Defence Procurement Procedure), introducing several key reforms. The IDDM category was created as a new top tier to incentivise full-cycle indigenisation, from R&D through manufacturing.

Other DAP 2020 innovations: positive indigenisation lists (5 lists covering 509+ items) that prohibit import of listed items beyond specified dates, creating a guaranteed domestic market for Indian manufacturers. The IDDM IC threshold is only 50%, lower than Buy (Indian) at 60%, because the design ownership distinguishes IDDM; if you design your own system, the 10% IC difference is acceptable.

Under the offset policy (Buy Global category), at least 30% of the contract value must be reinvested in India’s defence sector. DPP 2016 had no IDDM category, the escalation of indigenous content requirements across all categories in DAP 2020 reflects the accelerated Aatmanirbhar Bharat push after 2020.

INS Rajali (Arakkonam, Tamil Nadu, about 90 km west of Chennai) is the Indian Navy’s premier long-range maritime patrol air station on the east coast. The P8I is based on the Boeing 737-800ERX, a twin-engine narrow-body commercial airliner with extended range modifications.

The Boeing 747 is a completely different aircraft (four-engine, wide-body, used for long-haul passenger transport), a common confusion in examinations. India’s 12 P8I aircraft (contracted in two batches: 8 in 2009 and 4 in 2016) represent the largest foreign P-8 fleet outside the United States.

The Indian-origin components integrate into what is called the Mission System: BEL contributes Data Link II and IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) Interrogator Mark-2, Avantel contributes Mobile Satellite Service for in-flight communication, and ECIL (Electronics Corporation of India Limited, under Dept. of Atomic Energy, Hyderabad) contributes the speech secrecy system for encrypted voice communication. The MRO (Maintenance, Repair, Overhaul) contract signed in 2026 falls under DAP’s Buy (Indian) category with 100% Indigenous Content.

The 101st Constitutional Amendment Act, 2016 inserted four new provisions: Article 246A (concurrent GST power for Parliament and States), Article 269A (IGST on inter-state supply of goods and services, credited to the Consolidated Fund of India and apportioned between Centre and States as recommended by the GST Council), Article 279A (Constitution of the GST Council), and amended Article 268A (service tax sharing, subsequently replaced). The 7th Schedule was simultaneously amended, service tax was removed from the Union List and specific goods were removed from the State List.

GST replaced 17 different central and state taxes including Central Excise Duty, Service Tax, VAT, Central Sales Tax, Entry Tax, and Octroi. GST was implemented on July 1, 2017, replacing what PM Modi called a “tax on tax” system.

The Constitutional Bill was the 122nd Constitutional Amendment Bill, 2014 when introduced, it became the 101st Amendment Act, 2016 when enacted after ratification by more than half the State legislatures (a constitutional requirement for amendments affecting Centre-State relations).

At JJM 1.0 launch (August 15, 2019), only ~17% of rural households (~3.23 crore of 19.4 crore) had household tap connections. The mission’s nodal ministry is the Ministry of Jal Shakti (Department of Drinking Water and Sanitation).

Goa was the first state, and Puducherry the first Union Territory, to achieve 100% FHTC. Village Water and Sanitation Committees (VWSCs) or Pani Samitis are the community-level bodies managing O&M, expected to collect user charges for 5-10% of O&M costs from beneficiaries.

JJM 2.0 introduces reform-linked tranches, states receive funding only after implementing governance reforms (metering, cost recovery, online grievance redressal). The 55 lpcd standard is based on WHO guidelines for minimum water needs; the earlier NRDWP (National Rural Drinking Water Programme) had a lower 40 lpcd standard.

Meghalaya’s MoU (March 27, 2026) signals the North-East’s gradual progress, challenging terrain and dispersed habitation make pipeline connectivity difficult.

CERT-In (Indian Computer Emergency Response Team) was established in 2004 under Section 70B of the Information Technology Act, 2000, inserted by the IT Amendment Act of 2008. It functions under the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY), NOT MHA (Ministry of Home Affairs), a common confusion.

SIA-India (Space Industry Association-India) is the national apex body of private space companies. India currently has 54 operational satellites managed by ISRO, and IN-SPACe (Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre, established under the Indian Space Policy 2023) has registered 150+ private space startups.

The Indian Space Policy 2023 opened the sector to private participation, dramatically expanding the attack surface for cyber threats. Defence-in-Depth is a concept borrowed from military doctrine, multiple overlapping defence layers so that if one fails, others maintain protection.

Applied to space systems, it means: encrypted communications, authenticated command uplinks, hardened ground stations, supply chain verification, and continuous monitoring.

WCEF was founded by the Finnish Innovation Fund Sitra and has been held annually since 2017, rotating across continents. WCEF 2025 was held in Brazil (Latin America).

WCEF 2026 in India is significant because it is the first in continental Asia, Japan hosted a related event but not the main WCEF. India’s circular economy framework includes: NITI Aayog’s 11 sectoral strategies (2021) targeting 2 trillion USD opportunity by 2050, and CPCB’s Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) rules covering plastics (EPR portal launched 2022), e-waste (revised 2022), tyres, and used oil.

Both CPCB and SPCBs (State Pollution Control Boards) were created under the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974, Section 3 establishes CPCB and Section 4 establishes SPCBs. The Environment Protection Act, 1986 was enacted as an umbrella legislation following the Bhopal Gas Tragedy (1984) and empowers the Central Government directly, it did NOT create CPCB.

The Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 also empowers CPCB but did not create it.

India’s neighbourhood financial assistance instruments are distinct and must not be conflated: (1) SAARC Currency Swap Framework ($2B total facility, established 2012, India as sole provider, accessed for short-term BoP needs up to $400M per member); (2) Bilateral emergency credit lines (larger in scale, like Sri Lanka’s $1.4B package, RBI extended a $400M swap plus $1B credit line); (3) Lines of Credit via Exim Bank (project-tied financing for specific infrastructure/development projects); (4) Grants (budget support or reconstruction grants). India’s forex reserves (~$640 billion as of 2026) provide the macroeconomic backstop for all these commitments.

The Sri Lanka crisis (2022) included India’s $1.4B package, IMF bailout ($2.9B, 2023), China’s debt restructuring negotiations, and World Bank emergency support, making it a landmark in South Asian geopolitical economics. India was the first country to respond with financial assistance to Sri Lanka, arriving ahead of IMF and China.

Article 371(A) was inserted by the 13th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1962 (a year before Nagaland attained statehood on December 1, 1963 as the 16th state). It provides that no Act of Parliament shall apply to Nagaland in respect of: (a) religious or social practices of the Nagas; (b) Naga customary law and procedure; (c) administration of civil and criminal justice involving customary law; (d) ownership and transfer of land and its resources, unless the Nagaland Legislative Assembly by a resolution so decides.

Articles 371A through 371J cover different states: 371A (Nagaland), 371B (Assam), 371C (Manipur), 371F (Sikkim, recognition of existing laws and rights of Sikkim), 371G (Mizoram, similar to Nagaland), 371H (Arunachal Pradesh, special role for Governor). Nagaland’s GST collections reached Rs 987.38 crore by January 31, 2026, surpassing the Rs 949 crore target, driven by increased compliance and government infrastructure spending in the state.

The BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) was established by the Fortaleza Declaration (2014), with the formal treaty entering into force in 2015. Total pool: $100 billion; contributions: China $41B, Brazil/Russia/India $18B each, South Africa $5B.

Withdrawals above a certain threshold require an IMF programme, often called the “IMF link.” The SAARC Currency Swap Framework ($2B) was established in 2012 with India as the sole provider; member countries can access up to $400M per arrangement. India also accesses US dollar liquidity from the FIMA Repo Facility (Federal Reserve, permanent from 2021), not a swap but a standing collateralised borrowing facility where RBI pledges US Treasury securities.

The full financial safety net picture for India: $2B (SAARC, provider) + $18B (BRICS CRA, contributor) + $75B (Japan BSA, bilateral) + FIMA (collateral-based, uncapped) + $640B own reserves. The sum reveals that India’s own reserves dwarf all external arrangements, making the BSAs primarily confidence signals rather than actual liquidity backstops.

India has approximately 4 million active fisherfolk and is the world’s 3rd largest fish producer (after China and Indonesia). India pushed hard for Special and Differential Treatment (S&DT) provisions in the agreement to protect the livelihoods of small-scale and artisanal fishers who fish in coastal waters under 12 nautical miles.

WTO agreements require two-thirds member acceptance to enter into force (not a simple majority), explaining the 3-year gap between MC12 adoption (June 17, 2022) and entry into force (September 15, 2025). Phase 2 negotiations, covering subsidies contributing to overcapacity and overfishing by non-IUU actors (targeting large-scale commercial fleets), continue beyond MC14 and are the more contentious issue.

Global fisheries subsidies are estimated at ~$35 billion annually, of which ~$22 billion are considered harmful. China and the EU are among the largest providers of harmful subsidies, making Phase 2 negotiations extremely politically sensitive.

India’s Blue Economy Policy targets $1 trillion by 2047, making sustainable fisheries a core economic and food security interest.

The P8I sensor suite for maritime patrol: AN/APY-10 maritime surveillance radar (surface vessel detection), sonobuoys (passive and active sonobuoys dropped into the ocean for acoustic submarine detection), Magnetic Anomaly Detector (MAD) (detects the magnetic signature of submarine hulls), and Electro-Optical/Infrared (EO/IR) turret (visual identification of vessels). Weapons: Harpoon Block II anti-ship missiles (surface warfare), Mk-54 lightweight torpedoes (anti-submarine), and depth charges.

India’s BMD programme has two tiers: PAD (endo-atmospheric and exo-atmospheric, 50-80 km) using a two-stage interceptor, and AAD (endo-atmospheric, 15-30 km) using a single-stage interceptor. The Swordfish Long-Range Tracking Radar (based on Israeli Green Pine radar) provides fire control data.

The Phase-2 BMD programme aims for intercept at ranges beyond 5,000 km using the AD-1 and AD-2 interceptors currently under development by DRDO.

NIOT (National Institute of Ocean Technology) is headquartered in Chennai under the Ministry of Earth Sciences (MoES). Beyond the Floating LiDAR Buoy, NIOT manages India’s tsunami early warning system and conducts deep-sea mining research (manganese nodules at 5,000-6,000m depth in the central Indian Ocean under the Deep Ocean Mission).

The Floating LiDAR Buoy was successfully tested off Muttom coast, Tamil Nadu (near Gulf of Mannar). NIWE (National Institute of Wind Energy, Chennai) is a separate institute under MNRE, NIOT builds the ocean sensing hardware; NIWE conducts wind resource assessment and certifies wind energy sites.

India’s offshore wind target of 30 GW by 2030 (from the Offshore Wind Energy Policy, 2015) requires bankable wind data from sensors like the LiDAR buoy before commercial auctions can be triggered. NIOT’s indigenous buoy costs 30-40% less than European imports, removing a key cost barrier for offshore wind resource assessment.

Both NIOT and NIWE are in Chennai, making this the most frequently confused ministry-attribution pair in Indian competitive examinations.

Full WTO MC sequence with landmark outcomes: MC1 Singapore (1996, Singapore Issues) → MC2 Geneva (1998, e-commerce moratorium begins) → MC3 Seattle (1999, collapsed, birth of anti-globalisation movement, developing countries walked out) → MC4 Doha (2001, launched Doha Development Round) → MC5 Cancun (2003, collapsed, G20 developing nations walked out over agriculture) → MC6 Hong Kong (2005) → MC7 Geneva (2009) → MC8 Geneva (2011) → MC9 Bali (2013, peace clause on PSH agreed) → MC10 Nairobi (2015, first in Africa, ministerials commitment on agriculture) → MC11 Buenos Aires (2017) → MC12 Geneva (2022, Fisheries Subsidies Agreement adopted) → MC13 Abu Dhabi (2024, 166 members, e-commerce interim framework) → MC14 Yaounde (2026, first in sub-Saharan Africa). The Seattle (1999) and Cancun (2003) collapses shaped India’s negotiating posture at subsequent Ministerials, particularly on agriculture and S&DT provisions.

Russia’s share of India’s arms imports has declined from approximately 70% (2009-13) to approximately 36% (2019-23), per SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) data, a deliberate diversification. India continues procuring Russian systems for legacy platform maintenance (MiG-29, Su-30MKI, T-90 Bhishma, S-400, Tunguska) while investing in Western platforms (Rafale, P8I, Apache) and indigenous systems (Tejas Mk1A, Akash Mk2, Arjun Mk2).

CAATSA sanctions are NOT automatic, they require a presidential determination (formal finding by the US President that a sanctionable transaction occurred) and can be waived entirely based on national security interests. The US granted India a Presidential waiver for the S-400 deal under CAATSA Section 231, citing the strategic importance of the India-US relationship.

The Tunguska contract (Rs 445 crore, 2026) is a smaller spare-parts/ammunition procurement, below the threshold likely to trigger a formal sanctions review. India’s diversification to French (Rafale), American (P8I, Apache, CH-47F Chinook), and Israeli (Barak-8) platforms reflects a long-term strategy to reduce CAATSA exposure.

Key India-Japan economic cooperation projects under the strategic partnership: Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC) (the largest India-Japan bilateral project, integrating industrial townships along a 1,483 km rail corridor), Mumbai-Ahmedabad High-Speed Rail (508 km Shinkansen-inspired project, funded by JICA yen loans at 0.1% interest over 50 years), and Metro systems in Mumbai, Bengaluru, and Chennai. Japan is India’s largest bilateral ODA donor (~$3 billion/year from JICA, making Japan India’s biggest bilateral infrastructure financier).

India-Japan 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue (Foreign Minister + Defence Minister format) was launched in 2019. Both are Quad members (India, Japan, US, Australia), first leaders’ summit was held in March 2021.

India-Japan bilateral trade: ~$25.17 billion (FY 2024-25); Japan FDI cumulative: ~$39 billion (2000-2025); 1,450+ Japanese companies operating. The CEPA was negotiated under PM Manmohan Singh and PM Naoto Kan, signed in February 2011, entered into force August 1, 2011.

The Ranji Trophy is administered by the BCCI (Board of Control for Cricket in India), the world’s most powerful cricket board. Related domestic cricket tournaments: Duleep Trophy (inter-zonal, named after Duleepsinhji, Ranjitsinhji’s nephew, who also played for England) and the Irani Cup (Ranji Trophy champion vs Rest of India).

Ranjitsinhji played 15 Tests for England (1896-1902), scored 989 runs at 44.95 average, and famously pioneered the leg glance, a batting stroke. He served as the Maharaja Jam Saheb of Nawanagar, a princely state in the Saurashtra region of present-day Gujarat.

J&K Ranji team had to play home matches in neutral venues (typically Jammu, Chandigarh, or Mohali) due to the security environment in the Kashmir Valley, the maiden title in 2025-26 is therefore symbolically significant far beyond cricket. Auqib Nabi (Player of Tournament: 245 runs + 60 wickets) became a national sports figure from the region.

The Skill India ecosystem comprises three main pillars: PMKVY (Pradhan Mantri Kaushal Vikas Yojana, flagship demand-driven scheme, provides short-term training and RPL certification), NSDC (National Skill Development Corporation, PPP model, channels private investment into skill development), and Skill India International Centres (SIICs) (provide structured global employment pathways for semi-skilled and skilled workers). PMKVY 1.0 was launched in the same month (July 2015) as the Skill India Mission, but PMKVY is a specific scheme within the broader mission; confusing them is a common exam error.

The GATI Foundation (PMU at Kaushal Bhawan, New Delhi) focuses on the Global Skills Capital by 2047 goal and coordinates with foreign governments for recognition of Indian vocational qualifications. India’s employability rate: 56.35% (2026) up from 47% in 2019.

India commands 16% of global AI talent, a key differentiator in the global skills competition. India’s median age of ~28 years (2026) provides a 15-20 year window for demographic dividend realisation before the population starts ageing rapidly post-2040.

LiDAR (Light Detection and Ranging) emits laser pulses (typically infrared, 1064 nm wavelength) and measures the time-of-flight of the reflected signal to determine distance, velocity (via Doppler shift), and profile of the target medium. Applications across sectors: Topographic mapping (ISRO’s Cartosat), forestry canopy assessment (tree height, biomass), archaeological discovery (LIDAR revealed hidden Mayan cities under dense jungle), autonomous vehicles (360-degree point cloud mapping), flood modelling, urban planning, and offshore wind resource assessment.

LiDAR vs RADAR vs SONAR: LiDAR uses light/laser (high resolution, shorter range, weather-affected); RADAR uses radio waves (lower resolution, longer range, all-weather); SONAR uses sound waves (underwater detection). NASA’s ICESat-2 uses photon-counting LiDAR from orbit to measure ice sheet thickness changes to centimetre accuracy.

India’s indigenous floating LiDAR buoy reduces assessment costs by 30-40% compared to European imports, a critical cost reduction for triggering offshore wind commercial auctions in India’s exclusive economic zone.

The Havana Charter (1948) proposed the establishment of an International Trade Organization (ITO) as a full UN specialized agency, but the US Senate refused to ratify it, fearing loss of economic sovereignty. GATT (signed 1947, operative from 1948) became the provisional substitute and governed international trade for 47 years through eight negotiating rounds: Kennedy Round (1964-67, tariffs), Tokyo Round (1973-79, non-tariff barriers), Uruguay Round (1986-94, services/IP/agriculture).

The Uruguay Round’s three landmark agreements: GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services, first binding rules on international services trade), TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, minimum IP standards for all members), and AoA (Agreement on Agriculture, three pillars: market access, domestic support, export subsidies). GATT 1994 still exists as a legal instrument within the WTO framework, it is not the same as the original GATT 1947.

The Bretton Woods institutions (World Bank + IMF) are entirely separate from the WTO and deal with development finance and monetary stability respectively, not trade in goods and services.

Under GST’s three-tier structure: CGST (Central GST) goes to the Consolidated Fund of India, SGST (State GST) goes to the Consolidated Fund of the consuming state, and IGST (Integrated GST on inter-state supply) is credited to the Centre and apportioned between the Centre and the consuming state under Article 269A. The GST compensation cess (designed to protect states from revenue losses for 5 years post-GST) ended in June 2022.

Pre-GST, Central Sales Tax (CST) was origin-based, the producing state retained most revenue, benefiting manufacturing states like Gujarat, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, and Haryana. The shift to destination-based GST has fundamentally redistributed India’s indirect tax revenue map, BIMARU states and North-East states (which are net consumers) now collect more GST than their industrial contribution would have generated under the CST system.

The Mohit Minerals case (2022) reinforced this by holding that GST Council recommendations are persuasive but not binding on States, preserving their legislative autonomy.

India’s Offshore Wind Energy Policy was announced in 2015 by MNRE. Pilot projects of approximately 1 GW are planned off the Gujarat coast (Pipavav area) and Tamil Nadu coast.

India’s COP26 Glasgow commitments (NDC enhanced 2022): (1) 500 GW non-fossil capacity by 2030; (2) 50% electricity from non-fossil sources by 2030; (3) Reduce emissions intensity of GDP by 45% from 2005 levels by 2030; (4) Net zero by 2070. NIOT’s indigenous Floating LiDAR Buoy provides the bankable wind data needed to trigger commercial offshore wind auctions, previously, this data had to be collected using expensive imported systems.

NIWE (MNRE, Chennai) conducts wind resource mapping, turbine testing, and certification. Deep Ocean Mission (under MoES, NIOT) is a separate flagship programme announced in Union Budget 2021 with Rs 4,077 crore outlay, NIOT manages its technology development component.

Key Russian defence platforms currently in Indian service: Su-30MKI (IAF backbone, ~260 aircraft, over 50% of IAF fighter strength), MiG-29UPG (IAF) and MiG-29K (Indian Navy), T-90S Bhishma (Army, 1,000+, licence-manufactured by BEML/Heavy Vehicles Factory Avadi), S-400 Triumf (IAF, 5 squadrons contracted, 3 delivered by 2024), INS Vikramaditya (Navy carrier, converted Soviet Kiev-class ship), and Tunguska 2K22 (Army SHORAD). BrahMos is a separate India-Russia joint venture (BrahMos Aerospace Pvt.

Ltd., DRDO + NPO Mashinostroyeniya) and is NOT routed through Rosoboronexport at all. Russia’s share of India’s arms imports: ~70% (2009-13) → ~36% (2019-23) per SIPRI.

The decline reflects active diversification to France (Rafale, 36 aircraft, 2016 deal), USA (P8I, Apache, CH-47F Chinook), and Israel (Barak-8, Heron UAVs), while indigenous systems (Tejas, Akash, Arjun) gradually replace Russian platforms in new procurement cycles.

The Mohit Minerals case (Supreme Court, 2022) is a landmark judgment on GST Council powers: the Court held that GST Council recommendations are not binding on Parliament or State legislatures, they are only persuasive. This means any State can deviate from GST Council recommendations through its own legislation, though it would risk the uniform GST regime.

GST Council composition: Union Finance Minister (Chairman) + Union MoS Finance + Finance Ministers of all States/UTs with legislatures (total ~35 members). Voting: three-fourths majority required, Centre’s vote has one-third weight, all States’ votes together have two-thirds weight; unanimity is sought in practice.

Key related Articles: 246A (concurrent power to levy GST), 269A (IGST apportioned between Centre and States), 279A (GST Council), 286 (restrictions on state power to tax inter-state supply). The Council’s decisions, when followed, represent the highest form of cooperative federalism India has achieved in the fiscal domain.

India-Japan partnership milestones: 2006, Strategic and Global Partnership (PM Manmohan Singh + PM Junichiro Koizumi); 2014, upgraded to Special Strategic and Global Partnership (PM Modi + PM Abe, during Abe’s visit to India for Republic Day); 2016, civil nuclear cooperation agreement signed (bilateral, not Quad-related, Japan was the last of the major NSG countries to sign a nuclear deal with India); 2018, BSA upgraded from $50B to $75B (PM Modi visit to Tokyo); 2019, 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue launched (Foreign Minister + Defence Minister format, annual meetings); 2021, Quad leaders’ summit (first, virtual, March 12, 2021). The Quad (India, Japan, US, Australia) is an informal grouping with no treaty, no formal charter, no permanent secretariat, and no collective defence clause, unlike NATO (which has Article 5 mutual defence obligation).

Japan’s ODA to India: ~$3 billion/year through JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency), making Japan India’s largest bilateral infrastructure financier for over two decades.